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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirteen years ago the Nebraska Post Conviction Act was en-
acted' in response to the inadequacies of the available collateral
remedies for raising violations of certain constitutional guaran-
tees. 2 During the ensuing years, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. BA. 1968, Michigan
State University; J.D. 1971, University of Michigan.
1. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to 3004 (Reissue 1975). The Post Conviction Act
was passed by the Nebraska Legislature on April 9, 1965, and signed into law
by the Governor on April 12, 1965.
2. Prior to the passage of the Post Conviction Act, the only collateral remedies
available in Nebraska were the writ of error coram nobis, the writ of habeas
corpus, and the motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. While it is apparently possible to raise certain limited constitu-
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failed to develop any cohesive system for treating claims under the
statute. Instead, cases interpreting the Act are frequently confus-
ing, sometimes inconsistent, occasionally neglectful of precedent
and often offer no explanation for the result reached. Nonetheless,
a unifying thread can be traced through the opinions-a thread
that can be exposed and analyzed.
In essence, the Act provides a procedure for a prisoner sen-
tenced and incarcerated under the laws of Nebraska to assert a
claim of denial or infringement of his constitutional rights so as to
render the judgment of conviction void or voidable.3 A post convic-
tion proceeding is commenced by the filing of a motion in the court
which imposed the challenged sentence requesting that court to
tional claims under each of these remedies, see text accompanying notes 263-
77 infra, none is suitable for raising the broad range of claims cognizable
under the Post Conviction Act. As a result, for many prisoners there was no
adequate state remedy for raising constitutional claims regarding the validity
of their conviction and sentence. The federal courts thus entertained many
applications for writs of habeas corpus without first requiring petitioners to
exhaust state remedies. Noble v. Sigler, 244 F. Supp. 445 (D. Neb. 1964), afd,
351 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 853 (1966); Shupe v. Sigler,
230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964); Geaminea v. State, 206 F. Supp. 308 (D. Neb.),
appeal dismissed, 308 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1962). Stopping "the flood of federal
habeas corpus cases" by prisoners with no adequate state remedy was one of
the reasons for passage of the Post Conviction Act. Hearings on L.B. 836
Before the Judiciary Comm., 75th Neb. Legis., 1st Sess. (1965) (testimony of
Judge Herbert Ronin and Attorney General Clarence Meyer); Introducer's
Statement of Intent and Judiciary Comm. Statement on L.B. 836, 75th Neb.
Legis., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as Judiciary Comm. Statement].
An additional incentive for passage of the Post Conviction Act was the
pendency at the time of Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) (per curiam), in
the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari in Case to
"decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the States afford
state prisoners some adequate corrective process for the hearing and deter-
mination of claims of violation of federal constitutional guarantees," id. at
337, but the case was ultimately remanded to the Nebraska Supreme Court in
light of the intervening passage of the Post Conviction Act. In the prior Ne-
braska Supreme Court opinion, that court held that a claim of denial of coun-
sel, although a constitutional violation, was not cognizable under a state writ
of habeas corpus: 'The Legislature has not seen fit by amendment to enlarge
the powers of the courts of this state with respect to such writs. Neither
should this court do so by judicial legislation. Post conviction procedure is
properly one for the Legislature to consider." Case v. State, 177 Neb. 404, 414,
129 N.W.2d 107, 113 (1964). The pendency of Case v. Nebraska, as well as the
quoted language of the state opinion, served as further impetus for passage of
the Act. Hearings on L.B. 836 Before the Judiciary Comm., 75th Neb. Legis.,
1st Sess. (1965) (testimony of Judge Herbert Ronin and Attorney General
Clarence Meyer).
3. Only the violation or infringement of constitutional rights is cognizable undelr
the Act. State v. DeLoa, 194 Neb. 270,231 N.W.2d 357 (1975); State v. Williams,
189 Neb. 127, 128, 201 N.W.2d 241, 242 (1972); State v. Whited, 187 Neb. 592, 593,
193 N.W.2d 268, 269 (1971); State v. Bullard, 187 Neb. 334, 335, 190 N.W.2d 628,
629 (1971).
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vacate or set aside the conviction and sentence or, where appropri-
ate, the sentence alone. Once the motion to vacate has been filed,
the sentencing court reviews the motion in conjunction with the
files and records of the case to determine whether it presents a
justiciable issue. If the files and records show "to the satisfaction
of the court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief," the motion
may be summarily denied.4 Otherwise, the court must grant the
prisoner a prompt hearing on his claim.5
The Post Conviction Act is modeled substantially after 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255,6 the statutory procedure whereby federal prisoners may
raise in a post conviction proceeding claims that a sentence was
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975).
5. Id. Although the proceedings are civil in nature, the practice of the Nebraska
courts, to the extent ascertainable, is to treat the motion as a continuation of
the original criminal proceeding which resulted in the challenged sentence
rather than as a new or independent action (conversations of the author with
the Clerks of the Douglas and Lancaster County District Courts). In the mo-
tion to vacate, the designation of parties as well as the file number remains
the same as in the original criminal proceeding. Treating the motion as a
continuation of the original action conforms to the recommendations of the
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
POST CONVICTION REMEDIES § 1.2 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as
STANDARDS]. As a practical matter, however, the decision to treat the motion
as a new action or as a continuation of the prior proceeding has little procedu-
ral significance except insofar as it affects the internal management practices
of the clerks of the various courts.
The practice of the Nebraska district courts, at least in Douglas and Lan-
caster Counties, is whenever possible to assign the hearing on the motion to
vacate to the judge who presided over the original criminal proceeding. The
practice is commendable to the extent that it permits the judge to bring to the
proceedings his or her own familiarity with the case and an independent rec-
ollection of the facts. United States v. Delsanter, 433 F.2d 972, 973-74 (2d Cir.
1970); Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Mirra v.
United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967);
Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1949). See Rules Gov-
erning Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2255, Adv. Comm. Note to
R. 4 (West Supp. 1978); Kelly, Objectivity and Habeas Corpus: Should Federal
District Court Judges Be Permitted to Rule Upon the Validity of Their Own
Criminal Trial Conduct, 10 J.L. REF. 44 (1976); Developments in the Law--
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038, 1206-08 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Developments]. The practice also presents the danger that a judge
will find it difficult to be fair and objective in ruling upon the presence of
errors that may be of his or her own making. Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412
(8th Cir. 1970); Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 274 (1st Cir. 1967);
STANDARDS, supra, at § 1.4(c) & Commentary. This, however, is the same
danger that exists when a judge rules on a motion for a new trial, NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 29-2101 to -2103 (Reissue 1975), and there is no reason to find the
practice any less acceptable in a post-conviction setting than in the original
criminal proceeding.
6. (1976). Report of Judicial Council Sub-Comm., Hearings on L.B. 836 Before
the Judiciary Comm., 75th Neb. Legis., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). See Dabney v.
Sigler, 345 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1965); State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707, 711, 144
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imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence
given, or the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.7 Although there
are differences between the Act and section 2255,8 cases interpret-
ing the latter are of significant precedential value in construing the
provisions of the former.9
N.W.2d 525, 527 (1966); State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 696, 698-99, 144 N.W.2d 435,
436 (1966); State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 677, 144 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1966).
7. Prior to 1948, federal prisoners applied for the writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241 to 2254 (1976), in the federal judicial district of their confinement. The
result was an overburdening of those federal courts with federal prisons lo-
cated within their district. The problem was solved by the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), which gives federal prisoners a new remedy in lieu of,
but in all respects substantially equivalent to, habeas corpus. United States
v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). Relief under section 2255 is sought in the
court from which the prisoner was sentenced, thus creating a more equitable
distribution of cases among the districts. Habeas corpus continues to remain
available to state prisoners, but may be used by federal prisoners only if the
remedy provided by section 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective."
8. The primary difference between the two remedies is that section 2255 incor-
porates as bases for relief grounds that are available in a state habeas pro-
ceeding but theoretically are not available under the Post Conviction Act.
These include the claims that a court was without jurisdiction to impose the
sentence given and that a sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law. But see text accompanying notes 273-77 infra. Further, a
claim that a sentence was imposed in violation of the laws of the United
States is cognizable under section 2255, see Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333 (1974), while only constitutional claims may be raised under the Post
Conviction Act. See note 3 supra.
9. See State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707, 711, 144 N.W.2d 525, 527 (1966); State v.
Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 677, 144 N W.2d 406, 410 (1966) ("We think some of the
decisions of the federal courts with respect to section 2255 are applicable to
our own statute."). The general rule in Nebraska concerning the precedential
value of another jurisdiction's similar enactment has been stated in Todd v.
County of Box Butte, 169 Neb. 311, 99 N.W.2d 245 (1959):
The general rule to which the appellees resort is one well estab-
lished in this state. It is stated. . . as follows: "Where the legislature
adopts the statute of another state, it likewise adopts the judicial
construction which it had already received by the highest court in
such state."
... In State v. Boatman .... we said: "We quite agree that in
construing a statute borrowed from a foreign state there is a pre-
sumption that the legislature adopted it with approval of all interpre-
tations given it by the court of last resort of that state."
" * * when a statute has been adopted from another state, ordina-
rily the construction given prior to its adoption by the courts of that
state will be followed in the adopting state, in the absence of any
indication of a contrary intention on the part of the Legislature. The
rule is subject to the qualification, however, that a construction of
such a statute by the state from which it was adopted is entitled to no
greater consideration than previous decisions of this court, and will
be rejected for reasons which would require the overruling thereof
had it been first adopted in this state.". ..
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This article will develop a taxonomy of the different actions the
sentencing court may take in response to the filing of a motion to
vacate and evaluate those responses against a standard of provid-
ing a post conviction procedure that allows for the presentation
and consideration of all meritorious constitutional claims a pris-
oner may have, but which at the same time will result in the swift
and expeditious denial of frivolous or meritless claims.10 More
particularly, sections II through IV will discuss the various bases
upon which the trial courts are permitted to rely in summarily de-
nying relief to petitioners without according to them the benefits of
an evidentiary hearing. Section V will deal with the circumstances
under which the granting of a hearing will be required. Finally,
throughout the article, suggestions will be made for improvements
in the administration of the Act so as to better conform its opera-
tion to the purpose of the Act to be "fair to the person in custody
and to the State of Nebraska."'"
II. DISPOSITION ON THE BASIS
OF THE MOTION TO VACATE
The function of a pleading system is to aid in the enforcement
of substantive legal relations.12 In doing so, however, the system
must accommodate two competing and potentially conflicting in-
terests.' 3 On the one hand, the system should assist in framing the
issues on which the cause will be tried and in giving notice to the
adverse party and the court as to what claims the adverse party
will be called upon to meet.14 Groundless claims, in particular, are
The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive summary of our
decisions.
Id. at 315-16, 99 N.W.2d, at 249 (quoting State v. Boatman, 142 Neb. 589, 591, 7
N.W.2d 159, 160-61 (1942); Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v. Hall
County, 152 Neb. 410,428,41 N.W.2d 397,409 (1950) (asteriks in original)). But
see State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 696, 699, 144 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1966) ("It is our
conclusion that it was not the intent of the Nebraska Legislature to equate
our Post Conviction Act literally with section 2255 of the federal act .. ").
10. For a similar analysis of section 2255, see Note, Processing a Motion Attacking
Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 788
(1963).
11. Judiciary Comm. Statement, supra note 2.
12. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 11, at 54 (2d ed. 1947).
See generally F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, Crvni PROCEDURE § 1.1 (2d ed. 1977).
13. This is a simplification of a complex problem. Pleadings serve several func-
tions, some competing and some complementary, but it is not unfair to use
the two-interest analysis in the present context. See C. CLARK, supra note 12,
at § 11; F. JAmEs & G. HAzARD, supra note 12, at § 2.1 to .2.
14. B.C. Christopher & Co. v. Danker, 196 Neb. 518, 522, 244 N.W.2d 79, 81 (1976);
Johnson v. Ruhl, 162 Neb. 330, 335, 75 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1956); C. CLARK, supra
note 12, at § 11; F. JAmsS & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, at § 2.1 to .2. See State v.
Fitzgerald, 182 Neb. 823, 824, 157 N.W.2d 415, 416 (1968).
1979]
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a burden on the judicial machinery and are inherently unfair to
adversaries who must expend valuable resources in meeting and
resisting them. An optimal pleading system, through its notice
function, ideally should result in the early exposure and dismissal
of such claims.15 On the other hand, the system should not serve
as a trap for the unwary or inexperienced by imposing require-
ments too technical or formal and thereby frustrating the ends of
justice.1 6
Within a post conviction pleading system, the tension between
the two competing interests becomes heightened. For several rea-
sons, prisoners are the source of numerous frivolous petitions for
collateral relief.17 Balanced against this consideration, however, is
the fact that a prisoner with a valid claim concerning the constitu-
tional validity of his conviction will frequently find it a formidable
task to bring his claim correctly to the attention of a court.18 The
difficulty is in constructing a pleading system that will result in the
exclusion of frivolous claims without at the same time excluding
petitions raising valid but inartfully worded claims. The accommo-
15. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, § 2.13, at 95 ("The pleader's possible
desire to keep the nuisance value of his claim by concealing its weaknesses is
positively antisocial and should be thwarted if there is any procedural way to
do that without incurring equal or greater disadvantages."). See also, e.g.,
Gift Stars, Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F. Supp. 697, 701-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (The ex-
peditious determination of whether a claim is frivolous is desirable).
16. C. CLARc, supra note 12, at § 11.
17. The factors contributing to the high incidence among prisoners of frivolous
petitions for collateral relief are severalfold. First, the magnitude of the re-
ward for a successful collateral challenge, i.e., release from imprisonment, is
a strong incentive for seeking relief when coupled with the ready availability
of "jailhouse lawyers," the ease of obtaining a waiver of filing fees and other
court costs, and the relatively sparse competing demands on the prisoner's
time. Second, many prisoners, after an initial period of remorse for their
criminal conduct, begin to feel they have failed to receive their due from the
criminal justice system. Third, a trip to the sentencing court to participate in
an evidentiary hearing is seen as a vacation from prison life. Lastly, some
prisoners view litigation as a vehicle for obstructing the "system." See
generally Churder v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 207, 209 (E.D. Mo. 1968);
STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 3.1, at 50. The possibility of frivolous petitions
under the Post Conviction Act was recognized quite early by the Nebraska
Supreme Court. State v. Cingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 349, 142 N.W.2d 765, 769
(1966) ("It is apparent to everyone that... [the Act] affords a prisoner an
opportunity to file a frivolous or false claim for relief.").
18. Prisoners are frequently unrepresented by counsel, are many times poorly
educated and are usually unable to independently investigate the merits of
their claims. See Case v. State, 177 Neb. 774, 775, 131 N.W.2d 191, 191-92 (1964)
("It may be stated that the petition and the argument of the plaintiff is itself
vague and difficult to follow, probably because he is not a lawyer."); STAND-
ARms, supra note 5, § 3.1, at 50-52; Developments, supra note 5, at 1174-75. But
cf. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1977) (pro se prisoners are capable
of using law books to fie cases raising serious and legitimate claims).
[Vol. 58:355
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dation struck between these interests determines what form or
system of pleading will be required.19 The Nebraska system of
civil pleading is balanced more toward accommodating the exclu-
sion of frivolous claims,20 an accommodation that is reflected in the
fact pleading standard of the Post Conviction Act.
A prisoner requesting relief under the Post Conviction Act is
required in the initial pleading-the motion to vacate-to allege
facts which if proved would constitute an infringement of his con-
stitutional rights.2 1 The allegations of the motion need not be
presented in any technical form nor must the grammar be any
more than substantially understandable,2 2 but the pleading of
mere conclusions of fact or of law is insufficient. 23 Irrespective of
the title given the motion or the relief prayed for, if the motion
properly invokes the provisions of the Post Conviction Act, it is
treated as a motion to vacate.24 The motion must be verified,25 but
19. C. CLARK, supra note 12, at § 11.
20. Nebraska is a code pleading jurisdiction. Code pleading places its greatest
emphasis on the pleading of facts with such specificity as to provide fair no-
tice of the pleader's cause. See C. CLARK, supra note 12, at § 38.
21. State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 475, 259 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1977); State v. Turner,
194 Neb. 252,257,231 N.W.2d 345,349 (1975); State v. Russ, 193 Neb. 308, 310,226
N.W.2d 775, 777 (1975); State v. Spidell, 192 Neb. 42, 43, 218 N.W.2d 431, 432
(1974); State v. Johnson, 189 Neb. 824, 824, 205 N.W.2d 548, 549 (1973); State v.
Riley, 183 Neb. 616, 617, 163 N.W.2d 104, 105 (1968); State v. Dabney, 183 Neb.
316, 317, 160 N.W.2d 163, 164 (1968); State v. Fitzgerald, 182 Neb. 823, 824, 157
N.W.2d 415, 415 (1968); State v. Warner, 181 Neb. 538, 541, 149 N.W.2d 438, 440
(1967); State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 350, 142 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1966).
22. Harris v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 483, 484, 176 N.W.2d 733, 734 (1970). See State v.
Russ, 193 Neb. 308, 310,226 N.W.2d 775, 777 (1975). The same rule is applicable
to civil code pleading in general. Svoboda v. De Wald, 159 Neb. 594, 598, 68
N.W.2d 178, 182 (1955); Benson v. Walker, 157 Neb. 436, 446, 59 N.W.2d 739, 744
(1953):
Under the code system of pleading, it is not necessary to state a
cause of action or defense in any particular form. The facts are to be
stated. ... All that the law requires is that there shall be a cause of
action or defense. It looks at the real rights of the parties and aims at
the protection and enforcement of such rights.
23. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 257, 231 N.W.2d 345, 349 (1975); State v. Russ, 193
Neb. 308, 310,226 N.W.2d 775, 777 (1975); State v. Johnson, 189 Neb. 824, 825,205
N.W.2d 548, 549 (1973); State v. Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 330, 190 N.W.2d 781, 783
(1971); State v. Fitzgerald, 182 Neb. 823,824,157 N.W.2d 415, 415 (1968); State v.
Erving, 180 Neb. 680, 684-85, 144 N.W.2d 424, 428 (1966); State v. Losieau, 180
Neb. 671, 675, 144 N.W.2d 406,409 (1966); State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344,350,
142 N.W.2d 765, 769 (1966). Conclusions of fact and of law also are insufficient
in the pleading of civil actions under code pleading. Timmerman v. Hertz, 195
Neb. 237, 244-45, 238 N.W.2d 220, 225 (1976); Ripp v. Riesland, 176 Neb. 233, 237,
125 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1964); C. CLARK, .upra note 12, § 38, at 225.
24. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 256, 231 N.W.2d 345, 348-49 (1975); Harris v.
Sigler, 185 Neb. 483, 484, 176 N.W.2d 733, 734 (1970); State v. Woods, 180 Neb.
282, 283, 142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966). Similarly, under the rules of code plead-
ing the character of a pleading is determined by its content. Walkenhorst v.
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a failure to do so is apparently not a jurisdictional defect nor does
it require dismissal.26
The fact pleading standard for motions to vacate is derived from
the Act itself which requires the motion to state "the grounds re-
lied upon" and from the Act's designation of post conviction pro-
ceedings as civil in nature.27 Nebraska as a code pleading state
requires fact pleading in civil actions.2 8 Although phrased differ-
ently, the pleading standard for proceedings under the Act-that
the motion to vacate allege facts which if proved would constitute
an infringement of the petitioner's constitutional rights-is no dif-
ferent in its requirements or effect than the pleading standard for
civil actions in general which requires that the petition contain "a
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action. '29
Apolius, 172 Neb. 830, 836, 112 N.W.2d 31, 35 (1961) ("What a pleading may be
denominated in the caption is not necessarily controlling."); Standard Reli-
ance Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal, 171 Neb. 490, 497, 106 N.W.2d 704, 709 (1960)
"( [W] here the facts state a cause of action.., the court will grant the proper
relief, although it may not conform to the relief prayed for.")
25. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975).
26. Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1967). Nearly all jurisdictions require
verification of applications for post conviction relief as a deterrence to false
allegations, STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 3.3, at 54, and retention of the require-
ment has been urged for this reason. Id. at § 3.4; UNIFORM POST-CoNVCTION
PROCEDURE ACT, Commissioners' Comment to § 3. See also MacMillan, Trial
Court and Prison Perspectives on the Collateral Post Conviction Relief Proc-
ess in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 503, 509-13 (1969); Evans v. State, 242 Ark. 92,
96, 411 S.W.2d 860, 862-63 (1967). The requirement was kept in the Post Con-
viction Act "in the interest of good pleading and because the Federal Rule
[§ 22551 requires such motions to be verified." Report of Judicial Council
Subcomm., supra note 6, at 3. Whether verification does serve as a deter-
rence to false allegations is problematical in view of the few reported prose-
cutions for perjury arising out of post conviction proceedings. STANDARDs,
supra note 5, § 3.3, at 54.
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975).
28. In re Estate of Wise, 144 Neb. 273, 281, 13 N.W.2d 146, 151 (1944).
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-804 (Reissue 1975). See, e.g., State v. Warner, 181 Neb.
538, 149 N.W.2d 438 (1967) (allegation that prisoner had only a tenth-grade
education and could not and did not intelligently waive his right to counsel
fails to allege facts constituting an infringement of prisoner's constitutional
rights); State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 144 N.W.2d 406 (1966) (prisoner's alle-
gations that he was induced by abuse, threats, and false promises to make
incriminating statements are conclusions only); State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb.
344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966) (allegation that convictions were obtained in viola-
tion of defendant's constitutional rights is a mere conclusion).
Several cases suggest that a higher standard of pleading may be imposed
in post conviction proceedings than in ordinary civil actions. Compare State
v. Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 330, 190 N.W.2d 781, 783 (1971) ("[B]ald assertions of
insanity, unsubstantiated by a recital of credible facts and unsupported by
the record, are wholly insufficient ... .") (post conviction) with Wirth v.
Weigand, 85 Neb. 115, 122 N.W. 714 (1909) (allegation that plaintiff is insane
and confined in hospital for the insane is good against demurrer) (civil).
[Vol. 58:355
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The first category of cases approving the summary denial of a
motion to vacate without an evidentiary hearing contains those
cases in which the allegations of the motion are found to be inade-
quate. The denial of a motion to vacate on the basis of the insuffi-
ciency of the allegations therein serves as the procedural
equivalent of the general demurrer under code pleading, i.e., a de-
murrer objecting only that the petition does not state facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action.30 The courts do not in practice
confine themselves solely to considering the pleadings as they
would in ruling on a demurrer in an ordinary civil action,3 1 but in-
stead usually review the pleadings in conjunction with the files
and records of the original criminal proceeding toward which the
motion is directed. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes it is use-
ful to differentiate those cases in which the denial of post convic-
tion relief was based on the inherent insufficiency of the pleadings
from those in which the pleadings were inadequate when consid-
ered in conjunction with the files and records, or because of the
existence of a procedural bar to the motion.
A. Claims Not Cognizable Under the Post Conviction Act
Relief under the Post Conviction Act is limited to cases in
which there was a denial or infringement of the rights of the pris-
oner sufficient to render the judgment of conviction or sentence
void or voidable under the Constitution of Nebraska or of the
United States. 32 Despite the narrow confines of the issues cogniza-
ble under the Act, numerous prisoners have attempted to raise
other than constitutional issues in their motions to vacate, thereby
causing the summary denial of the motions.
33
Compare State v. Fitzgerald, 182 Neb. 823, 157 N.W.2d 415 (1968) (allegation of
denial of constitutional right to appeal is a legal conclusion only and is akin to
allegation of general negligence in a tort action) (post conviction) with Baker
v. Daly, 190 Neb. 618,211 N.W.2d 123 (1973) (general allegation of negligence is
sufficient unless attacked by motion) (civil).
30. Johnson v. Ruhl, 162 Neb. 330, 335, 75 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1956) (petition failing to
plead actionable facts is vulnerable to general demurrer); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-806 to -807 (Reissue 1975).
31. Koehn v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 152 Neb. 254, 259-60, 40 N.W.2d 874, 877 (1950)
(demurrer can only consider facts pleaded and cannot consider facts extrin-
sic to the pleading); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-806 (Reissue 1975) ('The defendant
may demur to the petition only when it appears on its face. . .
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975).
33. State v. Miles, 202 Neb. 126, 274 N.W.2d 153 (1979) (prisoner permitted to
plead guilty one day after arrest, and waiver in county court); State v. Walker,
197 Neb. 381, 248 N.W.2d 784 (1977) (subsequent statutory change in penalty
should result in vacation of sentence); State v. Niemann, 195 Neb. 675, 240
N.W.2d 38 (1976) (sentence imposed was illegal); State v. DeLoa, 194 Neb. 270,
231 N.W.2d 357 (1975) (minimum sentence exceeded one-third of maximum
sentence in violation of NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,105(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974));
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A number of the motions to vacate which raised issues not cog-
nizable in a proceeding under the Post Conviction Act were
brought by prisoners appearing pro se.34 By raising issues such as
the excessiveness of a sentence, the correctness of evidentiary rul-
ings made during the original trial or error in instructions to the
jury, these motions, whether brought pro se or by counsel, reflect a
basic lack of understanding of the nature and operation of the Act
itself.35 As stated in State v. Clingerman:36
A motion to set aside a judgment of conviction on [sic] a sentence cannot
serve the purpose of an appeal to secure a review of the conviction. Our
appellate review procedures are adequate and must be used if an appeal is
desired. We interpret... [the Post Conviction Act] to be intended to pro-
vide relief in those cases where a miscarriage of justice may have oc-
curred, and not to be a procedure to secure a routine review for any
defendant dissatisfied with his sentence. To hold otherwise will be to per-
mit defendants to misuse and abuse a remedy intended to provide relief
State v. Miles, 194 Neb. 128, 230 N.W.2d 227 (1975) (same as DeLoa); State v.
Taylor, 193 Neb. 388, 227 N.W.2d 26 (1975) (excessiveness of sentence and in-
complete presentence report); State v. Jonsson, 192 Neb. 730, 224 N.W.2d 181
(1974) (subsequent statutory change in penalty should result in modification
of sentence); State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 573 (1974) (lack
of presentence report); State v. Wade, 192 Neb. 159, 219 N.W.2d 233 (1974)
(minimum sentence exceeded one-third of maximum sentence); State v.
Spidell, 192 Neb. 42, 218 N.W.2d 431 (1974) (excessiveness of sentence); State
v. Moss, 191 Neb. 36, 214 N.W.2d 15 (1973) (sufficiency of the evidence, instruc-
tions to the jury, and the failure to limit impeachment by use of prior felony
conviction); State v. Fincher, 189 Neb. 746, 204 N.W.2d 927 (1973) (instructions
to the jury and failure of proof); State v. Kellogg, 189 Neb. 692, 204 N.W.2d 567
(1973) (excessiveness of sentence); State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 201
N.W.2d 241 (1972) (excessiveness of sentence); State v. Birdwell, 188 Neb. 116,
195 N.W.2d 502 (1972) (failure to allow examination of presentence report);
State v. Whited, 187 Neb. 592, 193 N.W.2d 268 (1971) (police failure to immedi-
ately check a purported alibi and the court's admission of leading questions
and hearsay evidence); State v. Bullard, 187 Neb. 334, 190 N.W.2d 628 (1971)
(claim that consecutive sentences should be concurrent); State v. Carreau,
182 Neb. 295, 154 N.W.2d 215 (1967) (excessiveness of sentence); State v. Er-
ving, 180 Neb. 680, 144 N.W.2d 424 (1966) (credibility of witnesses and weight
of testimony); State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966)
(court's admission of hearsay and other incompetent evidence).
In several additional cases raising nonconstitutional claims, it is not clear
whether a hearing was held before the denial of the motion to vacate or, if a
hearing was held, whether it was an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., State v.
Warner, 192 Neb. 438, 222 N.W.2d 292 (1974) (subsequent statutory change in
penalty should result in modification of sentence). The pleading of a
noncognizable claim is also grounds for the summary denial of relief in a sec-
tion 2255 proceeding. Paroutian v. United States, 395 F.2d 673, 675 (2nd Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1058 (1969).
34. E.g., State v. Miles, 194 Neb. 128, 230 N.W.2d 227 (1975); State v. Wade, 192
Neb. 159, 219 N.W.2d 233 (1974).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. 180 Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966).
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for those exceptional cases where the rights of a defendant have been ig-
nored or abused.
3 7
The summary denial of these motions represents a correct and
efficient use of judicial resources. It would be totally unproductive
to allow the motion to proceed to an evidentiary hearing or to per-
mit amendment in an effort to correct its deficiencies. The prob-
lem here is not in the inadequacy of the allegations, but in the
raising of issues not cognizable under the Post Conviction Act. No
amount of amendment nor greater skill in pleading will be able to
correct the basic deficiency of an incorrect conception of the scope
of the Act.
B. Allegations Which Are Conclusions of Fact or of Law
The second basis upon which the courts summarily deny mo-
tions to vacate because of pleading inadequacies is that the allega-
tions necessary to make out a constitutional violation are in the
form of conclusions of law or of fact. A motion to vacate is required
to set forth allegations of fact which if proved would constitute a
violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights; conclusory allega-
tions do not accomplish this task.3
The strict enforcement of a fact pleading standard when ap-
plied to motions to vacate drafted by prisoners without the assist-
ance of counsel results in the frequent denial of their claims on
procedural grounds without any consideration of the merits of
their contentions. Most prisoners simply do not have the knowl-
edge, education, or grasp of legal technicalities necessary to the
understanding and application of a pleading standard that has con-
founded numerous lawyers through the years. Without this under-
standing, prisoners will be severely hampered in expressing their
claims, irrespective of the merits, in a way that will survive review
under a fact pleading standard.
The potential injustice of a fact pleading standard is multiplied
when it is applied in conjunction with the Nebraska rule prohibit-
ing successive motions for post conviction relief. A prisoner who
brings a motion to vacate seeking vindication of a constitutional
right runs the risk of not only being denied relief on the claim be-
cause of inartful pleading, but also from ever receiving considera-
tion of the merits of the claim or of any other claim because of the
prohibition of successive motions to vacate.3 9 Despite its oft-re-
peated insistence that motions to vacate contain allegations of fact,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has apparently implicitly recognized
37. Id. at 350-51, 142 N.W.2d at 769-70.
38. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
39. See Jenner, The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 F.RD. 347, 360 (1950);
§ IV-A of text infra.
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that strict enforcement of such a standard when applied to prison-
ers proceeding pro se will result in the denial of many motions on
procedural grounds. Consequently, the court has on occasion act-
ed in a flexible manner in considering such motions on appellate
review.
When reviewing a lower court's denial of post conviction relief
to a pro se prisoner, the supreme court has in several instances
looked beyond the conclusory or otherwise inadequate allegations
of the motion to vacate and proceeded to examine the fies and
records of the case to determine if they affirmatively showed any
constitutional violations related to the facts that were pleaded. In
other words, where the motion to vacate contains defective allega-
tions, the court will attempt to ascertain the nature of the pris-
oner's constitutional claim and then review the files and records of
the case in an attempt to find support for the claim.40
40. In State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252,231 N.W.2d 345 (1975), the prisoner alleged he
was denied the right to be present at a suppression hearing and claimed that
if he had been present, he could have provided sufficient evidence to justify
the evidence in question being suppressed. The latter allegation was held to
be a conclusion only. The Nebraska Supreme Court then proceeded to ex-
amine the files and records in regard to the one fact pleaded and found that
the prisoner had waived the right to be present at the suppression hearing
through the action of his counsel. A similar approach was followed by the
court in State v. Russ, 193 Neb. 308, 226 N.W.2d 775 (1975). In State v. Fincher,
189 Neb. 746, 204 N.W.2d 927 (1973), it is impossible to ascertain whether the
allegations of the motion to vacate were considered conclusory, but the court
nonetheless stated, "We have reviewed the whole record and find that the
record affirmatively shows there was no denial or infringement of the appel-
lant's rights ... ." Id. at 747, 204 N.W.2d at 927.
In several other cases the court reviewed the fies and records with regard
to conclusory allegations, but apparently more with the intent to refute the
claims presented than to see if there was any support for them in the record.
In State v. Warner, 181 Neb. 538, 149 N.W.2d 438 (1967), the petitioner alleged
that he had only a tenth-grade education and, therefore, could not and did not
intelligently waive his right to counsel. The court held that this was a con-
clusory allegation and thus justified the denial of relief; but after so holding,
the court proceeded to state that an examination of the record also showed
the waiver was freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. The same approach
was followed in State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 144 N.W.2d 406 (1966), to refute
conclusory allegations that a guilty plea was the result of abuse, threats and
false promises.
In a third group of cases, the court considered the contentions of the pris-
oners even though the claims were presented in conclusory form. Whether
the court reviewed the files and records in deciding to deny the claims is un-
clear. State v. Spidell, 192 Neb. 42,218 N.W.2d 431 (1974); State v. Dabney, 183
Neb. 316, 160 N.W.2d 163 (1968); State v. Erving, 180 Neb. 680, 144 N.W.2d 424
(1966). Nor is it clear from the opinions whether the claims were of such a
nature that a resort to the record would have provided any additional infor-
mation with which to judge their validity.
If the court did not review the files and records yet proceeded to consider
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State v. Russ, 41 the only case in which this approach was explic-
itly recognized and articulated, provides an illustration of the
court's practice. The prisoner filed a pro se motion to vacate alleg-
ing that Omaha police officers had entered into an illegal conspir-
acy to arrest him in violation of his civil rights, that the police had
forcibly entered the home of a third party, and that they had ar-
rested him without a warrant. On appeal, the supreme court found
the motion contained only two allegations of fact: the arrest was
made in the residence of a third party following forcible entry into
that residence, and the arrest was made without a warrant. The
court correctly concluded that the factual allegations of the mo-
tion, without more, did not state a constitutional violation, but
went on to say that "because the defendant appears pro se we ex-
amine the files and bill of exceptions to determine if they affirma-
tively show constitutional violations related to the two facts
pled."42 After reviewing the ifies and records, no support for any
constitutional violation was found.
The Russ approach has been followed in several other cases in
which the allegations of the motions to vacate were defective 43 and
even in instances in which the prisoners were represented by
the petitioners' claims despite their having been presented in conclusory
form, then these cases serve to illustrate a second approach the court has
used to mitigate the potential harshness of a fact pleading standard. The ap-
proach, that of considering a post conviction claim on its merits to the extent
the allegations permit even though the allegations are in conclusory form,
serves basically to convert the pleading standard into one of notice pleading.
A last group of cases reveals the court refusing to give any consideration
to prisoners' claims because of their conclusory nature. In these cases the
court strictly followed the fact pleading standard and refused to consider the
claims on their merits or to conduct anything more than a minimal review of
the record. State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 201 N.W.2d 241 (1972); State v.
Fitzgerald, 182 Neb. 823, 157 N.W.2d 415 (1968); State v. Fugate, 180 Neb. 701,
144 N.W.2d 412 (1966); State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765
(1966).
It should be evident that the court has been less than consistent in its
response to post conviction motions containing conclusory allegations other
than to give lip service recognition to the fact pleading standard. The brevity
of the court's opinions and their frequent lack of any clear line of legal rea-
soning prevent the development of any precise guides to the court's ap-
proach. The best that can be done is to give recognition to the different
approaches taken and to recognize that any conclusions drawn are open to a
certain amount of speculation.
The pleading of conclusions is also unacceptable in section 2255 proceed-
ings and justifies the summary denial of relief, Ward v. United States, 486 F.2d
305 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974), but a pro se prisoner is not
held to the same pleading standards as a prisoner with counsel. Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22 (1963).
41. 193 Neb. 308, 226 N.W.2d 775 (1975).
42. Id. at 311, 226 N.W.2d at 777.
43. See note 40 supra.
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counsel at the trial court level.44 This approach where applied has
served to mitigate the potential harshness of the fact pleading
standard applicable to post conviction proceedings, but even with
such a doctrine the potential for the denial of a meritorious claim
because of inartful pleading is still great for three reasons. First,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has never made the Russ approach
applicable to the trial courts in their review of pleadings.45 Thus, a
prisoner will only receive the benefit of the doctrine if the denial of
the motion to vacate is appealed to the higher court.46 Second, oc-
casionally the allegations are presented in such a conclusory form
or confused manner that the court will be at a loss to determine of
what constitutional defect the petitioner is complaining.4 7 Third,
the constitutional defect complained of may depend for proof on
facts outside the record and, therefore, the court's review of the
fies and records naturally will not reveal any facts in support of
the claim.48
It is difficult to ascertain from the reported opinions the bases
of the trial courts' responses to motions to vacate which contain
conclusory or otherwise inadequate allegations. It is apparently
quite different, however, than that followed in the ordinary civil
action. Under code practice, when a plaintiff's complaint is dis-
missed for failure to state a cause of action because a necessary
allegation has been pleaded in the form of a conclusion or because
of a failure to include a necessary allegation, the court will grant the
plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the
defect can be cured by amendment.49 Thus, the pleading of con-
clusions, when successfully challenged by a general demurrer,
does not bring the action to an end; instead, the plaintiff is gener-
ally permitted to replead in an attempt to set out a viable cause of
44. E.g., State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 144 N.W.2d 406 (1966).
45. It is impossible to ascertain from the reported cases whether the trial courts
are following the Russ approach of their own volition. If the approach were
applied with some consistency by the Nebraska Supreme Court, then it
would be expected that the lower courts would do the same in an effort to
prevent any possibility of reversal on appeal.
46. Not infrequently the denial of a motion to vacate is not appealed. See note
186 infra.
47. E.g., State v. Crooks, 189 Neb. 344, 202 N.W.2d 627 (1972) (difficult to under-
stand arguments contained in the prisoner's pro se brief); State v. Duncan,
182 Neb. 598, 599, 156 N.W.2d 165, 166 (1968) ('The defendant's motion, plead-
ings, and briefs, do not even indicate any facts whatever which could conceiv-
ably constitute any denial or infringement of his constitutional rights in any
respect.").
48. E.g. State v. Fitzgerald, 182 Neb. 823, 157 N.W.2d 415 (1968) (prisoner claimed
an unconstitutional denial of his right to appeal).
49. Cagle, Inc. v. Sammons, 198 Neb. 595, 603-04, 254 N.W.2d 398, 404 (1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-854 (Reissue 1975).
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action.50 Even though proceedings under the Post Conviction Act
are civil in nature, none of the reported opinions involving appeals
under the Act mentions an instance of a trial court granting leave
to a prisoner to amend a defective motion to vacate prior to deny-
ing relief.5 '
The Russ approach is presumably the result of a commendable
desire on the part of the Nebraska Supreme Court to mitigate the
potential for injustice that occurs in applying a fact pleading stan-
dard to pro se motions to vacate. But as a solution to the problem
it is incomplete. A better answer to the problem would involve in-
stituting several additional curatives.
The first and most obvious step is to make the Russ approach
applicable to the lower courts as well as to the Supreme Court.
Then, when the motion to vacate raises constitutional claims de-
pendent on facts contained in the files and records, application of
the Russ approach will quickly reveal whether there is any merit
to the claim. Where, however, the allegations are too conclusory to
permit ascertainment of the claim presented or where the claim
depends on proof outside the record, a solution other than applica-
tion of the Russ approach will be necessary. In those situations,
permitting the prisoner an opportunity to amend his motion to va-
cate in order to present the necessary facts, as would occur in any
other civil action, would assist in the preservation of meritorious
claims 52 without abandoning the beneficial aspects of fact plead-
ing. For any opportunity to amend to be meaningful for a pro se
prisoner, the order granting the right to amend would have to be
accompanied by an opinion of the trial court specifically detailing
those allegations deemed to be conclusory and explaining the need
for the pleading of facts. A last curative measure and, in fact, the
best and most comprehensive solution would be for all indigent
prisoners to receive appointed counsel who would then be able to
correct any pleading deficiencies. 53
50. Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 431, 191 N.W.2d 601, 604 (1971).
51. This is not to say that amendment of the motion to vacate is not permitted.
See note 280 infra. At the federal level, several courts have held that the
"better practice" in a section 2255 proceeding is to direct the prisoner to
amend conclusory pleadings rather than to summarily deny relief. Raiford v.
United States, 483 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1973); Smith v. United States, 454 F.2d
1330 (9th Cir. 1972).
52. In contrast to a dismissal based on a technical defect, a final dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a cause of action is resjudicata with respect to
any subsequent proceeding raising the same facts or question. Knapp v. City
of Omaha, 175 Neb. 576, 122 N.W.2d 513 (1963). The Nebraska rule prohibiting
successive motions for post conviction relief, see § TV-A of text infra,
achieves the same result in proceedings under the Post Conviction Act.
53. Recognition must be given to the fact that most criminal convictions were
obtained in a constitutionally permissible manner and that as a result, the
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C. Facts Alleged Fail to Show a Constitutional Violation
The last basis upon which the courts summarily deny motions
to vacate due to inadequacy of the pleadings is that the allegations,
although raising issues cognizable under the Post Conviction Act,
fail to show a violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights.54
This generally results from failure to include in the motion a fact
necessary to show the violation 55 or, more infrequently, failure to
plead the necessary facts in sufficient detail.56
An example of the Nebraska Supreme Court's response to a
vast majority of post conviction claims for relief are frivolous. Although there
are no comparable statistics for proceedings under the Nebraska Post Con-
viction Act, only 3% of federal habeas corpus petitions ever result in a trial
being held. ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIrE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTs, tbl. C-58, at A-31 (1977). Adoption of the pro-
posal to provide appointed counsel for all indigent post conviction petitioners
is not likely to change these facts. Except to the extent that appointed coun-
sel is able to dissuade a prisoner from pursuing a frivolous claim, the number
of meritless filings might well increase since a prisoner would now have an
additional incentive to file in the form of free legal representation. See Lay,
Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of
Prisoners Preserved, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 701, 736 (1972). Additionally, the ap-
pointment of counsel for all indigent petitioners will impose a substantial
financial burden on the State. See generally Lake, The Echo of Clarence
Gideon's Trumpet, 44 NEB. L. REV. 751 (1965). Nevertheless, appointment of
counsel will insure that all of a prisoner's meritorious constitutional claims
will receive consideration.
54. This basis is closely related to the code pleading requirement that all facts
essential to the plaintiff's cause of action be alleged in the complaint. Pinker-
ton v. Leonhardt, 184 Neb. 430, 168 N.W.2d 272 (1969); Ainsworth v. County of
Fillmore, 166 Neb. 779, 90 N.W.2d 360 (1958).
55. State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 474, 259 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1977) (ineffective
assistance of counsel because of a failure to challenge a search, but no allega-
tion of grounds on which the search could be challenged); State v.
Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 489, 222 N.W.2d 573, 577 (1974) (ineffective assist-
ance of counsel because of a failure to challenge a psychiatric report or to ask
for further testing, but no allegations of how the report was to be challenged
or of what would be achieved by further testing); State v. Johnson, 189 Neb.
824, 205 N.W.2d 548 (1973) (incompetence of counsel for failure to call certain
witnesses and suppression of evidence by prosecutor, but no allegations of
what witnesses were called, what they could have testified to, or what evi-
dence was suppressed); State v. Nelson, 189 Neb. 144, 146, 201 N.W.2d 248, 249
(1972) (exclusion of women from the jury panel, but nothing to suggest
prejudice from exclusion); State v. Myles, 187 Neb. 105, 107-08, 187 N.W.2d 584,
586 (1971) (denial of right to appeal, but no showing of meritorious grounds
for appeal); State v. Silvacarvalho, 180 Neb. 755, 757, 145 N.W.2d 447, 448-49
(1966) (illegal interrogation, but no allegation of any statements being used
against the defendant).
56. State v. Ronzzo, 181 Neb. 16, 17, 146 N.W.2d 576, 576 (1966) (illegal interroga-
tion, but the time and substance of the interrogation are speculative). Lack
of a necessary allegation and insufficient detail in the allegations are both
grounds for the summary denial of section 2255 relief. Grimes v. United
States, 396 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1968).
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failure to plead a necessary fact occurs in State v. Johnson57 in
which the motion to vacate alleged the suppression of evidence by
the prosecution and incompetence of counsel due to a failure of
the defendant's attorney to call certain purported witnesses. In a
short and terse opinion, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the
failure of the motion to specify what witnesses were not called,
what the witnesses could have testified to, or what evidence was
suppressed, justified the summary denial of relief.58
The potential for the denial of meritorious claims because of in-
artful pleading when the denial is for a failure to plead a necessary
allegation is the same as when the denial is for pleading conclu-
sions of fact or of law, but with one added consideration. There
can be some expectation that a prisoner having once been made
aware of the need to plead facts, will be able to grasp the distinc-
tion between facts and conclusions 5 9 But in many instances there
can be no similar expectation that a prisoner, having been told to
plead facts showing a constitutional violation, will be able to ascer-
tain what facts, among all the available facts concerning his convic-
tion and sentence, a court will consider necessary for that showing.
State v. Johnson60 again serves as an illustration. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska affirmed the lower court's denial of relief on the
grounds the prisoner had failed to plead what witnesses were not
called, what they could have testified to, or what evidence was sup-
pressed. For its authority, the court relied on a Sixth Circuit case
interpreting section 2255.61 Prior to the decision in Johnson, there
was nothing in Nebraska case law to indicate the need for prison-
ers claiming incompetence of counsel or suppression of evidence
to use these allegations, nor does the Post Conviction Act suggest
by its terms the necessity of so pleading.62 Even given the under-
standing on his part that he must plead facts making out a consti-
tutional violation, it would appear unreasonable to expect the
57. 189 Neb. 824, 205 N.W.2d 548 (1973).
58. Id. at 825, 205 N.W.2d at 548.
59. For example, the Model Form for Use in Applications for Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254, Appendix of Forms (West
1977), designed for use by prisoners proceeding pro se instructs the petitioner
to plead facts.
60. 189 Neb. 824, 205 N.W.2d 548 (1973).
61. Harris v. Thomas, 341 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1965).
62. The holding in Harris v. Thomas, 341 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1965), that the names
and potential testimony of the witnesses who were not called must be al-
leged, was derived from the rule that facts, not conclusions, must be pleaded.
341 F.2d at 561. Case law prior to Johnson did clearly state the need to plead
facts rather than conclusions, see note 21 supra, but for a pro se prisoner it is
a long leap from this general proposition to the specific requirement that the
names and proposed testimony be alleged.
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petitioner in Johnson63 to know that he should refer to cases inter-
preting section 2255 for guidance as to what should be pleaded
under the Post Conviction Act. Yet his failure to look to such cases
resulted in the dismissal of what might well have been a meritori-
ous claim.64
The Russ approach 65 is also applicable when the pleadings are
defective through lack of a necessary allegation,6 6 but the doctrine
is a safeguard against the dismissal of meritorious claims only
when the missing allegation relates to matters on the record.
Where the missing allegation concerns matters outside the rec-
ord,67 then, as with conclusory allegations, there is a need for
granting the prisoner leave to amend the motion to vacate to sup-
ply the necessary allegation if he is able to do so. Once again, any
opportunity to amend, to be meaningful, would have to be accom-
panied by an opinion of the trial court explaining in what respect
the motion to vacate is deficient. In this situation, where the defi-
ciency is the failure to allege a fact concerning events outside the
record, the sole function of the opinion may well be to instruct the
prisoner as to what allegations are necessary to obtain an eviden-
tiary hearing. In short, for those prisoners less than fully respect-
ful of the truth, the opinion would only be an invitation to perjury.
The best and most comprehensive solution would again be the ap-
pointment of counsel who could conduct an investigation of the
facts, ascertain what facts need to be pleaded to make out a consti-
tutional violation, and draft the motion to vacate accordingly.
63. Although represented by counsel on appeal, the petitioner in Johnson ap-
peared pro se in the trial court. Transcript, State v. Johnson, 189 Neb. 824, 205
N.W.2d 548 (1973).
64. The defendant's counsel in the original criminal trial was disbarred on July 5,
1972, for numerous instances of neglect of duty. State ex rel. Nebraska State
Bar Ass'n v. Sturek, Supreme Court of Nebraska Docket No. 38583 (1972).
65. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
66. In State v. Myles, 187 Neb. 105, 187 N.W.2d 584 (1971), the prisoner alleged he
was wrongfully denied his right of appeal, but did not allege any meritorious
grounds for appeal. The court denied relief after noting that the record did
not reveal any grounds. The petitioner in State v. Silvacarvalho, 180 Neb. 755,
145 N.W.2d 447 (1966), pleaded the denial of counsel and a failure to warn him
of his right to remain silent during a police interrogation, but did not allege
that any statements made were used against him. The court held that the
files and records in the case established that the petitioner was entitled to no
relief, presumably because a review of the record revealed that no statements
were introduced against him at trial. Both of the cited cases reveal the same
sort of review conducted in Russ, but without acknowledgment that this was
being done.
67. E.g., State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 259 N.W.2d 917 (1977) (ineffective assist-
ance of counsel because of failure to challenge a search, but no allegation of
grounds on which the search could be challenged); State v. Johnson, 189 Neb.
824, 205 N.W.2d 548 (1973).
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I. DISPOSITION ON THE BASIS OF THE
FILES AND RECORDS
Where the files and records of the case, when read in conjunc-
tion with the motion to vacate, show to the satisfaction of the trial
court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the motion may be
summarily denied without conducting an evidentiary hearing.6 8 In
determining what the fies and records show, the court, within its
discretion, may adopt whatever reasonable procedures are neces-
sary.69
What constitutes the "files and records of the case" has never
been explicitly defined, but the opinions of the Nebraska Supreme
Court do provide some guidance to the trial courts in determining
what they may consider in denying a motion to vacate. Certainly
the transcript and the bill of exceptions in the original criminal
68. State v. Miles, 202 Neb. 126, 129, 274 N.W.2d 153, 154-55 (1979); State v. Spidell,
192 Neb. 42, 44, 218 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (1975).
The Post Conviction Act differs from section 2255 in that the former requires
that the files and records "show to the satisfaction of the court that the pris-
oner is entitled to no relief" while the federal statute requires that the files
and records "conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."
(Emphasis added.) The drafters of the Act explained the difference in word-
ing by noting, "Our committee has eliminated the word 'conclusively' to per-
mit some judicial discretion in the court in eliminating frivolous petitions and
those which on the face appear to have no substantial merit." Report of Judi-
cial Council Sub-Comm., supra note 6, at 3. Although the difference in word-
ing would suggest a lesser standard than that of section 2255 is to be used in
reviewing motions to vacate under the Act, there is no indication in the cases
that any such difference exists in application. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 198 Neb.
376, 378, 252 N.W.2d 643, 644-45 (1977) ("In a post conviction proceeding, the
fies and records of the case must affirmatively establish that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief or an evidentiary hearing must be granted.").
When the trial court denies relief to a petitioner without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, the journal entry should affirmatively indicate that the
ifies and records of the case show that he was entitled to no relief. State v.
Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 119, 266 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1978). It has also been suggested
that in a section 2255 proceeding the court should also make findings of fact
when denying a motion without a hearing. Brown v. United States, 468 F.2d
897, 898 (5th Cir. 1972).
On all appeals under the Post Conviction Act from an order denying an
evidentiary hearing, the ifies and records of the case which the trial court
judge considered in ruling on the motion shall accompany the transcript of
appeal and the transcript shall contain a certificate from the judge identifying
the files and records which were considered. State v. Fugate, 180 Neb. 701,
703-04, 144 N.W.2d 412, 414 (1966).
69. State v. Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 118-19, 266 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1978); State v.
Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485,486,222 N.W.2d 573, 576 (1974); State v. Reyes, 192
Neb. 153, 154-55, 219 N.W.2d 238, 239-40 (1974); State v. Fowler, 182 Neb. 333,
334-35, 154 N.W.2d 766,768 (1967); State v. Snyder, 180 Neb. 787, 790, 146 N.W.2d
67, 69 (1966); State v. Silvacarvalho, 180 Neb. 755, 759, 145 N.W.2d 447, 449
(1966); State v. Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 284, 142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966).
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proceeding may be relied upon.70 It is equally certain that evi-
dence extrinsic to the original proceeding may not be reviewed.7 1
Between these opposite ends of the spectrum, the courts may take
into account two other types of information even though they are
difficult to reconcile with the terms of the statute.
The primary category of information which can be considered,
in addition to the files and records of the case, is that information
of which the court may properly take judicial notice. 72 The two sit-
uations in which courts most frequently take judicial notice as a
basis for denying relief without an evidentiary hearing are consid-
eration of the competence of counsel and of inconsistent state-
ments and materials in related proceedings. In the first instance,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has stated a trial court may take ju-
dicial notice of the competency and qualifications of the lawyers
that practice before it, and this knowledge may be used to deny a
motion to vacate based on a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.73 Similarly, a court may as a basis for denying relief take judi-
70. State v. Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 328-29, 190 N.W.2d 781, 782 (1971) ("A transcript
and bill of exceptions have been filed, certified to contain all evidence, both
oral and documentary. These constitute the Tiles and records of the case'").
The transcript contains the judgment, decree or final order sought to be re-
versed, vacated or modified, as well as all other filings made with the clerk of
the court, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1912 (Reissue 1975), including pleadings, pa-
pers and orders. Anania v. City of Omaha, 170 Neb. 160, 167, 102 N.W.2d 49, 53
(1960). The bill of exceptions contains all of the evidence in the proceeding,
both oral and documentary. Everts v. School Dist. No. 16, 175 Neb. 310, 315-16,
121 N.W.2d 487, 490 (1963). Federal cases interpreting the similar language of
section 2255 indicate that any filings with the clerk of the court made up to
the time of filing of the motion to vacate may be considered part of the files
and records. Houston v. United States, 419 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1969) (affidavits
filed on direct appeal in opposition to petitioner's affidavits are technically a
part of the files and records); Streator v. United States, 395 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.
1968) (presentence reports and files of the probation officer are part of the
files and records).
71. See State v. Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 266 N.W.2d 327 (1978); State v. Dabney, 181
Neb. 263, 267-68, 147 N.W.2d 768, 771-72 (1967) (stipulated receipt into evidence
of evidence taken at trial of federal habeas corpus case may be treated as
according the prisoner an evidentiary hearing). Unless the evidence extrin-
sic to the record is part of an expanded record, see text accompanying notes
152-56 infra, federal cases interpreting the similar language of section 2255
are in accord with the Nebraska position. Owens v. United States, 551 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977) (ordinarily, contested facts
may not be decided on affidavits alone, but where affidavits are supported by
other evidence in the record, the court may rely on them); Taylor v. United
States, 487 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1973) (affidavit of United States Attorney offered
in opposition to motion to vacate is not part of files and records).
72. A court can, of course, take judicial notice of its own records in the case
before it. State v. Coffen, 184 Neb. 254,256, 166 N.W.2d 593, 594 (1969); Quinton
v. State, 112 Neb. 684, 688, 200 N.W. 881, 883 (1924).
73. State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 677, 144 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1966). In Losieau, the
supreme court took judicial notice of the competency of petitioner's counsel,
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cial notice of inconsistent claims and statements by a petitioner in
prior proceedings.7 4
The other category of information the court may rely on is the
judge's own recollection of what transpired during the original
criminal proceeding. Where the judge's memory of what occurred
during the trial and sentencing of the petitioner contradicts the al-
legations in the motion to vacate, the court may rely on its own
recollection of events as a basis for denying post conviction re-
lief.7 5
but made it clear the trial court had the power to do the same. The court's
decision to take judicial notice appeared to be merely gratuitous in this in-
stance, since petitioner claimed a lack of counsel rather than ineffective
assistance of counsel. Cf. State v. Robinson, 194 Neb. 111, 112-13, 230 N.W.2d
222, 224 (1975) (supreme court took judicial notice of the competence of peti-
tioners' counsel in affirming the denial of post conviction relief after an evi-
dentiary hearing); State v. Oziah, 186 Neb. 541, 546-47, 184 N.W.2d 725, 728
(1971) (same). It is certainly questionable whether judicial notice of this sort
comports with the requirement of NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-201 (Reissue 1975).
74. State v. Miles, 202 Neb. 126, 132, 274 N.W.2d 153, 156 (1979); State v. Losieau,
180 Neb. 671, 678, 144 N.W.2d 406, 411 (1966):
In the present case the prisoner alleges he only had 5 years of school-
ing. We think this court can take notice of our previous opinion set-
ting forth the interrogation by the trial court in the other conviction
where he stated he had finished the eighth grade in school and the
tenth by studying evenings at home. This court may take judicial
notice of inconsistent claims and statements of a defendant in suc-
cessive post conviction proceedings appealed to it in order to prevent
an imposition on the court.
The power to take judicial notice of related proceedings is not confined to the
supreme court alone but is also given to the trial courts. Knapp v. City of
Omaha, 175 Neb. 576, 582, 122 N.W.2d 513, 517 (1963) (where cases are interwo-
ven and interdependent, trial court may take judicial notice of its prior adju-
dication). Another example of the use of judicial notice occurs in State v.
Crooks, 189 Neb. 344, 202 N.W.2d 627 (1972), in which notice was taken that
life sentences are frequently commuted and that the sentences end before
the death of the prisoner.
75. In State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485,491,222 N.W.2d 573,578 (1974), the pris-
oner alleged he was sentenced for charges which were dropped as a result of
a plea bargain. The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing
and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. Although the supreme court did
not specifically say it was proper for the trial judge to rely on his or her own
recollection of his or her reasons for granting the sentence, the court denied
an evidentiary hearing on the basis that the necessary information was
locked within the judge's mind. But see State v. Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 330,190
N.W.2d 781, 783 (1971) ("It is entirely possible that the district judge was
aware of ample evidence to establish the defendant's competency to stand
trial, but that evidence, if any, does not appear in the record."). Virgilito may
well stand only for the proposition that the trial court should make findings of
fact reflecting its recollection of events. See State v. Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 119,
266 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1978).
The right of a federal trial judge to rely on his or her memory of events is
well established in section 2255 proceedings. Machibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962); Burris v. United States, 430 F.2d 399, 401 (7th Cir.
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The trial courts have used files and records in several different
ways to deny post conviction relief.7 6 Where properly utilized, re-
sort to the files and records may result in the swift and expeditious
disposition of frivolous claims, but when used as a convenient ex-
cuse for ignoring the petitioner's allegations, the result may be the
denial of meritorious claims.
A. No Factual Issue Presented
Frequently a prisoner's motion to vacate presents a constitu-
tional challenge based on events fully reflected in the records of
the original criminal proceeding. The error complained of oc-
curred during the course of the original proceeding and all of the
necessary relevant facts concerning the alleged error are undis-
puted and fully revealed in the files and records. In such a situa-
tion, there is no need to go outside the record to develop any
additional facts. In this respect, the trial court acts in no different
manner than does an appellate court in confining itself to consider-
ation of matters appearing on the record;7 7 each is concerned with
deciding questions of law rather than disputes of fact.78 And, like
an appellate court, the trial court may grant as well as deny relief
on the basis of the record before it.
The Post Conviction Act does not demand that the prisoner be
accorded an evidentiary hearing before a determination of the mo-
tion to vacate is made on the merits where the facts are undis-
puted and contained on the record:
It is clear that the sentencing court has discretion to adopt reasonable pro-
cedures for determining what the motion and the fies and records show,
and whether any substantial issues are raised, before granting a full evi-
dentiary hearing. Where no controverted material issues of fact are
presented, the facts as shown by the record are undisputed, the taking of
oral testimony on the motion could not add to or detract from the informa-
tion shown by the court's files and records, and the court is satisfied that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, no hearing is required under the provi-
sions of the Post Conviction Act.
7 9
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); United States v. McDowell, 305 F.2d 12,
14 (6th Cir. 1962). In fact, reliance on that right is usually considered desira-
ble. Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2nd Cir. 1967). See generally
Kelly, supra note 5.
76. See §§ rnr-A to -D of text infra.
77. See Schetzer v. Sullivan, 193 Neb. 841, 843, 229 N.W.2d 550, 552 (1975).
78. See State v. Pilgrim, 184 Neb. 457, 168 N.W.2d 368 (1969) (only issues present
in appeal from denial of motion to vacate are ones of law); Hancock v. Parks,
172 Neb. 442, 110 N.W.2d 69 (1961) (it is not the province of the supreme court
in actions at law to resolve conflicts in or weigh the evidence). But cf. NEB.
REv. STAT. § 25-1925 (Reissue 1975) (appeals in equity are triable de novo).
79. State v. Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 284, 142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966). Accord, State v.
Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 118-19, 266 N.W.2d 237,240 (1978); State v. Dabney, 181 Neb.
263, 265-66, 147 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1967).
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State v. Brown 8° is an example of a situation in which all of the
Woods, the first case decided on appeal under the newly enacted Post
Conviction Act, illustrates the often poorly researched and argued legal au-
thority presented to the Nebraska Supreme Court as a basis for its decisions.
In this case the prisoner was represented by counsel on appeal, yet his appel-
late brief contained exactly three paragraphs of argument without one case
citation. The state's brief was nearly as cursory with one and a half pages of
argument and one case citation. No reply brief was filed. Briefs for Appellant
and Appellee, State v. Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 142 N.W.2d 339 (1966).
80. 185 Neb. 389, 176 N.W.2d 16 (1970). Other examples of motions to vacate di-
rected to matters fully reflected in the record are numerous: State v. Flye, 201
Neb. 115,266 N.W.2d 237 (1978) (ineffective assistance of counsel and abuse of
discretion by trial judge in failing to raise or hold hearing on mental compe-
tency were alleged, reports were received at sentencing hearing showing de-
fendant's sanity); State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 259 N.W.2d 917 (1977) (claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move to suppress evidence
resulting from a possibily illegal search and seizure and failure to make cer-
tain objections at trial); State v. Hardin, 199 Neb. 314, 258 N.W.2d 245 (1977)
(claim that since all charges grew out of one transaction, defendant was be-
ing twice punished for the same offense); State v. Coleman, 197 Neb. 186, 247
N.W.2d 627 (1976) (claims of illegal arrest, lineup, nune pro tune order and
ineffective assistance of counsel; exact nature of complaints is unclear, but
court held that all questions raised could be resolved by reference to the rec-
ord); State v. Miles, 194 Neb. 128, 230 N.W.2d 227 (1975) (claim that judge had
failed to honor a plea bargain, but record showed no obligation on part of
judge to honor the agreement); State v. Jonsson, 192 Neb. 730, 224 N.W.2d 181
(1974) (claim that defendant is subject to amendatory legislation, but record
showed conviction final before date of enactment); State v. Brown, 192 Neb.
505, 222 N.W.2d 808 (1974) (denial of right to speedy trial); State v.
Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485,222 N.W.2d 573 (1974) (claim that presentence re-
port should have been prepared, but no legal requirement to do so); State v.
Warner, 192 Neb. 438, 222 N.W.2d 292 (1974) (same issue and disposition as in
Jonsson); State v. Goham, 191 Neb. 639, 216 N.W.2d 869 (1974) (claim that
state had lost jurisdiction through retrocession to federal government); State
v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974) (statutory procedures for waiv-
ing juvenile court jurisdiction are unconstitutional); State v. Fincher, 189 Neb.
746,204 N.W.2d 927 (1973) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Kellogg,
189 Neb. 692, 204 N.W.2d 567 (1973) (claim that appellate counsel should not
have been permitted to withdraw by the district court; this decision is the
opposite from that reached in State v. Blunt, 197 Neb. 82, 246 N.W.2d 727
(1976), in which the Nebraska Supreme Court granted relief on the exact
same claim); State v. Crooks, 189 Neb. 344, 202 N.W.2d 627 (1972) (sentence of
years imposed consecutively to life sentence is cruel and unusual punish-
ment); State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 201 N.W.2d 241 (1972) (constitutionality
of implied consent statute); State v. Howell, 188 Neb. 687,199 N.W.2d 21 (1972)
(denial of right to appeal and meritorious grounds for appeal because of ille-
gal search and seizure; court held on basis of record that there was no denial
of the right to appeal and that search and seizure issue had been waived and
was harmless error); State v. Whited, 187 Neb. 592, 193 N.W.2d 268 (1971)
(claim of denial of counsel at preliminary hearing and improper confronta-
tion, but court found on basis of record that no right to counsel existed at that
time and the in-court identification was untainted); State v. Rhodes, 187 Neb.
332, 190 N.W.2d 623 (1971) (claim that defendant should have been advised of
his ineligibility for parole at time of his guilty plea); State v. Ondrak, 186 Neb.
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necessary relevant facts were contained on the record and there
was no need for further factual development. The record of the
original trial showed that during the state's direct examination of a
police officer, he responded to a question about his interrogation of
the defendant by stating that the defendant had refused to answer
any questions in regard to the incident without the benefit of coun-
sel. The defense counsel moved to have the answer stricken and a
mistrial declared, but the motion was overruled. The question
presented in the motion to vacate was whether the admission of
the witness' statement over objection was prejudicial error and the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was.8 1
Nothing could have been added to the relevant facts of this case
had the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. All of the
facts necessary for the court's consideration and decision were
contained in the records of the original criminal proceeding. The
supreme court's disposition of the prisoner's motion to vacate on
the basis of the files and records of the case represented an effi-
cient use of valuable judicial manpower.82
838, 186 N.W.2d 727 (1971) (counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for pro-
bation at time of sentencing); State v. Gero, 186 Neb. 379, 183 N.W.2d 274
(1971) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Pilgrim, 184 Neb. 457, 168
N.W.2d 368 (1969) (claim of prejudice from jury seeing exhibits not admitted
into evidence; record showed no prejudice); State v. Losieau, 184 Neb. 178, 166
N.W.2d 406 (1969) (constitutionality of Habitual Criminal Act); State v. Nich-
olson, 183 Neb. 834, 164 N.W.2d 652, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969) (claim of
defective extradition proceedings; evidentiary hearing was held, but court
said issues were determinable from the record); State v. Kauffman, 183 Neb.
817, 164 N.W.2d 469 (1969) (claims that no intent to commit murder shown at
trial under felony-murder rule, and that felony-murder rule is unconstitu-
tional); State v. Losieau, 182 Neb. 367, 154 N.W.2d 762 (1967) (constitutionality
of Habitual Criminal Act); State v. Dabney, 181 Neb. 263, 147 N.W.2d 768
(1967) (claim of failure to appoint counsel on appeal, but record showed no
request for counsel); State v. Brevet, 180 Neb. 616, 144 N.W.2d 210 (1966)
(claim that defendant should have been informed that counsel would have
been appointed at state's expense and that district court did not have juris-
diction because transcript from justice of the peace court was not lodged in
that court until after plea and sentence; court found waiver of right to coun-
sel, and guilty plea waived need to file transcript); State v. Clingerman, 180
Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966) (claim of illegal arrest outside of county; stat-
ute permitted the arrest).
In several of the above cited cases it is difficult to ascertain from the opin-
ions whether an evidentiary hearing was held. Even if one was held, how-
ever, the issues cited could have been resolved by reference to the record
only.
81. 185 Neb. at 391, 176 N.W.2d at 18.
82. Section 2255 is similarly interpreted not to require an evidentiary hearing
when there is no substantial factual dispute. See, e.g., Mixen v. United
States, 469 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
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B. Motion and Files and Records Fail to Show a Constitutional
Violation
Another situation in which the courts summarily determine
motions to vacate by referring to the files and records of the case is
one in which the allegations of the motion, accepted as true, fail to
show a constitutional violation when considered in conjunction
with the files and records. This situation is very similar to that dis-
cussed in the preceding section, but in this instance the allegations
of the motion concern facts outside the record instead of events
reflected in the record.83 The courts then assume the truthfulness
of the allegations 84 in determining the existence of any constitu-
tional violation rather than conduct an evidentiary hearing to test
their verity.85
As an example, in State v. Snyder86 the petitioner alleged
among other things that at some time subsequent to his arrest he
was interrogated by the police without being advised of his right to
remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel, and, further,
that he was denied the assistance of counsel during a psychiatric
examination. The court found from examining the record that
there was nothing to indicate the results of any interrogation were
used against the petitioner at any stage of the original proceedings
and that the psychiatric examination was ordered by the trial court
upon the request of petitioner's trial counsel. Coupling the allega-
83. It is possible for a motion to vacate to plead the relevant facts in such com-
pleteness that no recourse to the files and records by the court would be nec-
essary to determine the lack of any constitutional violation. See, e.g., State v.
Craig, 181 Neb. 8, 146 N.W.2d 744 (1966), in which the petitioner claimed a
denial of equal protection because he received a longer sentence than one
codefendant and because another codefendant was not prosecuted. In this
instance, the lack of any constitutional violation was evident on the face of
the motion. Other examples are rare, presumably because of the pleaders'
desire to present their cases in the most favorable light, ignoring those as-
pects of the record harmful to their cause.
84. See State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 489, 222 N.W.2d 573, 577 (1974) ("As-
suming, as we must do, that [an allegation in the motion was true]"); State v.
Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 284, 142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966) ("It is important to note
also that for purposes of the court's consideration of the defendant's motion,
the allegations of fact made by the defendant were accepted as true and cor-
rect.").
85. If the allegations considered in conjunction with the files and records do
make out a constitutional violation, then an evidentiary hearing must be held.
See text accompanying note 283 infra. Disposition on this basis is somewhat
analogous to the procedure on a motion for a directed verdict at the close of
the plaintiff's case; the court treats as true all of the plaintiffs evidence and
every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence. McKamy v.
Bonanza Sirloin Pit, Inc., 195 Neb. 325, 237 N.W.2d 865 (1976); Hansen v.
Hasenkamp, 192 Neb. 530, 223 N.W.2d 44 (1974).
86. 180 Neb. 787, 146 N.W.2d 67 (1966).
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tions of the motion to vacate with the additional information re-
vealed by the record, the court held that (1) absent the use of any
confession or statement against the defendant, an "otherwise valid
conviction... is not rendered void or voidable solely because at a
pretrial police interrogation, the defendant was denied counsel,
and was not warned of his absolute right to remain silent";87 and
(2) "once a defendant... requests or submits to an examination
by court-appointed psychiatrists, he is not constitutionally entitled
to the presence of his counsel at the examination."88 On the basis
of the motion to vacate in conjunction with the files and records of
the case, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of relief.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has only once expressly articu-
lated the analytical process described above,89 but has frequently
engaged in this process in disposing of motions to vacate without
the benefit of evidentiary hearings. 90 The process represents a
fast, efficient method of disposing of meritless motions to vacate
87. Id. at 789, 146 N.W.2d at 68.
88. Id. at 790, 146 N.W.2d at 68.
89. State v. Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 284, 142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966).
90. State v. Kirby, 198 Neb. 646, 254 N.W.2d 424 (1977) (alleged a denial of right to
represent self, but the record showed he was not prejudiced by the denial);
State v. McDonnell, 192 Neb. 500, 222 N.W.2d 583 (1974) (claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to object to a joinder of causes, but court held
no prejudice was shown because defendant was acquitted on one of the
charges); State v. Menard, 189 Neb. 825, 205 N.W.2d 547 (1973) (claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness, but record showed
the evidence was overwhelming); State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 201 N.W.2d
241 (1972) (allegation that defendant was not advised of his rights when he
gave a specimen to determine blood alcohol content and that he gave a co-
erced confession, but the court found from examining the record that there
was no need to give constitutional warnings under the Implied Consent Law,
that the right to remain silent had been waived, and that no confession was
ever used against the defendant); State v. Dabney, 183 Neb. 316, 160 N.W.2d
163 (1968) (motion to vacate alleged the state suppressed evidence by not
calling certain witnesses, but the record revealed that the names of the wit-
nesses had been elicited by the state on direct examination; the court found
no duty on the part of the state to call the witnesses); State v. Fowler, 182
Neb. 333, 154 N.W.2d 766 (1967) (petitioner claimed he was not warned of his
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel at the time of a
pretrial interrogation, but the record revealed that any statements made were
never used against him); State v. Newman, 181 Neb. 588, 150 N.W.2d 113 (1967)
(although petitioner insisted that an investigation should be made of whether
the county attorney, who withdrew from the case because he was to appear
as a witness, assisted the special prosecutor in preparing the case, the court
found that the record revealed no prejudice to the defendant from any such
assistance); State v. Warner, 181 Neb. 538, 149 N.W.2d 438 (1967) (claim of
denial of counsel, but record showed counsel had been waived); State v. Dab-
ney, 181 Neb. 263, 147 N.W.2d 768 (1967) (claim of a failure to appoint counsel
on appeal, but the record showed no request for appointed counsel was ever
made); State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966) (allegations of
an illegal arrest outside of county and a refusal to issue process for a witness,
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while conferring on prisoners all of the benefits they could have
obtained had an evidentiary hearing been held.91 This method of
disposing of motions to vacate can, however, be subject to abuse if
the prisoner has failed to allege all of the relevant facts necessary
to the determination of his claim. For example, where the prisoner
has failed to allege a fact not reflected in the record, but which
could be proved at an evidentiary hearing, and the motion, had
that fact been pleaded, would have made out a constitutional viola-
tion, then disposition on the basis of the files and records will re-
sult in the denial of a meritorious claim.
In all of the reported cases in which the court followed the proc-
ess described above,92 the motion to vacate concerned issues
which, while not always well pleaded, would not have constituted a
constitutional violation regardless of the detail or completeness of
the pleadings. For instance, in the example of Snyder, it is difficult
to imagine any additional facts which the prisoner could have
pleaded that would have changed the outcome of the case. Never-
theless, before disposing of claims without first conducting an evi-
dentiary hearing, the courts should remain sensitive to the
possibility that the prisoner has failed through ignorance to plead
a necessary fact which, if pleaded, would present a constitutional
violation.93
The difficulty is in translating a general admonition to the
courts to be sensitive into workable guidelines for them to follow.
In most situations, a court would need to be possessed of clairvoy-
but the record showed the arrest was authorized by statute and that the wit-
ness was cumulative).
As is frequently the case in other contexts, it is occasionally difficult to
ascertain from the opinions whether the court reached its decision by exam-
ining the motion alone or in conjunction with the files and records. In any
event, the court could have reached its decision by examining the files and
records, and the cases are cited for that proposition.
91. Federal courts interpreting section 2255 have followed the same analytical
process as the Nebraska courts. See Boyden v. United States, 407 F.2d 140
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 881 (1969) (fact that petitioner was forced to
attend a line-up in the absence of appointed counsel was assumed to be true
in determining the existence of a constitutional violation).
92. See note 90 supra.
93. In State v. Craig, 181 Neb. 8, 146 N.W.2d 744 (1966), the petitioner had received
a sentence different than that of a codefendant. This, standing alone, is not
enough to make out a constitutional violation and the motion was properly
denied. However, a situation could be imagined in which the sentence is
greater because of the defendant's insistence on exercising his right to trial.
In that instance, there presumably would be a constitutional violation. See
United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170, 1177-79 (7th Cir. 1975). If this fact was not alleged in
the motion to vacate and did not appear on the record for whatever reason,
then the motion would be denied without consideration of the issue.
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ant powers in order to ascertain from the face of the motion the
existence of other critical facts not pleaded. The only adequate
method of insuring that all relevant necessary facts are placed
before the trial court in the initial pleading is to appoint counsel
for all indigent prisoners.
C. Allegations are Contradicted by Files and Records
On occasion, a prisoner alleges facts in a motion to vacate that
are clearly contradicted by the files and records of the case.94
Where the contradicted facts go to the heart of the prisoner's claim
and the facts, as shown by the fies and records, are of an irrefuta-
ble nature, the allowance of an evidentiary hearing to permit the
prisoner to attempt to prove the allegations of his motion would be
an exercise in futility. In such a situation the trial court is justified
in summarily denying the motion to vacate.95
As an illustration, the prisoner in State v. Ransom9 6 claimed in
his motion to vacate that he had been sentenced on a count charg-
ing that he was an habitual criminal while the record clearly
showed that he was sentenced on separate counts of burglary.9 7
The prisoner made no allegations of falsification or error in the re-
cord98 and there was no reasonably conceivable evidence the pris-
94. The term 'Tiles and records" is here meant in the broader sense of including
those facts of which the court may take judicial notice and events which are
recalled by the judge.
95. See State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 679, 144 N.W.2d 406, 411 (1966): "Even
though one of the grounds of a motion to vacate a sentence raises a factual
issue, where the issue is one that was readily determinable by reference to
files and records of the district court, the prisoner was not entitled to hearing
on the motion." The same principle has been followed by the federal courts
in interpreting section 2255. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,
494 (1962) ('This was not a case where the issues raised by the motion were
conclusively determined either by the motion itself or by the 'files and
records' in the trial court."); Steele v. United States, 362 F.2d 536, 537 (10th
Cir. 1966).
96. 188 Neb. 499, 197 N.W.2d 637 (1972).
97. The Habitual Criminal Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2221 to -2222 (Reissue
1975), does not create a new and separate offense for which a person may be
separately sentenced, but merely enhances the punishment for a criminal
conviction. Gamron v. Jones, 148 Neb. 645, 28 N.W.2d 403 (1947).
98. Transcript at 39-42, State v. Ransom, 188 Neb. 499, 197 N.W.2d 637 (1972). The
Nebraska Supreme Court has suggested, but not specifically stated, that the
trial court may rely on the accuracy of its own records and the bill of excep-
tions when contradicted by the allegations of a motion to vacate. See State v.
Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 679, 144 N.W.2d 406, 411 (1966); State v. Cllngerman, 180
Neb. 344, 351, 142 N.W.2d 765, 770 (1966). Although the issue has not been
squarely considered in any reported Nebraska case, the federal cases inter-
preting section 2255 have permitted the trial judge to rely on the accuracy of
the transcript of testimony and his or her own memory of events in rejecting
without an evidentiary hearing a claim of falsification of the transcript. E.g.,
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oner could have introduced at an evidentiary hearing that would
have refuted the virtually unassailable evidence of the record. In
this situation, the trial court could and did properly rely on the ac-
curacy of the record in denying the motion to vacate. Other exam-
ples in which the record was considered to be irrefutable include
the issues of whether a defendant had been represented by coun-
sel;99 whether an information had charged the defendant with be-
ing an habitual criminal;100 whether counsel was ineffective when
at the time his guilty plea was taken, the defendant testified he
was satisfied with his counsel;101 whether defendant received inef-
fective assistance of counsel or made an involuntary guilty plea,
when the defendant claimed he had acted in self defense but a
confession in the record showed this not to be so;102 whether there
had been a voluntary waiver of counsel;103 whether there had been
a resentencing of the defendant by a nunc pro tunc order; 0 4
whether the court had advised the defendant of his constitutional
rights;1 05 whether the defendant had requested to represent him-
self*l0 6 whether there had been any police interrogation when at
trial the defendant had testified there had not been any;107 and
whether the defendant was sentenced for charges which were
dropped as a result of plea bargaining when this was presumably
contradicted by the court's memory of events. 108
An apparent conflict has developed between the Nebraska and
federal cases in resolving the question of whether a prisoner
should be permitted, in effect, to impeach his own testimony, but
the conflict may now be settled. The issue, more precisely defined,
is whether a defendant's answers given at the time of the taking of
his guilty plea in response to the court's interrogation as to
whether the plea is voluntarily, understandingly and intelligently
made are controlling, or whether, despite the prisoner's assertions
at that time, he can assert in a subsequent collateral proceeding
United States v. McDowell, 305 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1962). But cf. United States v.
LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (specific allegations of fraud or irregular-
ity which call into dispute the accuracy of the record entitle the prisoner to a
hearing).
99. State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 676, 144 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1966); State v.
Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 347, 142 N.W.2d 765, 768 (1966).
100. State v. Coleman, 197 Neb. 186, 187, 247 N.W.2d 627, 628 (1976).
101. State v. Sargent, 186 Neb. 155, 156, 181 N.W.2d 449, 450 (1970).
102. State v. Reyes, 192 Neb. 153, 219 N.W.2d 238 (1974).
103. State v. Miles, 202 Neb. 126, 274 N.W.2d i53 (1979)..
104. State v. Coleman, 197 Neb. 186, 187, 247 N.W.2d 627, 628 (1976).
105. State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 347-48, 142 N.W.2d 765, 768 (1966).
106. State v. Kirby, 198 Neb. 646, 648, 254 N.W.2d 424, 425 (1977).
107. State v. Hizel, 181 Neb. 680, 682-83, 150 N.W.2d 217, 219, cert. denied, 389 U.S.
868 (1967).
108. State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 491, 222 N.W.2d 573, 578 (1974).
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that his answers were false.109
The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed this
issue in Blackledge v. Allison,110 in which the Court considered a
North Carolina prisoner's habeas challenge to his plea of guilty to
a single count of attempted safe robbery. At the plea taking, the
trial judge asked the defendant thirteen questions concerning his
understanding of the charge, its consequences and the voluntari-
ness of his plea. In particular, the defendant was asked whether
he understood he could receive a sentence of ten years to life-to
which he responded "yes"--and whether anyone had made any
promises or threats to induce him to plead guilty-to which he re-
sponded "no". Three days later the defendant was sentenced to
seventeen to twenty-one years in prison.
Subsequently, the defendant filed in federal district court a pro
se petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that he had pleaded
guilty because his attorney led him to believe that the attorney,
the prosecutor and the judge had agreed the defendant would re-
ceive a ten-year sentence in exchange for his guilty plea. The de-
fendant further explained that he had answered no to the judge's
interrogation as to whether any promises had been made because
he had been instructed by his attorney to so answer. The federal
district court dismissed the petition without a hearing and the
Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that in the circumstances of this
case summary dismissal was improper.1
The Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, put great emphasis on the need for finality in criminal
litigation" 2 and stated that a prisoner's answers given at the tak-
ing of a guilty plea have a strong presumption of truthfulness," 3
109. FED. R. Cind. P. 11 requires that before a plea of nolo contendre or guilty is
accepted, the federal district judge must advise the defendant personally of
the effects of his plea, insure that the plea is voluntary, and ascertain the
existence of any plea bargain argreements. State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183
N.W.2d 763 (1971), laid down the requirement that in Nebraska the taking of a
guilty plea must, at a minimum, conform to the procedures contained in the
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
To PLEAS OF GUILTY (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuiLTY], which are very similar to the procedures con-
tained in FED. R. CRIm. P. 11. The Nebraska court imposed the new standards
for taking guilty pleas in order to conform plea taking procedures to those
required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), which held that the rec-
ord must affirmatively disclose that a guilty plea was made understandingly
and voluntarily.
110. 431 U.S. 63 (1977). For an excellent discussion of the issues involved in the
collateral attack of guilty pleas, see Note, Rule 11 and Collateral Attack on
Guilty Pleas, 86 YALE IJ. 1395 (1977).
111. Allison v. Blackledge, 533 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1976), affd, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
112. 431 U.S. at 71.
113. Id. at 73-74.
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but it balanced against these considerations the need to safeguard
constitutional guarantees." 4 The Court refused to adopt a per se
rule according complete finality to a defendant's representations at
the time of his plea taking,"n5 but looked to whether the peti-
tioner's claim was alleged with sufficient specificity and, if so,
whether the allegations were so incredible as to justify dismis-
sal.116
The Court agreed that in this instance, because the trial court
had not explained the legitimacy of plea bargaining, had made no
inquiry of defense counsel and the prosecutor about the existence
of any plea bargain, and had made no verbatim record of the pro-
ceedings, it could not be said the allegations were beyond belief
and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing was necessary." 7 If the
omitted procedures had been followed, they "would almost surely
have shown whether any bargain did exist and, if so, insured that it
was not ignored."" 8
In contrast to Blackledge is the Nebraska Supreme Court's de-
cision in State v. Rapp." 9 There the defendant alleged that as a
result of plea bargaining, he was assured a lesser sentence than
that which he received. The trial court denied relief without con-
ducting an evidentiary hearing and the Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed on the grounds that at the time of the defendant's arraign-
ment, he assured the trial court that there had not been any plea
bargaining and that the court had told him that in the event there
had been any plea bargaining, the court was not a party to it and it
would not be binding on the court. The supreme court, in effect,
made the defendant's assertions at arraignment dispositive of the
issue. This was true even though the defendant had alleged that
his attorney had assured him a five-year sentence 120 and had al-
leged in a previous motion to vacate that the court had made it
clear off the record that it would abide by any plea bargain and
114. Id. at 72.
115. Id. at 74-75:
What Machibroda and Fontaine indisputably teach, however, is
that the barrier of the plea or sentencing proceeding record, although
imposing, is not invariably insurmountable. In administering the
writ of habeas corpus and its § 2255 counterpart, the federal courts
cannot fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all possibility that a de-
fendant's representations at the time his guilty plea was accepted
were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, du-
ress, or misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a con-
stitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.
(Footnotes omitted).
116. Id. at 76.
117. Id. at 75-80.
118. Id. at 79-80.
119. 186 Neb. 785, 186 N.W.2d 482 (1971).
120. Transcript at 28, State v. Rapp, 186 Neb. 785, 186 N.W.2d 482 (1971).
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that the on the record statements by the court to the contrary were
necessary to make the plea bargain legal.12 1 Further, the record of
the sentencing proceedings made it very clear that some sort of
plea bargaining had occurred and that the trial court was aware of
it.122
Even though the plea taking in Rapp did not suffer from several
of the omissions the United States Supreme Court found to be of
significance in Blackledge,123 the allegations of the motion to va-
cate, when considered in conjunction with the files and records of
the case, were not so "vague or conclusory"'124 nor so '"palpably in-
credible" as to warrant summary dismissal.125 The motion to va-
cate presented a prima facie case for relief which, if presented in a
petition for federal habeas corpus relief, would have justified fur-
ther factual development.126
The United States Supreme Court also dealt with the issue of
guilty pleas in Fontaine v. United States,127 in which it reversed
the lower court's denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing to
a federal prisoner proceeding under section 2255. In his motion,
the prisoner claimed that his plea of guilty had been induced, con-
trary to his responses to the trial court's Rule 11 interrogation, by a
combination of fear, coercive police tactics and physical and
121. Id. at 15.
122. Bill of Exceptions at 21-22, 25, State v. Rapp, 186 Neb. 785, 186 N.W.2d 482
(1971). At the sentencing hearing the trial judge also explained to the de-
fendant that the court would not follow any sentence recommendation in
light of an escape attempt by the defendant subsequent to the taking of his
guilty plea and offered the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Id. at 24-25. The Supreme Court could have based the denial of post convic-
tion relief on this ground, but, instead, based it on the defendant's answers at
the taking of the guilty plea.
123. For instance, the trial court in Rapp explained to the defendant the legiti-
macy of plea bargaining. Bill of Exceptions at 17.
The plea taking in Rapp occurred prior to the decision in State v. Turner,
186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971). Now that the trial courts are required to
adhere to the procedures of the STANDARDS RELATING To PLEAS OF GULTY,
supra note 109, the court must make inquiry of defense counsel and the pros-
ecution as to the existence of any plea bargain, id., § 1.5, and a verbatim re-
cording of the plea taking must be made. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-342.02 (Reissue
1975). However, the trial court is still not required to explain the legitimacy
of plea bargaining. See generally BENCH BOOK COMMITTEE OF THE NEBRASKA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, NEBRASKA BENCH BOOK 1976, XVIIm-8
to -9 (1976).
124. 431 U.S. at 75.
125. Id. at 76.
126. In fact Rapp did file a petition in federal district court for habeas corpus relief
alleging essentially the same facts as were presented in the state court pro-
ceedings and an evidentiary hearing was held by the federal court. Rapp v.
Wolff 489 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1974).
127. 411 U.S. 213 (1973).
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mental illness. The Supreme Court noted that the objective of
Rule 11 was to "flush out and resolve all such issues, but like any
procedural mechanism, its exercise is neither always perfect nor
uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an op-
portunity to prove the allegations.' 28 In this instance the detailed
allegations of the motion and supporting records did not conclu-
sively show that the petitioner was entitled to no relief and the
case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
The prisoner in State v. Leadinghorse,12 9 raising issues similar
to those presented in Fontaine, claimed his guilty plea was the re-
sult of teasing and verbal abuse by his jailors, his reactions to drug
withdrawal, 130 and false statements by his attorney that the de-
fendant's mother was urging him to plead guilty.131 First reciting
the prisoner's responses at the time of his guilty plea that his plea
was knowing, voluntary and intelligent, the Nebraska Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing
on the bases that no suggestion was made that the prisoner's jail-
ers were coercing him to plead guilty, that his incarceration for five
months made his claim of drug withdrawal frivolous, and that it
was a "strain on credulity" to believe that a message from his
mother induced him to plead guilty.'
32
Although the need for further factual development in
Leadinghorse is not nearly so compelling as in Fontaine, it is still
reasonably safe to say that a federal court considering the same
facts in a habeas corpus proceeding would not have summarily de-
nied the petitioner's claim as did the Nebraska courts. 133 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court did label several of the defendant's factual
assertions incredible, an acceptable basis under Blackledge for
summarily denying relief,'3 but the factual contentions presented
in Leadinghorse are not so inherently unbelievable as the court
would have the reader conclude. 13 5
128. Id. at 215.
129. 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 573 (1974).
130. Id. at 490, 222 N.W.2d at 578.
131. Transcript at 28, State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 573 (1974):
The guilty plea was induced, in part, by misrepresentations made by
counsel to defendant that he had spoken to defendant's mother and
that defendant's mother had told counsel that she wanted defendant
to plead guilty when in fact counsel had not discussed the issue of
whether defendant should plea guilty with defendant's mother.
132. Id. at 491, 222 N.W.2d at 578.
133. There is no record of the petitioner in Leadinghorse ever having instituted a
federal habeas corpus action so this conclusion must remain speculative.
134. 431 U.S. at 74.
135. But see Malone v. United States, 299 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1962) ("It must
have seemed fantastic to the District Judge, as it was to us, that a federal
prisoner who was confined in jail for six months awaiting trial could conceal
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A recent indication that the Nebraska standard is coming into
line with the federal standard is found in State v. Svoboda.136
There the prisoner alleged that his guilty pleas were involuntary
as a result of the trial judge's participation in plea negotiations and
his attorney's misrepresentations and coercion. The motion to va-
cate had been summarily denied in the sentencing court but on
appeal the case was reversed and remanded with instructions to
conduct an evidentiary hearing.137 Even though the claims of mis-
representation and coercion were presumably in contradiction of
the defendant's assertions at the time of the plea taking, no men-
tion of this was made in the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion.
Whether this shows a greater willingness on the part of the court
to consider claims impeaching a defendant's answers at the time of
a guilty plea or is an aberrational decision remains to be seen.
one and one-half ounces of gum opium on his person, avoid detection and
keep enough on hand to drug himself to the extent that he was incompetent
at his trial.").
136. 199 Neb. 452, 259 N.W.2d 609 (1977). See also State v. Hoppes, 202 Neb. 383, -
N.W.2d - (1979). In Hoppes the prisoner's testimony at his post conviction
evidentiary hearing was characterized as "severely impeached" by the state-
ments made at his plea taking, id. at 388-89, - N.W.2d at -, which indicates
that statements made at the plea taking may be subject to later contradiction.
The trial courts have been much more willing than the Nebraska Supreme
Court to grant an evidentiary hearing to a prisoner challenging the voluntari-
ness of his guilty plea. See State v. Hoppes, 202 Neb. 383, -N.W.2d - (1979);
State v. Partridge, 201 Neb. 799, 272 N.W.2d 366 (1978); State v. Ford, 200 Neb.
779, 265 N.W.2d 456 (1978); State v. Morrow, 197 Neb. 627, 250 N.W.2d 247
(1977); State v. McClelland, 194 Neb. 535, 233 N.W.2d 786 (1975); State v.
Krider, 191 Neb. 285, 214 N.W.2d 611 (1974); State v. Mayes, 190 Neb. 833, 212
N.W.2d 621 (1973); State v. Smith, 188 Neb. 388, 196 N.W.2d 918 (1972); State v.
Fusby, 188 Neb. 139, 195 N.W.2d 495 (1972); State v. Hall, 188 Neb. 130, 195
N.W.2d 201 (1972); State v. Mason, 187 Neb. 675, 193 N.W.2d 576 (1972); State v.
Cruse, 187 Neb. 331, 190 N.W.2d 629 (1971); State v. Alvarez, 185 Neb. 557, 177
N.W.2d 591 (1970), modified, 408 U.S. 937 (1972); State v. Coffen, 184 Neb. 254,
166 N.W.2d 593 (1969); State v. Crenshaw, 183 Neb. 449, 161 N.W.2d 502 (1968);
State v. Raue, 182 Neb. 735, 157 N.W.2d 380 (1968); State v. Tunender, 182 Neb.
701, 157 N.W.2d 165, supp. op., 183 Neb. 242, 159 N.W.2d (1968); State v. Jack-
son, 182 Neb. 472, 155 N.W.2d 361 (1968); State v. Williams, 182 Neb. 444, 155
N.W.2d 377 (1967); State v. Putnam, 182 Neb. 185, 153 N.W.2d 456 (1967); State
v. Decker, 181 Neb. 859, 152 N.W.2d 5 (1967). The reasons for the trial courts'
liberality are unclear, but may reflect an appreciation on their part that rever-
sal on appeal is less likely after an evidentiary hearing, since the supreme
court will only set aside findings of the trial court that are clearly erroneous.
State v. Halsey, 195 Neb. 432, 434, 238 N.W.2d 249, 250 (1976); State v. McClel-
land, 194 Neb. 535, 538, 233 N.W.2d 786, 787 (1975); State v. Crenshaw, 183 Neb.
449, 450-51, 161 N.W.2d 502, 503 (1968). See State v. Fowler, 201 Neb. 647, 271
N.W.2d 341 (1978). However, when the trial court denies the motion without
an evidentiary hearing, the supreme court will examine the files and records
anew. See State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 258, 231 N.W.2d 345, 349 (1975); State
v. Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 190 N.W.2d 781 (1971).
137. 199 Neb. at 456, 259 N.W.2d at 611.
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The significance of the federal and state courts following differ-
ent standards in determining whether to allow an evidentiary
hearing or further factual development becomes apparent when a
state prisoner, having been denied post conviction relief without
an evidentiary hearing in the state courts, files a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in federal court. Townsend v. Sain13 8 requires
that when the merits of a factual dispute raised by a habeas peti-
tion and return were not resolved in a state court hearing, then the
federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to the habeas ap-
plicant.139 A state court's summary denial of relief to prisoners in
situations in which the federal habeas court would grant an evi-
dentiary hearing results in a shifting of the fact finding process
from the state to the federal courts and an abdication by the state
courts of their proper role in the application and enforcement of
federal law.140 The Nebraska courts, by giving conclusive effect to
138. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Court in Townsend decided the issues of when the
district court must grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing and
when it is permissible to rely on the state court's findings of fact-
We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to
a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the mer-
its of the factual disputes were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)
the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record
as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material
facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6)
for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313. See generally, Developments, supra note 5, at 1118-40.
139. The district court may also remand the case to the state courts for a full and
fair evidentiary hearing within a reasonable period of time, e.g., Beal v. Hen-
derson, 317 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. La. 1970); Neal v. Taylor, 264 F. Supp. 418
(E.D.N.C. 1967), and is required to do so when the issue is the voluntariness
of a confession. Sigler v. Parker, 396 U.S. 482 (1970). See generally, Develop-
ments, supra note 5, 1145-48.
140. The rationale for encouraging the state courts to assume the initial responsi-
bility for enforcing federal constitutional standards has been extensively dis-
cussed elsewhere and will not be repeated here, see, e.g., Case v. Nebraska,
381 U.S. 336, 344-47 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200 (1950); Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Allocation of Fact-
Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 896 (1966); Developments, supra note 5,
at 1093-95, other than to note that the federal courts' deference to the state
courts is based on comity and is thought justified as necessary to preserve
the role of the state courts in the application and enforcement of federal law,
to maintain the orderly administration of state court procedures and to re-
duce the tensions inherent in a system of federal review of state decisions.
Developments, supra note 5, 1093-95.
A broader issue inherent in the conclusions of this article is whether the
states should adapt their post conviction procedures to conform to the proce-
dures for federal habeas corpus promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court or whether they should pursue policies that, while conflicting with the
federal procedures, nonetheless are important to the vindication of state in-
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a prisoner's answers to the trial court's interrogation at the time of
the prisoner's guilty plea, although the prisoner has presented de-
tailed factual allegations contradicting the answers and the allega-
tions are not wholly incredible, have shifted to the federal district
courts the responsibility of determining the truthfulness of the
prisoner's claims. 14 1
D. Probative Value of Files and Records Outweighs Allegations
Even where the allegations of the motion to vacate are not di-
rectly contradicted by the files and records of the case, the courts
have nevertheless found in certain instances that the probative
value of the record outweighs the allegations of the motion. The
first example of the courts following this approach occurs when the
alleged facts are incredible and therefore beyond belief,142 a basis
terests. For instance, a state may well conclude that it is more desirable to
have the federal courts make the initial determination on the voluntariness of
a guilty plea than it is to detract from a policy of finality of criminal convic-
tions by permitting the state courts to consider collateral challenges to such
pleas. Resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this article and is only
noted in passing. See generally Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N.W.2d 136
(1946); Clinton, Are The Courts Too Available?, Daily Record, May 1, 1978, at
15, col. 1; Holman, Multiple Post-Trial Litigation in Criminal Cases, 19 DE
PAUL L REV. 490 (1970). Recognition, however, must be given to the fact that
many conclusions of this article are based on the premise that the states
should retain control, in the first instance, over the determination of constitu-
tional error in their own criminal proceedings by conforming when necessary
to federal habeas procedure.
141. The best example occurs in State v. Rapp, 186 Neb. 785, 186 N.W.2d 482 (1971),
in which the state courts summarily denied relief, but the federal courts
granted an evidentiary hearing. See note 126 supra.
142. See State v. Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 119, 266 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1978) ("[B]ald asser-
tions of insanity, unsubstantiated by a recital of credible facts and unsup-
ported by the record, are wholly insufficient, and justify the summary
dismissal of a post conviction proceeding."); State v. Johnson, 189 Neb. 824,
825,205 N.W.2d 548,549 (1973) ("Conclusions, not substantiated by allegations
of fact with some probability of verity, are not sufficient to warrant a hear-
ing.") (quoting from Harris v. Thomas, 341 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1965)); State v.
Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 330, 190 N.W.2d 781, 783 (1971) (same as Flye); State v.
Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 679, 144 N.W.2d 406, 411 (1966) ("His allegation that he
pleaded guilty in the city jail is incredible and in any event did not enter into
his plea of guilty.").
This is in accord with the practice in section 2255 proceedings in which
summary dismissal is proper when there are "contentions that in the face of
the record are wholly incredible." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977);
Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970) ("If the petition be
frivolous or patently absurd on its face, entry of dismissal may be made on
the court's own motion without even the necessity of requiring a responsive
pleading from the government."). See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28
U.S.C.. foil. § 2254, Adv. Comm. Note to R. 4 (West 1977).
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relied upon by the court in State v. Leadinghorse.143 Another ex-
ample occurs when the prisoner has presented inconsistent allega-
tions within the motion to vacate or in related motions. Where this
occurs, the court is free to disbelieve the allegations.14 4 Similarly,
it has been stated that delay in raising a claim leads to a strong
inference of invalidity.145
The underlying rationale of these rules is that some claims are
so unworthy of belief that the granting of an evidentiary hearing
would be a wasteful expenditure of judicial resources. While the
rationale is sound, the danger is that the courts will use it to indis-
criminately deny hearings where the allegations are "improba-
ble,".' but not "palpably incredible."' 47 Mere improbability of
success should not prevent a petitioner from attempting to prove
what ultimately might be a valid claim.
An approach that would better insure that possibly valid but
improbable claims are not denied without opportunity for further
factual development, yet that will still cull out meritless claims
without the expense and burden of a full evidentiary hearing is to
143. 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 573 (1974). See text accompanying note 131 supra.
144. State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 678, 144 N.W.2d 406, 411 (1966). The rule is the
same in section 2255 proceedings. Lucas v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 584, 590
(N.D.W. Va. 1953).
145. State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 677, 144 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1966). See State v.
Kirby, 198 Neb. 646, 648, 254 N.W.2d 424, 425 (1977); State v. Brevet, 180 Neb.
616, 620, 144 N.W.2d 210, 214 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 967 (1967). Cf. State
v. Mason, 187 Neb. 675, 677, 193 N.W.2d 576, 578 (1972) (addition of claim after
appointment of attorney is noteworthy).
A distinction must be made between the effect on the probity of the allega-
tions of delay in bringing a motion to vacate and the right to bring the motion
at all. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975) makes it clear that a motion to
vacate may be brought at any time; there is no statute of limitations applica-
ble to proceedings under the Post Conviction Act. The cases interpreting sec-
tion 2255 allow the length of delay to be a factor in judging the believability of
the allegations of the motion, Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 531 (4th
Cir. 1970); Parker v. United States, 358 F.2d 50, 54 n.4 (7th Cir. 1965), and the
doctrine of laches has now been made applicable to the bringing of delayed
motions to vacate. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.CA
foil. § 2255, Adv. Comm. Note to R. 9 (West Supp. 1978).
146. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962):
Not by the pleadings and the affidavits, but by the whole of the testi-
mony must it be determined whether the petitioner has carried his
burden of proof and shown his right to a discharge. The Govern-
ment's contention that his allegations are improbable and unbeliev-
able cannot serve to deny him an opportunity to support them by
evidence. On this record it is his right to be heard.
Id. at 495. (quoting from Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941)).
147. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977): '"The critical question is whether
these allegations, when viewed against the record of the plea hearing, were so
'palpably incredible,' . . . so 'patently frivolous or false,'. . . as to warrant
summary dismissal"
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require the regular filing of a responsive pleading by the state and
to permit the trial court to expand the record on which it bases its
conclusions.
Requiring the regular filing of a responsive pleading'4 8 will
rarely result in the disposition of a motion on the basis of the an-
swer alone except insofar as it brings to the court's attention infor-
mation that it was not aware of or to which it had not given proper
consideration. 14 9 But the filing of an answer will assist in the de-
velopment of the issues and hopefully their narrowing, 5 0 and will
serve "sometimes, as not infrequently occurs, to admit the merit or
veracity of some or all of the petitioner's assertions."' 51
Expansion of the record expedites the determination of the
meritoriousness of a motion to vacate through the inclusion of ad-
ditional relevant materials in the fies and records of the case. Let-
ters predating the filing of the motion, 152 documents, exhibits,153
answers under oath to written interrogatories propounded by the
court, depositions of the prisoner and others, 54 and even affidavits
148. The content of answers in civil actions is governed by NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-
811 to -812. See generally Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 28
U.S.C-.A foll. § 2255, Adv. Comm. Note to R. 5 (West Supp. 1978).
149. The answer could point out to the court a basis for denying the motion such
as the instant motion being a second or successive motion or it could provide
the court with information not usually contained in the files and records, such
as appellate briefs. See generally Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings,
28 U.S.C. foil. § 2255, Adv. Comm. Note to R. 5 (West Supp. 1978).
150. See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970); STANDARDS,
supra note 5, § 4.3 & Commentary, Developments, supra note 5, at 1178. But
see Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2254, Adv. Comm. Note to
R 4 (West 1977) (it is the duty of the trial judge to screen out frivolous appli-
cations and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by
ordering an unnecessary answer).
151. Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970).
152. Id. at 529, 533 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2255, R. 7 (West Supp.
1978); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll § 2254, R. 7 (West 1977).
153. Harris v. United States, 436 F.2d 591, 594 (10th Cir. 1971); Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2255, R. 7 (West Supp. 1978);
Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.CA. foll. § 2254, R. 7 (West 1977).
154. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81 (1977); Moorhead v. United States, 456
F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1972); Reed v. United States, 438 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir.
1971); Russell v. United States, 321 F.2d 533, 533 (9th Cir. 1963) ("Obviously
appellant can be required to particularize his claim. Perhaps a deposition
taken of appellant would show more clearly whether a hearing need be held,
or if held, whether there is any need for Russell's presence.") Rules Gov-
erning Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C-.A foil. § 2255, R. 6 (West Supp.
1978); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Adv. Comm. Note
to R. 6 (West 1977); STANDARDS, supra note 5, at § 4.5(b). But cf. Burleson v.
United States, 430 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1965) (refusal of prisoner to answer depo-
sition questions does not make evidentiary hearing unnecessary).
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in the appropriate case1 55 may be considered by the court in ex-
ploring the veracity of a prisoner's allegations. Through expansion
of the record, the trial court is afforded an intermediate state of
consideration between summary dismissal and a full evidentiary
hearing.156
Expansion of the record is based on the premise that "the evi-
dence against a petitioner's extra-record contentions may be so
overwhelming as to justify a conclusion that an unsupported and
inherently improbable allegation does not raise a substantial issue
of fact."' 57 Thus, it is well suited for the ascertainment of indepen-
dently verifiable facts. Where, however, the issue is one of credi-
bility, resolution should be by live testimony before the court
rather than by affidavits or similar out of court forms of evi-
dence.I5 8
155. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2255, R. 7 (West
Supp. 1978); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.CA foil. § 2254, R. 7 (West
1977). See United States v. Carlino, 400 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied,
394 U.S. 1013 (1969) (affidavit of prisoner showed no basis for claim); Mirra v.
United States, 379 F.2d 782, 787 (2d Cir. 1967) (affidavit of doctor taken as true
would only raise possibility of mental incompetency at time of trial); Accardi
v. United States, 379 F.2d 312, 313 (2d Cir. 1967) (affidavit of prisoner was to-
tally devoid of any factual elaboration). An opposite proposition may be
found in Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970):
By the inclusion of affidavits within the scope of 'Tiles and
records" the majority neatly obviates the necessity of a hearing in
every case. It could never have been envisioned that the summary
disposition provided in the statute would encompass such trial by
affidavit. Testimony by witnesses to past events should be live and
subject to testing by cross-examination. Affidavits cannot be probed-
nor can they fill in missing details which may significantly alter or
refute the account. "It is only when the witnesses are present and
subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to
be given their testimony can be appraised."
Id. at 533. (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
156. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 82 (1977); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d
526, 529-30 (4th Cir. 1970); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foil.
§ 2254, Adv. Comm. Note to R. 7 (West 1977).
157. Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 996 (3d Cir. 1972). See Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 82 n.25 (1977) ("But before dismissing facially adequate
allegations short of an evidentiary hearing, ordinarily a district judge should
seek as a minimum to obtain affidavits from all persons likely to have
firsthand knowledge of the existence of any plea bargain.").
158. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 82 n.25 (1977); Raines v. United States, 423
F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970) ("When the issue is one of credibility, resolution
on the basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive, but this is not to say they
may not be helpful."); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.CA. foil. § 2254,
Adv. Comm. Notes to R. 4, 7 (West 1977). The express language of Rule 7, for
both sections 2254 and 2255, would permit the disposition of a habeas petition
or section 2255 motion to vacate on the basis of affidavits even when the issue
is one of credibility. The scope of the language is, however, called into doubt
by the Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules and note 25 of Blackledge.
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Machibroda v. United States'59 illustrates a situation in which
expansion of the record would have revealed whether a claim was
substantial before a full evidentiary hearing was held. The pris-
oner claimed his pleas of guilty to two counts of bank robbery were
involuntary because on three separate occasions an Assistant
United States Attorney had promised him that he would receive a
total sentence of not more than twenty years if he pleaded guilty
when, in fact, he received consecutive terms of twenty-five and
fifteen years. He further alleged that he had been told not to tell
his attorney about the conversations and that if he told the court or
his attorney, two other robberies would be brought up. Finally, he
alleged he wrote several letters to the Attorney General and the
court in regard to the promises he had received and he had re-
ceived replies. The district court denied the prisoner's section 2255
motion without an evidentiary hearing and the court of appeals af-
firmed.160 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a hearing
was necessary, but noted:
The language of the statute [section 22551 does not strip the district courts
of all discretion to exercise their common sense. Indeed, the statute itself
recognizes that there are times when allegations of facts outside the rec-
ord can be fully investigated without requiring the personal presence of
the prisoner. Whether the petition in the present case can appropriately
be disposed of without the presence of the petitioner at the hearing is a
question to be resolved in the further proceedings in the District Court.161
The Court previously had noted: "It is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that many of the material allegations can either be corrobo-
rated or disproved by the visitors' records of the county jail where
the petitioner was confined, the mail records of the penitentiary to
which he was sent, and other such sources. '162 In other words, the
Court was suggesting a procedure for expanding the record by re-
sort to independently verifiable facts.
Procedure under section 2255 and federal habeas corpus now
explicitly provides for expansion of the record, 63 but this is not
the only method for testing the allegations of a motion to vacate
short of a full evidentiary hearing. The motion for summary judg-
ment'6 is ideally suited for testing allegations capable of in-
159. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
160. Machibroda v. United States, 280 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1960).
161. 368 U.S. at 495-96 (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. at 495.
163. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2255, R. 7 (West
Supp. 1978); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254, R. 7 (West
1977).
164. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1330 to -1336 (1975). See generally Mecham v. Colby, 156
Neb. 386, 56 N.W.2d 299 (1953):
The court examines the evidence on motion for summary judg-
ment, not to decide any issue of fact presented in the case, but to
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dependent verification and the Court in Blackledge has urged
utilization of this procedural device. 165
The reported cases give no indication that the Nebraska trial
courts have made use of any procedure for expanding the record
nor has the state used the motion for summary judgment as a
means of avoiding the need for a full evidentiary hearing. Given
the Nebraska Supreme Court's authorization of the trial courts to
adopt whatever reasonable procedures are necessary for determin-
ing what the files and records show 166 as well as the civil nature of
the Post Conviction Act,167 there would appear to be no reason
why these procedures could not be adopted as methods of expedit-
ing the resolution of post conviction litigation. More importantly,
the use of these procedures would insure that motions to vacate
raising claims that are merely improbable, but not necessarily in-
credible, would not be summarily denied without further factual
development.
IV. DISPOSITION ON THE BASIS OF A PROCEDURAL BAR
When the motion to vacate in conjunction with the files and
records of the case reveals the existence of what can best be classi-
fied as a procedural bar to relief, the motion may be summarily
denied without further factual development or an evidentiary
hearing. The various procedural bars, derived from the express
language of the Post Conviction Act and from case law, cover a
discover if any real issue of fact exists.... In other words, the court
can merely determine that an issue of fact does or does not exist. If
such an issue does exist, the summary judgment act has no applica-
tion; if such issue does not exist, a motion for summary judgment
affords a proper remedy. The evidence offered in support of the mo-
tion is for the purpose of showing that no issue of fact exists, not to
try issues on pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits which
constitute only a part of the evidence available on a trial on the mer-
its. The burden is upon the moving party to show that no issue of
fact exists, and unless he can conclusively do so, the motion for sum-
mary judgment must be overruled.
Id. at 389, 56 N.W.2d at 301 (citations omitted).
165. 431 U.S. at 80.
166. See text accompanying note 69 supra. The problem confronting those federal
courts which allowed an expansion of the record in section 2255 proceedings
prior to the effective date of Rule 7 was how to justify the expansion in light of
the language of section 2255 requiring the holding of a hearing if the files and
records did not negative the petitioner's claim. Their solution was to desig-
nate the additional information as an "expansion" of the record rather than
going outside the record. Harris v. United States, 436 F.2d 591, 594 (10th Cir.
1971); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529-30 (4th Cir. 1970). While this
solution is less than fully satisfying, the lack of any definition of files and
records in the statute does permit the taking of a flexible approach, an option
also open to the Nebraska courts.
167. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975).
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myriad variety of situations, but for analytical purposes may be
classified into four types: (1) where the motion to vacate is a sec-
ond or successive motion; (2) where the issue presented has been
previously adjudicated; (3) where the issue presented has been
previously waived; and (4) where a statutory prerequisite to relief
has not been satisfied.
A. Successive Motions
The Post Conviction Act provides for limiting successive mo-
tions for post conviction relief: "The court need not entertain a sec-
ond motion or successive motions for similar relief on behalf of the
same prisoner."'168 On its face the quoted language would appear
to vest the trial court with the unlimited discretion to deny consid-
eration of a second motion to vacate if it had once previously con-
sidered a motion from the same prisoner challenging the same
conviction or sentence.169 Neither the United States nor Nebraska
Supreme Courts have chosen to so interpret this language, but, in-
stead, have developed markedly different rules concerning succes-
sive applications.
After entertaining several appeals from prisoners denied relief
in prior motions and who were now contesting the denial of a sec-
ond motion to vacate, 70 the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v.
168. Id.
169. In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the nearly identical language of section 2255:
Under § 2255, it is enough, in order to invoke the court's discretion to
decline to reach the merits, that the prisoner is seeking "similar re-
lief" for the second time. This language might seem to empower the
sentencing court to apply resjudicata virtually at will, since even if a
second motion is predicated on a completely different ground from
the first, the prisoner ordinarily will be seeking the same "relief."..
But the language cannot be taken literally.
Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted). The Court went on to explain that principles
of resjudicata do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings under section 2254
and, whereas the scope of section 2255 is the same as that of section 2254, res
judicata also does not apply to section 2255. Res judicata does apply to
habeas corpus proceedings in Nebraska where the second petition is based
on the same reasons and facts as a first petition. Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb.
885, 905, 22 N.W.2d 124, 135 (1946); Williams v. Olson, 145 Neb. 282, 287-88, 16
N.W.2d 178, 180, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 877 (1944).
170. State v. Rapp, 186 Neb. 785, 186 N.W.2d 482 (1971); State v. Dabney, 183 Neb.
316, 160 N.W.2d 163 (1968); State v. Wycoff, 183 Neb. 373, 160 N.W.2d 221 (1968);
State v. Sheldon, 184 Neb. 852, 172 N.W.2d 631 (1969); State v. Cole, 184 Neb.
864, 173 N.W.2d 39 (1969). It is unclear from the cited opinions whether the
trial courts chose to base their respective denials of post conviction relief on
the provisions of NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975), limiting successive
motions. However, it is hinted, although not clearly stated in Dabney and
Cole that the affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of the motions was
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Reichell7 ' laid down a new rule severely curtailing the bringing of
successive motions for post conviction relief:
We hold that a motion for relief under the Post Conviction Act must state
all grounds which are available to the prisoner as a basis for relief at the
time the motion is filed. After a first motion for post conviction relief has
been judicially determined, any subsequent motion for post conviction re-
lief from the same conviction and sentence may be dismissed by the dis-
trict court, unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis
relied upon for relief was not available at the time of filing a prior motion
for post conviction relief.
17 2
Since its adoption the rule has been applied repeatedly to bar con-
sideration of a second motion for post conviction relief.'7 3
The facts of Reichel reveal the narrow scope of the rule. In 1966
Reichel had been convicted of burglary and sentenced as an habit-
ual criminal and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.174 Shortly
thereafter Reichel filed his first motion for post conviction relief
claiming that the denial of a pretrial discovery motion had resulted
in the suppression of evidence favorable to him. The motion to va-
cate was denied by the district court without an evidentiary hear-
ing and the denial was affirmed on appeal.17 5 Less than two years
later Reichel filed a second motion for post conviction relief claim-
ing he had made an unintelligent waiver of his right to counsel in
one of the prior convictions upon which his habitual criminal sen-
tence was based. The district court denied an evidentiary hearing
and dismissed the motion.
On appeal the supreme court agreed with Reichel that the rec-
ord of the prior conviction was insufficient to show a valid waiver
of his right to counsel and that ordinarily he would be entitled to
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the waiver was intel-
ligently and understandingly made. However, in this instance, an
interest in the finality of judgments and an end to litigation 7 6 com-
based in part on the fact that the second motions presented issues raised and
determined in the first motions.
171. 187 Neb. 464, 191 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
172. Id. at 467, 191 N.W.2d at 828.
173. The Reichel rule has been applied in State v. Newton, 202 Neb. 361, -N.W2d
- (1979); State v. Niemann, 195 Neb. 675, 240 N.W.2d 38 (1976); State v. Has-
kett, 194 Neb. 523,233 N.W.2d 782 (1975); State v. Hall, 194 Neb. 173,231 N.W.2d
123 (1975); State v. Fincher, 191 Neb. 446, 216 N.W.2d 172 (1974); State v.
Huffman, 190 Neb. 319, 207 N.W.2d 696 (1973); State v. Weiland, 190 Neb. 111,
206 N.W.2d 336 (1973); State v. Redemer, 188 Neb. 653, 198 N.W.2d 325 (1972);
State v. Smith, 188 Neb. 388, 196 N.W.2d 918 (1972); and State v. Birdwell, 188
Neb. 116, 195 N.W.2d 502 (1972). See also State v. Pilgrim, 188 Neb. 213, 196
N.W.2d 162 (1972).
174. State v. Riley, 182 Neb. 300, 154 N.W.2d 741 (1967).
175. State v. Reichel, 184 Neb. 194, 165 N.W.2d 743 (1969).
176. State v. Reichel, 187 Neb. 464, 466-67, 191 N.W.2d 826, 827-28 (1971):
There ought to be some final end to litigation in a criminal case.
Post conviction procedures come into play only after traditional
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pelled applying a rule forbidding the bringing of a second post con-
viction motion where the basis relied upon was available at the
time of filing of the prior motion. This was so although the peti-
tioner had presented a prima facie case for relief.
What would appear to be a grant of discretion, by the Act 7 7 and
by Reichel, 78 to the trial courts in determining whether to enter-
tain a second motion for post conviction relief has in application
become an inflexible bar to such motions. As an example, in State
v. Smith,179 a case decided after Reichel, the trial court exercised
its discretion in favor of entertaining a prisoner's second motion
for post conviction relief by appointing counsel, granting a hearing
and deciding the motion on the merits. On appeal, however, the
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, not
on the merits, but by citing the rule given in Reichel and stating,
"We see no reason to depart from that holding in this case."1 80
The opinions of the Nebraska Supreme Court do not reveal in
what situations the basis relied upon for relief in the second mo-
tion to vacate would not have been available at the time of the
filing of the previous motion. Several obvious examples are when
a constitutional standard with retroactive application has been an-
nounced subsequent to the filing of the prior motion;18 1 when the
facts forming the basis for the motion were not known to or reason-
ably ascertainable by the prisoner at the time of the filing of the
prior motion; and when there is a showing of new evidence, previ-
ously undiscoverable, concerning a claim presented in a prior mo-
tion.182
The Reichel rule is the source of several problems, but it causes
criminal procedures have been completed. Post conviction remedies
are cumulative and are not concurrent with any other remedy. There
is no justification for allowing a prisoner to continue litigation end-
lessly by piecemeal post conviction attacks on his conviction and
sentence.
See State v. Fincher, 191 Neb. 446, 447, 216 N.W.2d 172, 173 (1974); State v.
Weiland, 190 Neb. 111, 113,206 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973); State v. Pilgrim, 188 Neb.
213, 214-15, 196 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1972).
177. NEi. REv. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975): '"e court need not entertain a sec-
ond motion or successive motions. . . ." (Emphasis added.).
178. 187 Neb. at 467, 191 N.W.2d at 828: "[A]ny subsequent motion... may be
dismissed ..... " (Emphasis added.)
179. 188 Neb. 388, 196 N.W.2d 918 (1972).
180. Id. at 389, 196 N.W.2d at 918. The opinion does not reveal whether the second
motion for post conviction relief presented the same or different grounds for
relief than the first motion.
181. See State v. Warner, 192 Neb. 438, 222 N.W.2d 292 (1974).
182. A situation not covered by the Reichel rule occurs when the motion to vacate
states facts which if true would constitute grounds for relief under another
existing remedy. In that case, the motion will be dismissed without
prejudice. See text accompanying note 251 infra.
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least concern when applied to a second motion based on grounds
previously heard in a prior motion if the prior motion was decided
on the merits. Once the merits of a dispute have been determined,
there is little justification for incurring the social and economic
costs of relitigating the matter.18 3 The matter should be, and in
Nebraska is, properly considered res judicata.8 4
Where the trial court's determination has not been appealed
and, therefore, not affirmed on the merits, there is more reason for
permitting reconsideration of the controversy. Certainly where
the prisoner was represented by competent counsel who chose not
to appeal the trial court's decision for tactical reasons and the pris-
oner agreed, there is no excuse for permitting the relitigation of
the same issue.18 5 But where the prisoner appeared in the trial
court unrepresented by reason of indigency and failed to obtain an
appellate determination of his contentions because of a lack of
knowledge of the legal mechanics of bringing an appeal,186 there is
a greater potential for injustice. However, rather than tolerating
the relitigation of previously determined issues,187 it would be far
more desirable to liberalize the procedures for appointment of
counsel so as to avoid the problem.
The major difficulty in applying the Reichel rule to successive
183. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 12, at 529-30:
Whether the scope of the rules of res judicata is relatively narrow
(as it formerly was) or relatively broad (as it has now become), the
social objectives of the rules have remained much the same. They
give recognition to the fact that the purpose of a lawsuit is not only to
do substantial justice but to bring an end to controversy. It is impor-
tant that judgments of the court have stability and certainty. This is
true not only so that the parties and others may rely on them in or-
dering their practical affairs (such as borrowing or lending money, or
buying property), but also so that the moral force of court judgments
will not be undermined. There is still need for some flexibility, and
of course the law does afford procedures for correcting, reversing, re-
opening, and vacating judgments. But the limitations on these proce-
dures are on the whole stricter and more strictly enforced, and the
area for discretion is narrower, than is the case with prejudgment
procedures.
(Citations omitted.).
184. State v. Redemer, 188 Neb. 653, 198 N.W.2d 325 (1972). But cf. Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (res jzdicata is inapplicable to federal
habeas corpus).
185. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
186. State v. Niemann, 195 Neb. 675, 240 N.W.2d 38 (1976), and State v. Redemer,
188 Neb. 653, 198 N.W.2d 325 (1972), are two examples of where the prisoners
failed to appeal from the denial of his first motion to vacate. The reasons for
the decisions not to appeal are not indicated, but it is certainly questionable
whether it was because they were satisfied with the trial court's decision. See
Harris v. Brewer, 434 F.2d 166, 169 (8th Cir. 1970).
187. But see Powell v. Sacks, 303 F.2d 808, 810 (6th Cir. 1962); STANDARDS, supra
note 5, at 94.
1979]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
motions occurs when the issues raised in the second motion are
different from those raised in the prior motion or, when the issues
are the same, the disposition of the prior motion was not on the
merits. In either event the prisoner is prevented from receiving a
complete review of the constitutional validity of his conviction and
sentence. The problems are severalfold in applying the Reichel
rule to this last situation. First, concepts of finality of judgment
and resjudicata are elevated to a position paramount to the vindi-
cation of constitutional rights in such a way as to foreclose a pris-
oner from receiving consideration of his claims of constitutional
error. Such an ordering of priorities does not comport with current
notions concerning the need for a full and fair determination of
constitutional claims.18 8
Second, where the prior motion for post conviction relief has
been brought by a pro se prisoner, as is frequently the case, the
injustice of applying the Reichel rule to any subsequent motion is
compounded. Most prisoners have little or no grasp of legal techni-
calities or of their constitutional rights as is evidenced by the
numerous filings of frivolous motions to vacate. But unless a pris-
oner with a valid constitutional claim is possessed of unusual legal
acumen or just plain luck, he is more likely than not to file a
groundless motion to vacate or one containing less than all of his
claims for relief. Nevertheless, by filing the motion, no matter how
unwise or misguided this might be, he will have foreclosed himself
from the future consideration of the valid claim when subse-
quently discovered by himself or counsel.18 9
Third, unless the prisoner has deliberately bypassed available
state procedure by intentionally failing to assert a claim in the
prior motion to vacate, the federal courts are free to consider in a
habeas corpus proceeding claims the Nebraska courts would be
precluded from reaching because of the Reichel rule.190
188. In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the Court stated:
Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life
or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is al-
leged. If "government ... [is] always [to] be accountable to the ju-
diciary for a man's imprisonment," ... access to the courts on
habeas must not be thus impeded. The inapplicability of resjudicata
to habeas, then, is inherent in the very role and function of the writ.
Id. at 8 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963)). Similar priorities were
voiced in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963): "But conventional notions of
finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest fed-
eral policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be
denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."
But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977).
189. See Collins & Neil, The Oregon Postconviction-Hearing Act, 39 ORE. I- REV.
337, 341 (1960); Jenner, supra note 39, at 360.
190. In the landmark case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court
held that a state prisoner who may have procedurally forfeited his right to
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raise a federal constitutional claim in the state courts through an untimely or
incorrect assertion of that claim is not similarly foreclosed from raising the
claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless there has been a deliber-
ate bypassing of the state court procedures for raising the claim. Applying
the principles of Fay v. Noia to a situation in which the state prisoner was
barred from consideration of his federal constitutional claims in the state
courts because they were first asserted in a second or successive application
for post conviction relief; the courts that have considered the question have
held that the claims may be reviewed in federal habeas corpus absent a de-
termination that the prisoner engaged in the deliberate piecemeal presenta-
tion of his claims to the state courts. Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972);
Smith v. Wolff, 506 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1974); Harris v. Brewer, 434 F.2d 166 (8th
Cir. 1970).
Recently the Supreme Court has chosen at least partially to retreat from
the broad rule announced in Fay v. Noia. In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536 (1976), the Court considered a state prisoner's challenge in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding to the composition of the grand jury that had in-
dicted him. State law required that any challenge to the composition of the
grand jury be made in advance of trial or it would be considered waived; the
same rule applied in the federal courts. Since in Davis v. United States, 411
U.S. 233 (1973), it was decided that a failure to raise a timely challenge to the
composition of the grand jury in a federal criminal prosecution was a waiver
of the right in a subsequent section 2255 proceeding, the Court held the same
conclusion should apply to a state prisoner in a federal habeas proceeding
unless the prisoner can show cause for his failure to timely challenge the
composition and demonstrate actual prejudice.
Subsequently, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Court con-
sidered a contention by a state prisoner in a federal habeas proceeding that
he had not understood his Miranda rights before making incriminating state-
ments, although this issue had not been raised at or before trial in compli-
ance with the state's contemporaneous objection rule. The Court held that
the prisoner's failure to comply with the state rule was an independent and
adequate state procedural ground barring federal habeas review absent a
showing of cause and prejudice. As stated by the Court:
[Wle deal only with contentions of federal law which were not re-
solved on the merits in the state proceeding due to the respondent's
failure to raise them there as required by state procedure. We leave
open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the
"cause" and "prejudice" standard, and note here only that it is nar-
rower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia,. . . which
would make federal habeas review generally available to state con-
victs absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the federal constitu-
tional contention. It is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, going
far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it, which we today reject.
Id. at 87-88 (footnotes omitted, citations omitted; emphasis in original). See
also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). See generally Soloff, Litigation
and Relitigatior: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 6 HOFsTRA L. REV. 297 (1978); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedu-
ral Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L Rnv. 473 (1978). Whether a
state rule barring successive applications for post conviction relief would also
be considered an adequate and independent state ground for barring federal
habeas review is not clear. Certainly many of the reasons given in Sykes for
holding the contemporaneous objection rule to be an adequate ground would
also be applicable to the Reichel rule. See Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41
(1972).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
For example, the prisoner in Smith v. Wolff' 9 ' had pleaded
guilty to first degree murder during the commission of a robbery
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. No direct appeal was
taken from the conviction and sentence. He then filed a motion to
vacate which was denied, after which he filed a motion for a new
trial in the post conviction proceeding. The motion for a new trial
was dismissed for being fied out of time and the dismissal was
affirmed on appeal by the Nebraska Supreme Court.192
Smith then filed a second motion to vacate, the trial court ap-
pointed counsel, a hearing was held and the trial court denied re-
lief on the merits. On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the
court refused to consider the merits of the appeal, but instead ap-
plied the Reichel rule and affirmed the lower court decision. 193
Having twice been before the Nebraska Supreme Court without
receiving a ruling on the merits of his constitutional claims, Smith
next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court raising the same claims presented to the state
courts as well as additional claims. The district court proceeded to
dismiss those claims not yet presented to the state courts on the
grounds Smith had not exhausted his state remedies. On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit held that further relief in the state courts was
no longer available because of the rule against successive motions
and since Smith had not deliberately bypassed the state courts,
the case was remanded to the district court with directions to con-
sider his claims. 194
From Smith it can be seen that the Reichel rule does not com-
pletely foreclose a prisoner from receiving consideration of a fed-
eral constitutional claim first presented in a successive motion to
vacate, but merely shifts that consideration to another forum, the
federal court. As a consequence, the federal courts end up ruling
for the first time on matters which quite properly should initially
be considered by the state courts of Nebraska.
In contrast to the position taken by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Reichel, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
191. 506 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1974).
192. State v. Smith, 182 Neb. 458, 155 N.W.2d 368 (1968).
193. State v. Smith, 188 Neb. 388, 196 N.W.2d 918 (1972).
194. There is some indication in Robinson v. Wolf 468 F.2d 438 at 439-40 (8th Cir.
1972), that the Reichel rule is constitutionally impermissible. If this is the
correct reading of the opinion, the court's conclusion is clearly erroneous.
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 45 (1972) ('"There can be no doubt that states
may likewise provide ... that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must
assert all known constitutional claims in a single proceeding."); Harris v.
Brewer, 434 F.2d 166, 168 (8th Cir. 1970) ("Federal courts cannot insist upon
liberalization of state procedures.).
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the similar language of section 2255195 to formulate a radically dif-
ferent rule than that followed by the Nebraska courts. In Sanders
v. United States,196 the Court laid down a three-part test for deter-
mining when a second or successive application for post conviction
relief may be denie&
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal
habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the
subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the
prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and
(3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the
subsequent application.197
There is some indication that the Nebraska Supreme Court is
moving toward adopting the second of the three parts of the
Sanders test. In State v. Svoboda,19 8 the prisoner had brought mo-
tions to vacate in three separate but contemporaneous criminal
proceedings claiming that his guilty plea in each of the proceed-
ings was involuntary because of the trial court's participation in
plea bargaining discussions and because of misrepresentation and
coercion by counsel as to the plea bargains. The same issues had
been raised in the prisoner's direct appeal from the convictions,
but because he had failed to fie motions for a new trial, the
Supreme Court had refused to consider the issues on appeal and
affirmed the judgments. 99 Now, on a consolidated appeal from the
denial of post conviction relief, the state contended that the
supreme court was barred from considering the prisoner's conten-
tions because of the rule that a motion to vacate cannot be used as
a substitute for an appeal or to secure a further review of issues
already litigated.200
The court, in an opinion by Justice McCown, the author of the
Reichel opinion, rejected the state's argument, stating: 'The asser-
tion of a constitutional right by a defendant in a direct appeal of a
criminal conviction in this court does not constitute a waiver of his
right to post conviction review where this court does not consider
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976): "The sentencing court shall not be required to enter-
tain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same
prisoner."
196. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
197. Id. at 15. The Sanders test is now incorporated in Rules Governing § 2254
Cases, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2254, R. 9(b) (West 1977) and Rules Governing Sec-
tion 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2255, R. 9(b) (West Supp. 1978). See
generally Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study
on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Act, 63 IA. L REV. 15 (1977);
Williamson, Federal Habeas Corpus: Limitations on Successive Applications
From the Same Prisoner, 15 WM. & MARY L REV. 265 (1973); Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.CA foil. § 2254, Adv. Comm. Note to R. 9 (West 1977).
198. 199 Neb. 452, 259 N.W.2d 609 (1977).
199. State v. Svoboda, 194 Neb. 663, 234 N.W.2d 901 (1975).
200. See text accompanying notes 204-05 infra.
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or pass upon the issue."'20 1 The same rule, which is basically the
second part of the Sanders test, could and should be applied to
situations in which the constitutional issue was first asserted in a
prior post conviction proceeding. Whether the Nebraska Supreme
Court will take this next step remains to be seen.20 2
One problem presented by the Sanders rule which is avoided
by application of the Reichel rule is that of repeated filing by pris-
oners who, having been previously unsuccessful in obtaining post
conviction relief, seek again to find that combination of words that
will result in gaining their freedom. A rectifier for this problem
currently exists in the form of the courts' power to deem any sub-
sequent proceedings an abuse of process and all matters con-
nected with the prisoner's conviction to be res judicata.20 3
Adoption of the first two parts of the Sanders rule would cure
many of the problems that result from the application of the
Reichel rule. The new rule would better promote the full and fair
consideration of a prisoner's constitutional claims and would act to
preserve the proper relationship between the state and federal
courts. An alternative to the adoption of the Sanders rule as an
ameliorative for the harshness of the Reichel rule would be the ap-
pointment of counsel for all indigent petitioners filing pro se under
the Post Conviction Act. Such a step would greatly aid in insuring
201. 199 Neb. at 455, 259 N.W.2d at 611. Accord, State v. Curnyn, 202 Neb. 135, 138,
274 N.W.2d 157, 159-60 (1979).
202. The Nebraska Supreme Court has chosen not to apply the Reichel rule when
the prior collateral proceeding was other than under the Post Conviction Act.
In Robinson v. Wolff, 349 F. Supp. 514 (D. Neb. 1972), affd, 468 F.2d 438 (8th
Cir. 1972), the petitioner argued that he had exhausted his available state
remedies concerning a constitutional issue never presented to the state
courts because he had previously brought a petition for habeas corpus in the
state courts and now, under the Reichel rule, was foreclosed from presenting
the new constitutional issue in a motion to vacate under the Post Conviction
Act. The district and circuit courts both rejected this argument on the
grounds that the Reichel rule only applies to successive motions under the
Post Conviction Act and not to other collateral remedies. The petitioner then
brought a motion to vacate in the state courts, was denied relief, and the de-
nial was affirmed on appeal. State v. Robinson, 194 Neb. 111, 230 N.W.2d 222
(1975). In its opinion the Nebraska Supreme Court made no mention of the
Reichel rule. See also State v. Nicholson, 183 Neb. 834, 164 N.W.2d 652, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
The refusal to apply the Reichel rule when the prior collateral proceeding
was other than a motion to vacate is a correct result. The Post Conviction Act
provides only a cumulative remedy if an issue is cognizable under any other
remedy, then it should not be heard in a motion to vacate under the Post
Conviction Act. Therefore, any other available collateral remedy is mutually
exclusive of the remedy under the Post Conviction Act. See text accompany-
ing note 251 infra.
203. State v. Pilgrim, 188 Neb. 213, 196 N.W.2d 162 (1972). See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1963).
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that all constitutional claims would be raised in the prisoner's first
motion to vacate, thus avoiding the need for any successive mo-
tions.
B. Previous Adjudication
The summary denial of a claim because the issue presented has
been previously adjudicated usually occurs in situations in which
the same issue raised in the post conviction proceeding was
presented and adversely decided on direct appeal from the original
conviction.204 When this has occurred, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has in almost every instance responded by citing the rule, or
some variation of the rule, that "[a] motion to vacate a judgment
and sentence under the Post Conviction Act cannot be used as a
substitute for an appeal or to secure a further review of issues al-
ready litigated. 205 Nor will rephrasing, embroidering, expanding
or adding new arguments save an issue from application of this
204. See generally STANDARDS, supra note 5, at §§ 2.1(a) (v), (vi), 6.1 and Commen-
tary.
205. State v. Lacy, 198 Neb. 567, 568, 254 N.W.2d 83, 84 (1977); State v. McDonnell,
192 Neb. 500, 501-02, 222 N.W.2d 583, 584 (1974); State v. Spidell, 192 Neb. 42,44,
218 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1974); State v. Lincoln, 186 Neb. 783, 784, 186 N.W.2d 490,
490-91 (1971). See State v. Svoboda, 199 Neb. 452, 454, 259 N.W.2d 609, 611
(1977).
A common variation of the cited rule is that "[a] defendant who has ap-
pealed his conviction cannot secure a second review of the identical proposi-
tion advanced in such appeal by resort to a post conviction procedure." State
v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 695-96, 264 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1978); State v. Bartlett, 199
Neb. 471, 475, 259 N.W.2d 917, 921 (1977); State v. Franklin, 187 Neb. 363, 363-64,
190 N.W.2d 780, 780 (1971); State v. Newman, 181 Neb. 588, 589, 150 N.W.2d 113,
114 (1967). See State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485,486-87,222 N.W.2d 573, 576
(1974). Other variations are contained in State v. Brown, 192 Neb. 505,506, 222
N.W.2d 808, 808 (1974); State v. Moore, 192 Neb. 74, 75-76, 218 N.W.2d 540, 541
(1974); State v. Blackwell, 191 Neb. 155, 159, 214 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1974) (Clin-
ton, J., concurring); State v. Moss, 191 Neb. 36, 37, 214 N.W.2d 15, 16 (1973);
State v. Weiland, 188 Neb. 626, 627, 198 N.W.2d 327, 329 (1972); State v. Pilgrim,
188 Neb. 213, 214, 196 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1972); State v. Birdwell, 188 Neb. 116,
117, 195 N.W.2d 502, 502-03 (1972); State v. Huffman, 186 Neb. 809, 811, 186
N.W.2d 715, 717 (1971); State v. Erving, 180 Neb. 680, 684, 144 N.W.2d 424, 428
(1966). Also see State v. DeLoa, 194 Neb. 270, 231 N.W.2d 357 (1975).
The federal courts considering the issue have agreed that a federal habeas
petitioner having once raised an issue on direct appeal to the Nebraska
Supreme Court is foreclosed from raising the same issue under the Post Con-
viction Act and, therefore, has exhausted his available state remedies. Rice v.
Wolf 513 F.2d 1280, 1290 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1003 (1975); Davis v.
Sigler, 415 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir. 1969); Kennedy v. Sigler, 397 F.2d 556, 559
(8th Cir. 1968); Homan v. Sigler, 278 F. Supp. 201, 203 (D. Neb. 1967). See
Homan v. Sigler, 283 F. Supp. 404,404-05 (D. Neb. 1968). But cf. Blunt v. Wolff,
501 F.2d 1138, 1141 (1974) (where prisoner was denied right to appellate coun-
sel, Nebraska Supreme Court may well grant new appeal on same issues);
State v. Blunt, 197 Neb. 82, 246 N.W.2d 727 (1976) (court considered same
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rule.206 But to be "litigated" on appeal the issue must have been
actually considered or passed upon on the merits. If disposed of
on procedural grounds, the issue may properly be raised again in a
subsequent motion for post conviction relief. 20 7
An exception to the rule exists where a miscarriage of justice is
shown,208 but what constitutes a miscarriage of justice has never
been expressly defined.209 It appears, sometimes more by implica-
tion than by positive assertion, that a second consideration is per-
missible in four situations: (1) where the issue on direct appeal
has been considered on nonconstitutional grounds;210 (2) where
claim on merits when prisoner was denied right to appellate counsel in prior
appeal).
In a small number of cases, the Nebraska Supreme Court for no apparent
reason ignored the prior appeal and decided the prisoners' contentions on the
merits. State v. Moss, 185 Neb. 536, 177 N.W.2d 284 (1970); State v. Sheldon,
184 Neb. 852, 172 N.W.2d 631 (1969); State v. Nicholson, 183 Neb. 834, 164
N.W.2d 652, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
206. See State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 259 N.W.2d 917 (1977); State v. McDonnell,
192 Neb. 500, 501, 222 N.W.2d 583, 584 (1974); State v. Moore, 192 Neb. 74, 218
N.W.2d 540 (1974). Accord, DeMaro v. Willingham, 401 F.2d 105, 106 (7th Cir.
1968) (§ 2255); De Welles v. United States, 372 F.2d 67, 70 (7th Cir. 1967)
(§ 2255).
207. State v. Curnyn, 202 Neb. 135, 138, 274 N.W.2d 157, 159-60 (1979); State v.
Svoboda, 199 Neb. 452, 455, 259 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1977).
208. State v. Agnew, 185 Neb. 716, 717, 178 N.W.2d 592, 593 (1970); State v. O'Kelly,
181 Neb. 618, 620, 150 N.W.2d 117, 119 (1967); State v. Sheldon, 181 Neb. 360,361,
148 N.W.2d 301, 301 (1967); State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707, 714, 144 N.W.2d 525,
529 (1966).
209. The Nebraska Supreme Court on several occasions has stated, '"The Post
Conviction Act was intended to provide a remedy where a miscarriage of jus-
tice has occurred," but has not defined what this means nor whether it means
something different than when the phrase is used in cases such as those cited
in the preceding footnote. State v. Nelson, 189 Neb. 144, 145, 201 N.W.2d 248,
248 (1972); State v. Snyder, 180 Neb. 787, 790, 146 N.W.2d 67, 69 (1966); State v.
Silvacarvalho, 180 Neb. 755, 759, 145 N.W.2d 447, 449 (1966); State v.
Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 350-51, 142 N.W.2d 765, 770 (1966). See generally 27
WORDS AND PHRASES, Miscarriage of Justice 454 (1961).
210. In State v. Leadinghorse, 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 573 (1974), the motion to
vacate claimed that a sentence of 15 years imprisonment for sodomy was
cruel and unusual punishment while on direct appeal the defendant had
claimed the sentence was excessive. State v. Leadinghorse, 187 Neb. 386, 191
N.W.2d 440 (1971). The court noted in the post conviction action that,
"[d]efendant seeks to avoid our rule that a defendant who has appealed a
conviction cannot secure a second review of the identical proposition ex-
amined in that appeal by resorting to a post conviction procedure by framing
the question in a constitutional context," id. at 485-87, 191 N.W.2d at 576, and
then proceeded to consider the defendant's constitutional claim on its merits
and denied relief.
Similarly, on direct appeal in State v. Erving, 174 Neb. 90, 116 N.W.2d 7
(1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 876 (1963), the prisoner claimed that the trial
court committed nonconstitutional error in allowing the state to show that he
refused to answer questions put to him by the county attorney soon after his
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there has been a retroactive change in the applicable constitu-
tional standard since the time of the direct appeal;21 ' (3) where
there is a showing of new evidence;212 and (4) where on the direct
appeal the defendant was unconstitutionally denied his right to
the effective assistance of appellate counsel.21 3
arrest and asserted that he wanted to see an attorney. On appeal from the
denial of post conviction relief, the prisoner again challenged the same testi-
mony, but on the constitutional grounds that he had not been advised of his
right to remain silent or to consult with an attorney. State v. Erving, 180 Neb.
680, 144 N.W.2d 424 (1966). The court referred to its earlier opinion in denying
the prisoner's claim, but did consider the claim on its merits.
211. In State v. Goham, 187 Neb. 34, 187 N.W.2d 305, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971), the court on direct appeal held the state had not lost jurisdiction over
the offense because of retrocession of jurisdiction over the Indian reservation
where the crime occurred. Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held in an unrelated case that retrocession had occurred. In State v.
Goham, 191 Neb. 639, 216 N.W.2d 869 (1974), an appeal from a denial of post
conviction relief, the court again considered whether the state had jurisdic-
tion and again held that retrocession had not occurred, but then for purposes
of argument proceeded to consider the petitioner's claim, assuming that ret-
rocession had occurred.
In State v. Pilgrim, 184 Neb. 457, 168 N.W.2d 368 (1969), the court consid-
ered the application of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), to a claim
presented on direct appeal that the state had displayed to the jury exhibits
not admitted into evidence. State v. Pilgrim, 182 Neb. 594, 156 N.W.2d 171
(1968). Although the claim had been previously considered, the court deter-
mined on the merits the prisoner's contention that Bruton, a case decided
subsequent to the direct appeal, had application.
Lastly, in State v. Alvarez, 185 Neb. 557, 564, 177 N.W.2d 591, 596 (1970),
modified, 408 U.S. 937 (1972), the court stated: "Questions going to the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty itself were considered by this Court in the
original appeal. There have been no controlling changes since that time
which would alter the conclusions reached."
212. Only by implication can it be concluded that the showing of new evidence
would induce the courts to entertain again a claim once previously consid-
ered. In State v. Blackwell, 191 Neb. 155, 214 N.W.2d 264 (1974), the trial court
granted an evidentiary hearing on the prisoner's claim of incompetence to
stand trial, a claim considered on direct appeal in State v. Blackwell, 184 Neb.
121, 165 N.W.2d 730 (1969). Additional evidence was presented at the hearing,
relief was denied, and the supreme court affirmed the denial. The majority
and dissenting opinions considered the claim on its merits with only the con-
curring opinion of Justice Clinton resting on the rule against a second consid-
eration of issues once decided. In State v. Moore, 192 Neb. 74,218 N.W.2d 540
(1974), the court only noted that all of the circumstances surrounding a claim
of illegal search and seizure were known at the time of the direct appeal rais-
ing the same issue.
213. See Blunt v. Wolff, 501 F.2d 1138 (1974); State v. Blunt, 197 Neb. 82,246 N.W.2d
727 (1976). Under section 2255 the federal courts, within their discretion, may
deny a motion to vacate on the basis of the files and records when the trial or
appellate court has had a "say" on the prisoner's claim. Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8 (1968). In fact, this discretion is almost always
exercised to deny a second consideration. E.g., Odom v. United States, 455
F.2d 159, 160 (9th Cir. 1972). But an exception does exist when there is a
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Two other situations in which the courts will consider an issue
to be barred from consideration because of a previous adjudication
occur when the issue raised in the present motion to vacate was
presented in a prior motion for post conviction relief and when the
issue presented is a factual question or is based on a factual ques-
tion raised and adversely determined by the jury or court during
the course of the original trial. Once it has been disposed of in a
prior motion, the courts will not consider an issue again,2 14 while
issues of fact once determined by the jury or court will not be re-
tried in a post conviction proceeding.2 15
The refusal of the Nebraska courts to consider a claim previ-
ously adjudicated is essentially an application of the doctrine of res
judicata. The arguments for and against the enforcement of the
rule parallel those concerning the rule prohibiting a second motion
for post conviction relief where the motion raises the same claim
as the prior motion.216 The exceptions to both rules are essentially
the same 217 and the rules in both instances embody a commenda-
showing of new evidence, Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 230; Argo v.
United States, 473 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973); a
change in the applicable constitutional standard, Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. at 320; Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963); Barnett v.
United States, 439 F.2d 801, 803 (6th Cir. 1971); or other "unusual circum-
stances," Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 17; Hanson v. United States, 406
F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1969). A subsequent change in the applicable nonconstitu-
tional law is a basis for a second consideration when the claimed error of law
was a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice and
exceptional circumstances are presented justifying the need for the remedy
afforded by habeas corpus. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974).
This exception is based on the language of section 2255 allowing relief for
violations of the "laws of the United States," a basis not available under the
Post Conviction Act.
214. State v. Weiland, 190 Neb. 111, 112-13, 206 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973); State v. Pil-
grim, 188 Neb. 213, 214, 196 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1972); State v. Cole, 184 Neb. 864,
865-66, 173 N.W.2d 39, 40 (1969); State v. Dabney, 183 Neb. 316, 317, 160 N.W.2d
163, 164 (1968). This basis for denial of relief will now occur very infrequently,
if at all, because of the adoption of the rule prohibiting a second or successive
motion to vacate. See text accompanying note 171 supra. The United States
Supreme Court has also held that a second section 2255 motion raising the
same issues as a first motion need not be entertained when the prior determi-
nation was on the merits and the ends of justice would not be served by
reaching the merits again. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
215. State v. Weiland, 188 Neb. 626, 627, 198 N.W.2d 327, 329 (1972); State v. Ford,
187 Neb. 353, 354, 190 N.W.2d 787, 788 (1971); State v. Hizel, 181 Neb. 680, 682,
150 N.W.2d 217,219, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 868 (1967). The same rule is followed
in section 2255 proceedings. See Davidson v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 167,
168-69 (E.D.N.C. 1966); United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 808
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
216. See note 183 & accompanying text supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 181-82 supra. The rule against consideration of
a claim previously adjudicated has exceptions for a retroactive change in the
applicable constitutional standard and for a showing of new evidence. The
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ble policy of refusing to reconsider an issue once finally decided.
C. Previous Waiver of the Issue
The third basis upon which the courts have held an issue to be
barred is that the issue has previously been waived. The primary
example of this occurs when the claimed constitutional error was
apparent to the prisoner and his counsel at the time of the trial
resulting in his conviction, but was not raised on direct appeal.
Where this has occurred, the Nebraska Supreme Court has stated
the error will not ordinarily be considered in a post conviction pro-
ceeding.2 18 Nor is it of significance that no objection was made to
the error at the time of the trial2 19 or that no appeal was taken from
rule against successive motions does not apply when the second motion af-
firmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon was not available at
the time of the filing of the prior motion. The exceptions to the first rule are
subsumed into the exception to the second rule. The exceptions to the first
rule for an issue being previously considered on nonconstitutional grounds
and for the unconstitutional denial of counsel on direct appeal would not
arise in situations of second or successive motions.
218. State v. Fowler, 201 Neb. 647, 271 N.W.2d 341 (1978) (rule applied after an evi-
dentiary hearing; it was unclear whether counsel was aware of claimed defect
at time of trial); State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 696, 264 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1978);
State v. Nelson, 189 Neb. 144, 145-46, 201 N.W.2d 248, 248-49 (1972); State v.
Weiland, 188 Neb. 626, 627, 198 N.W.2d 327, 329 (1972); State v. Lincoln, 186
Neb. 783, 784, 186 N.W.2d 490, 491 (1971); State v. LaPlante, 185 Neb. 816, 818,
179 N.W 2d 110, 111 (1970); State v. Howard, 182 Neb. 411, 418, 155 N.W.2d 339,
343-44 (1967) (rule applied after evidentiary hearing); State v. Losieau, 182
Neb. 367, 368-69, 154 N.W.2d 762, 763 (1967). See Poindexter v. Wolff; 403 F.
Supp. 723, 733 (D. Neb. 1975). The rule is frequently stated in the form of the
oft-quoted ruberic that "[a] motion to vacate a judgment and sentence under
the Post Conviction Act cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or to
secure a further review of issues already litigated." E.g., State v. Lincoln, 186
Neb. at 784, 186 N.W.2d at 490-91. See also text accompanying note 205 supra.
The Nebraska rule is obviously analogous to the deliberate bypass rule
applicable in federal habeas proceedings. See note 190 supra. Under what
circumstances counsel's decision to forego raising an issue will be considered
binding on the defendant has not been answered under the Nebraska rule.
Compare State v. Losieau, 182 Neb. 367, 154 N.W.2d 762 (1967) with Losieau v.
Sigler, 421 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1970). In the federal habeas corpus case, the
district court found that there was not a deliberate bypass of an available
state remedy because of a failure to raise an illegal search and seizure issue
on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court and that the defendant had specifi-
cally asked his attorney to present the claims on appeal. The briefs in the
state post conviction proceeding did not raise this issue, but, instead, argued
that there were unstated reasons which appeared to defendant's attorney
making it advisable not to raise the error or, in the alternative, that his attor-
ney was ineffective. Brief for Appellant at 38-41, State v. Losieau, 182 Neb.
367, 154 N.W.2d 762 (1967).
219. See State v. Lacy, 198 Neb. 567, 254 N.W.2d 83 (1977); State v. Russ, 193 Neb.
308, 226 N.W.2d 775 (1975); State v. Nelson, 189 Neb. 144,201 N.W.2d 248 (1972);
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the conviction.220
Exceptions to the rule have arisen. In several post conviction
proceedings, the court has considered the merits of a constitu-
tional claim that was raised at trial but not raised in the subse-
quent direct appeal2 21 or that was raised at trial and no direct
appeal was taken.222 Unfortunately the court has given no gui-
dance as to when the exceptions will be applied and in only one
instance has it even given recognition to the deviation from its own
rule of not considering such claims. 223
Reference to cases arising under section 2255 provides scant ad-
ditional help in determining when an exception will be made. The
federal courts have long held that a district court may refuse to
consider a section 2255 motion to vacate which raises a constitu-
tional issue when the petitioner has deliberately bypassed the
remedies available at the original trial or on direct appeal.224 The
State v. Pilgrim, 188 Neb. 213, 196 N.W.2d 162 (1972); State v. Howard, 182 Neb.
411, 155 N.W.2d 339 (1967).
220. See State v. Oziah, 198 Neb. 423, 253 N.W.2d 48 (1977).
221. State v. Reizenstein, 183 Neb. 376, 160 N.W.2d 208 (1968) (in the post convic-
tion proceeding, prisoner contended certain statements he gave were invol-
untary; on direct appeal he contended method of disclosing the statements to
the jury was improper even though all facts on which the claim of involuntari-
ness was based were known to the prisoner at that time); State v. Fugate, 180
Neb. 701, 144 N.W.2d 412 (1966) (defendant claimed certain statements were
involuntary and made without benefit of counsel; the same issue was raised
at the original trial and in the motion for a new trial, but was abandoned on
appeal).
222. State v. Brown, 185 Neb. 389, 176 N.W.2d 16 (1970) (prisoner challenged a wit-
ness' comments on his assertion of his fifth amendment rights during a police
interrogation, but the same objection was made at the original trial, and no
appeal was taken from his conviction); State v. Sllvacarvalho, 180 Neb. 755,
145 N.W.2d 447 (1966) (prisoner through pretrial motions and a motion for a
new trial raised the issue of police interrogation without benefit of counsel
and without warning of his right to remain silent, but no appeal was taken
from his conviction). In State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 201 N.W.2d 241 (1972),
the prisoner executed a written waiver of his right to direct appeal, but it is
impossible to tell from the opinion whether any issues raised in the post con-
viction proceeding were raised in the original criminal trial or were apparent
at the time.
223. State v. Fugate, 180 Neb. 701, 707, 144 N.W.2d 412, 416 (1966): "Under these
circumstances, we do not believe that the defendant should be deprived of a
post conviction review at this time upon the ground that the matter has been
fully litigated."
224. E.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8 (1969); Mitchell v. United
States, 482 F.2d 289,292 (5th Cir. 1973); Battaglia v. United States, 428 F.2d 957,
960 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 919 (1970).
A separate but related rule holding that section 2255 may not be used to
challenge error that was not raised on direct appeal is often cited, but has no
application to proceedings under the Post Conviction Act. Paige v. United
States, 456 F.2d 1278, 1279 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Gordon, 433 F.2d
313, 314 (2d Cir. 1970). To this rule there are several exceptions: (1) the
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courts will depart from this rule, however, when the ends of justice
would be served by reaching the merits of the constitutional
claim 225 or where there are exceptional circumstances excusing
the failure to raise the issue.226 All of the Nebraska cases in which
consideration on the merits was given to issues presented at trial
but not raised on direct appeal concern claims of fifth amendment
violations. 227 Arguably, the ends of justice were served by the
court reaching the merits in each one of these cases, but whether
an exception to the rule will be made in other circumstances, simi-
lar to the practice under section 2255, remains to be seen.228
The other situation in which an issue is considered barred from
consideration because of a prior waiver is one in which the peti-
tioner has procedurally waived the issue by failing to raise it at the
appropriate time. This form of waiver should be distinguished
from the preceding situation of deliberate bypass. With a procedu-
ral waiver, the foreclosure is automatic upon failure to raise the
objection or claim at the designated time, absent a showing of un-
constitutionality in the waiver itself. With a deliberate bypass, the
waiver is a factual determination dependent upon the intent of the
claimed error was of significant constitutional dimensions, Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. at 223; Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1947) (fed-
eral prisoner proceeding under habeas corpus); (2) the claimed error seri-
ously affected the trial even though not of constitutional magnitude, if it was
not correctable on appeal, United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 323 (2d Cir.
1963); (3) the claimed error rests on facts outside of the record, United States
v. Hedberg, 411 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1969); (4) the claimed error goes to the ille-
gality of the sentence itself and not to trial errors relating to the underlying
conviction, Natarelli v. United States, 516 F.2d 149, 152 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975); and
(5) other exceptional circumstances exist, United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d at
323. See generally Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 222-24. This rule
should be distinguished from the deliberate bypass rule previously dis-
cussed.
225. United States v. Haywood, 464 F.2d 756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
226. McKnight v. United States, 507 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1975) (medical reasons
caused the prisoner to abandon his direct appeal, thus rendering the bypass
involuntary).
227. See notes 221-22 mupra.
228. Poindexter v. Wolff, 403 F. Supp. 723, 733-34 (D. Neb. 1975), arf'd, 540 F.2d 390
(8th Cir. 1976), suggests another instance in which the Nebraska courts
would make an exception to the rule:
The subject [admissibility of a photograph] was mentioned in only
one sentence of the petitioner's pro se brief to the Supreme Court of
Nebraska [on direct appeal], and I cannot conclude that the issue
was properly presented to the court. I am well aware that the
Supreme Court of Nebraska has rules that errors known to petition-
ers at the time of their direct appeal and which were not presented
therein will not ordinarily be considered in a post-conviction peti-
tion. The issue is not completely foreclosed from such post-convic-
tion relief, however, and the state courts should be first given the
opportunity to consider it.
(Emphasis in original; citations omitted.).
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defendant and his counsel.229
The Nebraska Supreme Court has found a procedural waiver in
situations when the post conviction challenge is to the composition
of the jury in the original criminal proceeding;2 30 to prejudicial
publicity regarding the prisoner's prosecution;23 1 to the legality of
a search and seizure;232 and to the absence of the prisoner from a
session in which a stipulation regarding a hearing on a search and
seizure claim was entered into.2 3 3 The effect of designating an is-
sue as procedurally waived if not raised at the appropriate time, of
course, is to remove the issue from the scope of those cognizable
under the Post Conviction Act.
It is difficult to ascertain whether the breadth of the Nebraska
procedural waiver rule differs from that applied in federal habeas
corpus because of the uncertain state of the federal rule.2 4 The
Nebraska court has made only passing reference to the reasons
why the rule is applied in some situations and not in others and so
it is difficult to articulate any predictive standards for its future
application.23 Whether the court is adhering to the same reasons
229. See generally Dumont v. Estelle, 513 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 1975). A procedu-
ral waiver is also frequently referred to as a procedural default.
230. State v. Robinson, 194 Neb. 111, 230 N.W.2d 222 (1975). In Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), the Supreme Court held that where a federal pris-
oner sought for the first time in a section 2255 proceeding to challenge the
composition of the grand jury that indicted him when FED. R. CFma. P.
12(b) (2) required that such challenges be made by motion before trial, the
claim was waived absent a showing of cause for noncompliance with the
Rules and some showing of actual prejudice. This is substantially the same
rule as that enunciated in Robinson except that the state rule does not re-
quire a showing of cause. Subsequently, in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976), the Davis rule was applied to a state procedural requirement that
challenges to grand jury composition be raised before trial. Cf. Robinson v.
Wolff 349 F. Supp. 514 (D. Neb. 1972) (a pre-Davis decision suggesting a con-
stitutional challenge to jury array would not be procedurally waived under
the Post Conviction Act).
231. State v. Erving, 180 Neb. 680, 144 N.W.2d 424 (1966).
232. State v. Howell, 188 Neb. 687, 199 N.W.2d 21 (1972).
233. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 231 N.W.2d 345 (1975).
234. See note 190 supra.
235. In State v. Howell, 188 Neb. 687, 199 N.W.2d 21 (1972), the court relied on the
statutory requirement that a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence be
brought prior to trial. In State v. Robinson, 194 Neb. 111, 230 N.W.2d 222
(1975), the court cited the case law rule that challenges to the composition of
the jury must be made before trial. The court has failed to mention similar
requirements in other instances with no explanation as to why. Compare
State v. Mackey, 200 Neb. 549, 264 N.W.2d 430 (1978) (claim that a statute is
unconstitutional must be raised at or before trial or it is waived) with State v.
Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974) and State v. Williams, 189 Neb.
127,201 N.W.2d 241 (1972) (post conviction cases considering the constitution-
ality of statutes without any mention of a waiver rule). Similarly, the court
has pointed out that an issue which is waived for purposes of direct appeal
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and standards as announced by the United States Supreme Court
for the federal rule can only be conjecture, but to the extent the
Nebraska rule is more restrictive than the federal rule, the Ne-
braska courts have delegated their post conviction adjudicative
powers to the federal courts.236
D. Failure to Fulfill A Statutory Prerequisite
The nonfulfillment of a statutory prerequisite to relief is the last
procedural bar that serves as a basis for the summary denial of
post conviction relief. The two prerequisites that have to date sur-
faced in the opinions are the requirements that a petitioner be in
custody and that no other remedy be currently available for raising
the petitioner's claim.
Section 29-3001 of the Post Conviction Act requires a petitioner
under the Act to be "in custody under sentence."2 37 The exact
scope of the custody requirement, which also applies to federal
habeas and section 2255 proceedings, 238 has proved difficult of defi-
nition. There is no question that a prisoner challenging the judg-
ment and sentence under which he is currently incarcerated is in
custody under the Act.239 The difficulty arises in considering all of
the numerous sentencing variations that can occur because of the
release of prisoners on parole, sentences imposed by more than
one jurisdiction, concurrent and consecutive sentences, sentences
of probation, sentences that have been completed, but are serving
as the basis for an enhanced sentence under a multiple offender
statute, and so on.
A consecutive sentence scheduled to begin sometime in the fu-
ture may be challenged before its commencement date. Prior to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Peyton v. Rowe,240
a prisoner in custody under one sentence could not in a federal
habeas or section 2255 proceeding challenge a second conviction
because of a failure to file a motion for a new trial may, nonetheless, be raised
in a post conviction proceeding if of constitutional dimensions. State v.
Beans, 199 Neb. 807, 261 N.W.2d 749 (1978); State v. Price, 198 Neb. 229, 252
N.W.2d 165 (1977).
236. See Frazior v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224, 1230 (8th Cir. 1971); Midgett v. Warden,
329 F.2d 185, 186 (4th Cir. 1964); Comment, Post-Conviction Relief in
Arkansas, 24 AnK. L REV. 57, 83 (1970).
237. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975). See State v. Moore, 190 Neb. 271,
272, 207 N.W.2d 518, 519 (1973) ('"The Post Conviction Act extends relief only
to persons 'in custody."').
238. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2255 (1976).
239. This proposition is so basic that no case specifically holds to this effect, but
examples of prisoners challenging a sentence being served are numerous.
E.g., State v. Miles, 194 Neb. 128, 230 N.W.2d 227 (1975); State v. Cortez, 191
Neb. 800, 218 N.W.2d 217 (1974).
240. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
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and sentence he had not yet begun to serve. Under what is known
as the '"prematurity doctrine," the prisoner was not considered to
be in custody until service of the sentence had commenced. 24 1 In
State v. Losieau,242 an opinion presaging the decision in Peyton,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held the doctrine did not apply to
proceedings under the Post Conviction Act:
Logic, necessity, and the practical considerations of modem jurisprudence
make it imperative that historical doctrine not outweigh effective criminal
procedure. A refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the court here would
necessitate placing preeminent emphasis on the history of the writ of
habeas corpus rather than on the practical and effective employment of
the Post Conviction Act. We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances
here, the defendant was "in custody under sentence" and the remedies of
the Post Conviction Act may be sought against the validity of a final judg-
ment of conviction, even though the petitioner has not yet begun to serve
the sentence imposed.
2 4 3
A logical but as yet unruled upon extension of the holding in
Losieau is that the procedure of the Post Conviction Act is avail-
able to a prisoner in custody in another jurisdiction to attack a Ne-
braska conviction and sentence scheduled to be served upon
completion of the term imposed by the other jurisdiction. Such a
conclusion is not only supported by the quoted language of the
Losieau opinion, but by the majority of the federal courts that
have considered whether a state prisoner may challenge a federal
sentence scheduled to commence in the future.244
Another issue that has arisen under the custody requirement is
whether the Act provides a vehicle for attacking a conviction and
sentence already completed, but which is serving as the basis for
an enhanced sentence under an habitual criminal statute. Al-
though this question has been squarely presented on two separate
occasions, the Nebraska Supreme Court avoided answering it both
241. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), overruled the Court's earlier decision in
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), which held that under federal habeas
corpus, "[a] sentence which the prisoner has not begun to serve cannot be
the cause of restraint which the statute makes the subject of inquiry." 293
U.S. at 138. The prematurity doctrine still applies to Nebraska habeas pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Kuwitzky v. O'Grady, 135 Neb. 466, 282 N.W. 396 (1938).
242. 180 Neb. 696, 144 N.W.2d 435 (1966).
243. Id. at 701, 144 N.W.2d at 438.
244. Simmons v. United States, 437 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1970); Desmond v. United States Bd. of Parole,
397 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968); Collins v. United
States, 418 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Porter v. United States, 343 F. Supp.
849 (E.D. Mo. 1972). Cf. United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d
1176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971) (federal prisoner may chal-
lenge future state sentence). Contra, Tremarco v. United States, 412 F. Supp.
550 (D.N.J. 1976); Newton v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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times.245 However, in several other cases the court proceeded to
consider the merits of a prisoner's attack on his prior convictions
without any discussion of the issue.246 Further, in State v.
Bevins,247 the court considered the prisoner's contentions even
though the prior conviction was serving as the basis for another
state's enhanced sentence under which the prisoner was currently
incarcerated. 248
There are other forms of restraint which have not yet been con-
sidered by the Nebraska Supreme Court as to whether they rise to
the level of "custody" as that term is used in the Post Conviction
Act.249 It is clear, however, that once a sentence has been com-
pleted and the petitioner released from custody, he may no longer
resort to the provisions of the Act.250
The other statutory prerequisite, that no other remedy be cur-
rently available for raising the prisoner's claim, is based on the
provisions of section 29-3003 of the Act:
The remedy provided by sections 29-3001 to 29-3004 is cumulative and is
not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the
245. State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966); State v. Losieau, 180
Neb. 671, 144 N.W.2d 406 (1966).
246. State v. Reichel, 187 Neb. 464, 191 N.W.2d 826 (1971) (although motion to va-
cate denied because it was a successive motion, the court held that but for
this fact, an evidentiary hearing would be necessary concerning attack on
prior conviction); State v. LaPlante, 185 Neb. 816, 179 N.W.2d 110 (1970); State
v. Brevet, 180 Neb. 616, 144 N.W.2d 210 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 967 (1967).
See Noll v. Nebraska, 537 F.2d 967, 969 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976).
247. 187 Neb. 785, 194 N.W.2d 181 (1972). The opinion states only that the prisoner
was "convicted several years ago," id. at 785, 194 N.W.2d at 182, but the pris-
oner's supreme court brief reveals that he was serving a sentence of life im-
prisonment in California as an habitual criminal based partly on the
challenged Nebraska conviction. Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Bevins, 187
Neb. 785, 194 N.W.2d 181 (1972).
248. A petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding is permitted to challenge a
prior conviction used to enhance a sentence being currently served. Nelson
v. Tahash, 347 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wilkins, 315 F.2d 865
(2d Cir. 1963).
249. These include, for example, a petitioner released on parole, see generally
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); a petitioner on probation, see
generally United States ex rel. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215,217 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970);
or a petitioner released after the institution of his post conviction proceed-
ings but prior to a decision being rendered, see generally Williams v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974).
250. State v. Moore, 190 Neb. 271, 207 N.W.2d 518 (1973) (relief denied prisoner
bringing motion to vacate after completion of sentence). See State v. Ewert,
194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d 609 (1975). But see State v. Myles, 187 Neb. 105, 187
N.W.2d 584 (1971) (prisoner alleged a denial of right to appeal, but had al-
ready served his sentence). In Myles, the court considered the motion on the
merits on the basis of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In Moore, the
decision in Myles was distinguished on the grounds that Myles was not a post
conviction proceeding, but a direct appeal. This is clearly an incorrect read-
ing of the opinion in Myles.
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courts of this state. Any proceeding filed under the provisions of sections
29-3001 to 29-3004 which states facts which if true would constitute grounds
for relief under another remedy shall be dismissed without prejudice.2 5 1
A cumulative remedy is a statutorily created remedy available
in addition to other previously existing remedies. 252 Although gen-
erally a party may elect between cumulative and pre-existing rem-
edies, 2 53 the post conviction remedy, by the terms of the Act, may
not be pursued simultaneously with any previously existing rem-
edy.2 4 In other words, the remedy is cumulative, but not concur-
rent.
In Nebraska, the only previously existing remedies available to
set aside a judgment and sentence once final255 are direct ap-
251. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3003 (Reissue 1975).
252. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 254-55, 231 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1975); People v.
Santa Fe Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 28 Cal. 2d 675, 683, 171 P.2d 713, 717
(1946); Wood v. Honeyman, 178 Or. 484, 535, 169 P.2d 131, 153 (1946).
253. Kosicki v. S.A. Healy Co., 380 Ill. 298, 302, 44 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1942); Barrett v.
Daly, 319 Ill. App. 169, 171, 48 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1943).
254. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 255, 231 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1975). See State v.
Svoboda, 199 Neb. 452, 454, 259 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1977); State v. Reichel, 187
Neb. 464, 466, 191 N.W.2d 826, 827-28 (1971); State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 696, 698,
144 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1966).
255. The following rule exists in Nebraska:
[I]n the absence of statute, when a valid sentence has been put into
execution by commitment of a prisoner, the District Court has no au-
thority to set aside, modify, amend, or revise the sentence, either
during or after the term or session of court at which the sentence was
imposed. Any attempt to do so is of no effect and the original sen-
tence remains in force.
State v. Adamson, 194 Neb. 592, 594, 233 N.W.2d 925, 926 (1975). See also State
v. McDermott, 200 Neb. 337, 263 N.W.2d 482 (1978); State v. Betts, 199 Neb. 277,
258 N.W.2d 136 (1977); State v. Price, 198 Neb. 229, 252 N.W.2d 165 (1977); State
v. Snider, 197 Neb. 317,248 N.W.2d 342 (1977); State v. Brewer, 190 Neb. 667, 212
N.W.2d 90 (1973); State v. Keyser, 190 Neb. 445, 209 N.W.2d 187 (1973); State v.
Carpenter, 186 Neb. 605, 185 N.W.2d 663 (1971); Housand v. Sigler, 186 Neb. 414,
183 N.W.2d 493 (1971); Moore v. State, 125 Neb. 565, 251 N.W. 117 (1933); Myers
v. Fenton, 121 Neb. 56, 236 N.W. 143 (1931); Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66,231
N.W. 510 (1930); In re Jones, 35 Neb. 499, 53 N.W. 468 (1892).
Commitment of a prisoner occurs at the time he is sentenced. Once he
leaves the courtroom, his sentence is beyond the power of the court to
change. State v. Price 198 Neb. 229, 252 N.W.2d 165 (1977); State v. Snider 197
Neb. 317, 248 N.W.2d 342 (1977); State v. Brewer 190 Neb. 667, 212 N.W.2d 90
(1973); Hickman v. Fenton 20 Neb. 66, 231 N.W. 510 (1930); In re Jones 35 Neb.
499, 53 N.W. 468 (1892); In re Fuller, 34 Neb. 581, 52 N.W. 577 (1892); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2401 (Reissue 1975). The only exceptions to this rule occur where
the original judgment or sentence is erroneous or void, State v. McDermott
200 Neb. 337, 263 N.W.2d 482 (1976); State v. Blankenship, 195 Neb. 329, 237
N.W.2d 868 (1976); State v. Adamson 194 Neb. 592,333 N.W.2d 925 (1975); State
v. Shelby, 194 Neb. 445,232 N.W.2d 23 (1975); Dimmel v. State, 128 Neb. 191,258
N.W. 271 (1935); Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66, 231 N.W. 510 (1930); where it
is necessary to correct the judgment to make it conform to the judgment actu-
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peal,256 a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, 257 the writ of error coram nobis,258 and the writ of habeas
ally pronounced, State v. Adamson, 194 Neb. 592, 333 N.W.2d 925 (1975); In re
Jones, 35 Neb. 499, 53 N.W. 468 (1892); or where there is direct or implied stat-
utory authorization for the change, State v. Adamson, 194 Neb. 592, 333
N.W.2d 925 (1975); State v. Keyser, 190 Neb. 445, 209 N.WF.d 187 (1973);
Housand v. Sigler, 186 Neb. 414, 183 N.W.2d 493 (1971).
An example of a court being directed to use its inherent powers to vacate a
void judgment occurs in State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d 609 (1975).
There the petitioner had been convicted under a statute, the effective date of
which did not occur until after the date of the violation. The prisoner had
been sentenced to a fine, no appeal had been taken, and the fine had been
paid by the time of the motion. Neither habeas corpus nor post conviction
relief was available because the petitioner was not currently incarcerated.
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court directed the lower court in these cir-
cumstances, where no appeal had been taken and upon proper motion, to set
aside the judgment of conviction. It can be argued that the inherent power of
the court to vacate void or erroneous judgments constitutes an additional
remedy for setting aside a judgment once final.
256. A direct appeal to the supreme court is instituted by filing with the clerk of
the district court a notice of appeal within one month of the rendition of the
verdict or the overruling of a motion for a new trial. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1912
(Reissue 1975).
257. Id. § 29-2101. The motion must be filed within a reasonable time after the
discovery of the new evidence, but in any event, within three years after the
date of the verdict. Id. § 29-2103. When a motion for a new trial on grounds
other than newly discovered evidence is pending, there is no judgment or
final order which might be vacated or set aside and the bringing of a motion
to vacate is improper. State v. Werts, 189 Neb. 468, 203 N.W.2d 157 (1973).
258. The writ of error coram nobis "reaches only matters of fact, unknown to the
applicant at the time of judgment, not discoverable by him with reasonable
diligence, and which fact or facts are of such a nature that if known to the
court they would have prevented entry of the judgment." State v. Turner, 194
Neb. 252,255, 231 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1975). The applicability of coram nobis has
been described as a two-part test- (1) Do facts exist which could not have
been reasonably discovered by a petitioner prior to the original entry of judg-
ment; and (2) would these facts have necessarily caused the court to enter a
different judgment? State v. Wilson, 194 Neb. 587, 589, 234 N.W.2d 208, 210
(1975). See Comment, Post Conviction Remedies, 46 NEB. L. REV. 135 (1967);
Note, The Judicial Obstacle Course, 29 NEB. L. REv. 445 (1950); Note, Coram
Nobis, 26 NEB. L. REv. 102 (1946); 20 NEB. L. REv. 173 (1941); Note, Scope of
Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Criminal Cases, 19 NEB. L. Bum.- 150 (1940);
Orfield, Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Nebraska-An Addendum, 11 NEB. L.
BULL. 421 (1933); Orfield, Applicability of Writ of Error Coram Nobis in
Nebraska, 10 NEB. L Bum- 314 (1932).
The time in which an application for a writ of error coram nobis may be
brought is unclear. In State v. Rhodes, 192 Neb. 557, 222 N.W.2d 837 (1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975) (citing Newcomb v. State, 120 Neb. 69, 261
N.W. 348 (1935)), the time limitations of NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2008 (Reissue
1975) were held applicable to coram nobis proceedings. Section 25-2008 con-
tains time limitations for bringing a proceeding to vacate or modify a judg-
ment in civil actions under section 25-2001. In Newcomb, the claim was that
of insanity at the time of the guilty plea, erroneous proceedings against a
person of unsound mind being one of the grounds for vacating a judgment
1979]
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corpus.259 The first of these, direct appeal, is actually a continua-
under section 25-2001. Section 25-2008 limits vacating a judgment on this
ground to within two years after removal of the disability.
The confusion arises in applying the time limitations of section 25-2008 to
the presentation of claims other than the insanity of the defendant. The only
other ground contained in section 25-2001 for vacating a judgment that could
be applicable to coram nobis proceedings is that of newly discovered material
evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered
and produced at trial. A petition for vacation or modification on this basis
must be filed within one year of the rendition of the judgment being chal-
lenged, however, this time limitation is contained in section 25-2001 rather
than section 25-2008. How to reconcile the time limitations of section 25-2008
to claims other than insanity of the defendant remains unclear.
Rhodes suggests that the one year time limitation of section 25-2001, appli-
cable to claims of newly discovered evidence, would also be applicable to a
similar claim in a coram nobis proceeding. In Rhodes, the defendant claimed
his sentence was void because he was not present when it was pronounced; it
included a provision for hard labor; he was required to be a witness against
himself; and he was denied the right of confrontation. The Nebraska
Supreme Court dealt with these claims on their merits, but before doing so,
stated the claim was not suitable for coram nobis because all the relevant
facts were known at the time of trial and, more importantly, the motion was
not brought within the time limitations of section 25-2008. There are no time
limitations in section 25-2008 applicable to a claim of this nature, the only
possible ground being that of newly discovered evidence contained in section
25-2001. Although certainly unclear from the language of the opinion, it would
thus appear that the court intended to apply the time limitations of section
25-2001 as well as those of section 25-2008 to the bringing of an application for
a writ of error coram nobis.
Coram nobis is only available when there is no other remedy for a wrong.
Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 85, 102,261 N.W. 330, 348 (1935). Since a motion for a
new trial may also raise newly discovered evidence, see note 257 supra, pre-
sumably an application for a writ of error coram nobis would not be proper
within three years of the date of the verdict. Because Rhodes apparently lim-
its the time for the bringing of a petition for a writ of coram nobis for most
purposes to one year from the time of the judgment, the arguable effect of
Rhodes is to render coram nobis a nugatory remedy for the most part. See
Note, State Post Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 154, 181 (1965); Note, Coram Nobis, 26 NEB. L. REv. 102 (1946).
259. Habeas corpus is a statutory remedy, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2801 to -2824 (Re-
issue 1975), for challenging the sentencing court's jurisdiction of the offense
and of the defendant and for determining whether the sentence was within
the power of the court to impose. To secure release by habeas corpus, it must
appear that the sentence was absolutely void. When the judgment is regular
upon its face and was given in an action in which the court had jurisdiction of
the offense and of the person of the defendant, extrinsic evidence is not ad-
missible to show its invalidity. Percy v. Parratt, 202 Neb. 102, 273 N.W.2d 689
(1979); Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 70, 71 N.W.2d 716, 719 (1955); Jackson v.
Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 894,22 N.W.2d 124, 129 (1946). See Comment, Post Convic-
tion Remedies, 46 NEB. L. REv. 135 (1967); Note, The Judicial Obstacle Course,
29 NEB. L. REv. 445 (1950); 9 NEB. L. BULT. 343 (1941). There are no applicable
time limitations to the bringing of a habeas corpus proceeding.
In State v. Kluge, 198 Neb. 115, 120, 251 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1977) (Clinton, J.,
dissenting), a motion for a new trial, a proceeding under the Post Conviction
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tion of the original criminal proceeding, and properly not a 'post
conviction" remedy.260 Where a direct appeal is pending at the
time of the commencement of a post conviction proceeding, the lat-
ter will be dismissed without prejudice. 261 This is so even, presum-
ably, where the motion to vacate raises issues different from those
raised on the direct appeal or issues not reflected in the record on
appeal.262 Arguably the same would be true if the time for bring-
ing a direct appeal had not yet expired even though no appeal had,
in fact, been brought.
A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence and coram nobis are both procedures for bringing newly dis-
covered evidence to the attention of the trial court for the purpose
of setting aside the judgment. Although there are significant differ-
ences between the two remedies,263 both are for the purpose of
raising errors of fact and not of law, constitutional or otherwise.264
It is obvious that for most constitutional errors cognizable under
the Post Conviction Act, coram nobis and a motion for a new trial
Act and coram nobis were given as the exclusive means for setting aside a
conviction once final. There is no indication of why habeas corpus was omit-
ted from the available remedies.
260. See State v. Reichel, 187 Neb. 464, 466, 191 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
261. State v. Moore, 187 Neb. 507, 192 N.W.2d 157 (1971); State v. Williams, 181 Neb.
692, 150 N.W.2d 260 (1967); State v. Dabney, 181 Neb. 263, 147 N.W.2d 768
(1967); State v. Carr, 181 Neb. 251, 147 N.W.2d 619 (1967).
262. The wording of section 29-3003 would indicate the key test to be whether an
issue would constitute grounds for relief under another remedy, not whether
the issue has been actually raised under the other remedy. But cf. Smith v.
State, 167 Neb. 492, 93 N.W.2d 499 (1958) (motion for new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence and direct appeal may be brought concur-
rently); Mater, Effective Criminal Appellate Advocacy: Seeking Reversal by
Concurrent Collateral and Direct Attacks in the Appellate Court, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 333 (1975); Lay, Post Conviction Remedies and the Overburdened Judici-
ary: Solutions Ahead, 3 CREIGHrToN L. REV. 5, 17-20 (1969). Except in unusual
circumstances, a federal defendant is not permitted to simultaneously bring a
direct appeal and a section 2255 motion to vacate for the reason that the dis-
position of the direct appeal may render the motion moot. Jack v. United
States, 435 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971); Welsh v.
United States, 404 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1968).
263. For example, on a motion for a new trial, the newly discovered evidence
"must be competent, material, credible, and [that] which might have
changed result [sic] of trial and which by the exercise of due diligence could
not have been discovered and produced at trial." State v. Seger, 191 Neb. 760,
763, 217 N.W.2d 828, 830 (1974). On the other hand, for coram nobis the newly
discovered evidence "must be such as would have prevented a conviction. It
is not enough to show that it might have caused a different result." Parker v.
State, 178 Neb. 1, 3, 131 N.W.2d 678, 680 (1964).
264. State v. Wilson, 194 Neb. 587, 589, 234 N.W.2d 208, 210 (1975) ("As for appel-
lant's first claim, that he was denied due process of law at the arraignment, it
is obvious that a writ of error coram nobis was intended to remedy errors of
fact, not errors of law."); State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 255, 231 N.W.2d 345, 348
(1975) (coram nobis not available to correct errors of law).
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on the ground of newly discovered evidence do not provide a con-
current remedy. It is possible, nevertheless, to posit a situation
where an overlap does exist.265 This occurs where the newly dis-
covered evidence goes not to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner,
but to the existence of a constitutional violation which, if shown,
would have caused a different result at trial. Several Nebraska
cases have suggested the availability of coram nobis for this pur-
pose 266 even though traditionally the remedy was confined to evi-
dence bearing only on the guilt or innocence of the prisoner.267
These cases were decided prior to the adoption of the Post Convic-
tion Act and may have represented a tentative effort by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court to fashion a limited remedy for raising
constitutional violations.268 Now that the Act provides the neces-
sary means for presenting such claims, the court may well choose
to adhere to the traditional view of coram nobis. 269
Another area of confusion and potential overlap between coram
265. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 254, 231 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1975) ('The remedy
provided by the Post Conviction Act and that afforded under the ancient com-
mon law writ of error coram nobis overlap to some degree."). In State v. Dab-
ney, 183 Neb. 316, 318, 160 N.W.2d 163, 164 (1968), the court suggests that a
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is never
available for raising constitutional issues: "[T] here is an adequate procedure
provided by our law to secure a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence if one is entitled to it, and the Post Conviction Act cannot be used
for that purpose."
266. Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 729, 39 N.W.2d 561, 569 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 923 (1950); Swanson v. State, 148 Neb. 155, 159, 26 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1947);
Hawk v. Olson, 145 Neb. 306, 309-10, 16 N.W.2d 181, 183, rev'd, 326 U.S. 271
(1945). See Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D. Neb. 1964); Geaminea v.
Nebraska, 206 F. Supp. 308, 312 (D. Neb.), appeal dismissed, 308 F.2d 367 (8th
Cir. 1962); Grandsinger v. Bovey, 153 F. Supp. 201, 213-15 (D. Neb. 1957), affd,
253 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1958).
In Swanson, the court stated:
An application for a writ of coram nobis will be denied in the ab-
sence of a showing that the alleged acts of inefficiency on the part of
petitioner's counsel upon which the motion for the writ was predi-
cated were not known, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
could not have been known, by the petitioner before the close of trial.
148 Neb. at 159, 26 N.W.2d at 597.
267. Burzell v. People, 402 Ill. 259, 261, 83 N.E.2d 585, 586 (1949); Quinn v. State, 209
Ind. 316, 318, 198 N.E. 70, 72 (1935); Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 196, 179
N.E. 633, 647 (1932); Wheeler v. State, 158 Ind. 687, 696, 63 N.E. 975, 981 (1902);
Commonwealth v. Sirles, 267 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1954); Note, State Post Convic-
tion Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 258, at 161. In some
jurisdictions, coram nobis has been expanded well beyond its original scope
to encompass all violations of the prisoner's constitutional rights. E.g., Lyons
v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943). Nebraska has not followed this
lead.
268. See Grandsinger v. Bovey, 153 F. Supp. 201, 211-15 (D. Neb. 1957), affd, 253
F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1958).
269. See State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 255, 231 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1975) ('The writ
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nobis and the Post Conviction Act concerns the issue of the pris-
oner's sanity at the time of trial or guilty plea. Coram nobis has
long been used for raising claims of this sort,270 a practice Ne-
braska has also followed.27 ' This is so even though it is difficult to
reconcile such a claim with the requirement of coram nobis that
the new evidence not have been reasonably discoverable prior to
the original entry of judgment. But insanity at the time of trial
may also be raised by a motion to vacate under the Post Conviction
Act and to this extent the two remedies overlap.
272
The extent of overlap between habeas corpus and the Post Con-
viction Act is similarly difficult to ascertain. Habeas corpus is,
among other things, a remedy for challenging the sentencing
court's jurisdiction of the offense and of the person of the defend-
ant, and the power of the court to impose the sentence given. The
claimed defect in jurisdiction must render the judgment or sen-
tence absolutely void rather than merely voidable in order for the
prisoner to secure release.273 The Post Conviction Act also pro-
does not reach such matters as the legality of a search or seizure."); Parker v.
State, 178 Neb. 1, 8-9, 131 N.W.2d 678, 683 (1964).
270. See, e.g., Linton v. State, 72 Ark. 532,81 S.W. 608 (1904); Friedman, The Writ of
Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEmp. L.Q. 365, 398 (1929).
271. Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 100-01, 261 N.W. 339, 348 (1935); Newcomb v.
State, 129 Neb. 69, 261 N.W. 348 (1935).
272. State v. Cortez, 191 Neb. 800, 218 N.W.2d 217 (1974); State v. Blackwell, 191
Neb. 155, 214 N.W.2d 264 (1974); State v. Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 190 N.W.2d 781
(1971). See State v. Flye, 201 Neb. 115, 266 N.W.2d 237 (1978). Presumably, the
motion to vacate was not dismissed in Virgilito and Blackwell pursuant to
section 29-3003 because the issue of sanity was raised at the time of trial and,
therefore, was not unknown to the defendant at the time of judgment, an es-
sential requirement of coram nobis. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 255, 231
N.W.2d 345, 348 (1975). But in Cortez, the sanity of the defendant was not
considered at trial.
A last area of potential overlap between coram nobis and the Act concerns
claims of a guilty plea being given under duress or because of fraud or mis-
take. Corar nobis has traditionally been available to set aside pleas given
under these conditions, State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 P. 38 (1893); Sanders
v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1883); Friedman, supra note 270, at 398-402, as have the
provisions of the Act, State v. Elliott, 192 Neb. 217, 219 N.W.2d 775 (1974). To
date, the Nebraska courts have not ruled on whether coram nobis is available
in Nebraska for this purpose.
273. Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 69-70, 71 N.W.2d 716, 719 (1955); Jackson v. Olson,
146 Neb. 885, 894, 22 N.W.2d 124, 129 (1946); Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 880-81,
22 N.W.2d 136, 139 (1946).
The only exception to the requirement that the judgment or sentence be
absolutely void is a case in which the prisoner contends not that the sentence
is invalid, but that he has served his sentence and is entitled to discharge.
Gamron v. Parratt, 199 Neb. 163, 256 N.W.2d 867 (1977).
The writ of habeas corpus is also available for challenging any unlawful
restraint of liberty, Rose v. Vosburg, 107 Neb. 847, 187 N.W. 46 (1922); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 29-2801 to -2901; including the right to the custody of a child, In
re Schwartzkopf, 149 Neb. 460, 31 N.W.2d 294 (1948); the correctness of extra-
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vides a remedy for attacking a "judgment void.., under the Con-
stitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. 274
Whether a judgment void for purposes of habeas corpus is also
void under the Act and whether a judgment can be void but on a
basis other than under the Constitution are questions never an-
swered by the Nebraska court and are beyond the scope of this
discussion. However, the opinions of the court do reveal several
areas of overlap between the two remedies.
An example that illustrates well the concurrent nature of
habeas corpus and the Post Conviction Act is a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute.275 In general, constitutional viola-
tions occurring in the proceedings leading to the prisoner's convic-
tion are not cognizable in habeas corpus, 27 6 but where the prisoner
raises the constitutional validity of the statute under which he was
convicted and sentenced, the claim may be presented either under
dition proceedings, Gorgen v. Tomjack, 160 Neb. 457, 70 N.W.2d 514 (1955); im-
prisonment for contempt, In re Havlik, 45 Neb. 747, 64 N.W. 234 (1895); and the
excessiveness of bail, State v. Watkins, 190 Neb. 450, 209 N.W.2d 184 (1973).
274. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975).
275. Other examples of overlap between habeas corpus and the Post Conviction
Act occur with claims challenging the geographic jurisdiction of the court,
compare Robinson v. Sigler, 187 Neb. 144, 187 N.W.2d 756, appeal dismissed,
404 U.S. 987 (1971) (habeas challenge to jurisdiction over crimes committed
on Indian reservation) with State v. Goham, 191 Neb. 639, 216 N.W.2d 869
(1974) (post conviction challenge to jurisdiction over crimes committed on
Indian reservation); claims challenging the jurisdiction of the court over the
defendant, compare Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 71 N.W.2d 716 (1955) (habeas
available for challenges to jurisdiction) and Howell v. Hann, 155 Neb. 698, 53
N.W.2d 81 (1952) (habeas challenge to defendant being forcibly brought into
state) and Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W.2d 124 (1946) (same as
Howell) with State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974) (post con-
viction challenge to district court jurisdiction over juveniles) and State v.
Nicholson, 183 Neb. 834, 164 N.W.2d 652, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969) (post
conviction challenge to defendant being forcibly brought into state); claims
challenging the imposition of two sentences for one violation, compare
Gamron v. Jones, 148 Neb. 645, 28 N.W.2d 403 (1947) (habeas challenge to im-
position of sentence for underlying offense and separate sentence for being
an habitual criminal) and Kuwitsky v. O'Grady, 135 Neb. 466, 282 N.W. 396
(1938) (same as Gamron) with State v. Huffman, 186 Neb. 809, 186 N.W.2d 715
(1971) (post conviction challenge to two sentences being imposed for sepa-
rate counts arising out of one transaction; evidentiary hearing held, but not
on this issue); and claims of double jeopardy, compare In re Resler, 115 Neb.
335, 212 N.W. 765 (1927) (habeas corpus) with State v. Huffman, 186 Neb. 809,
186 N.W.2d 715 (1971) (post conviction; evidentiary hearing held, but not on
this issue).
276. Nicholson v. Sigler, 183 Neb. 24, 157 N.W.2d 872, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 876
(1968); Case v. State, 177 Neb. 404, 129 N.W.2d 107 (1964), vacated, 381 U.S. 336
(1965); Swanson v. Jones, 151 Neb. 767,39 N.W.2d 557 (1949); Jackson v. Olson,
146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W.2d 124 (1946); Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N.W.2d 136
(1946).
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habeas corpus or the Act.277 Given this overlap, a court should dis-
miss without prejudice the numerous motions to vacate that have
raised claims of an unconstitutional statute, leaving the claim to be
brought by way of habeas corpus. Although the precise degree of
overlap between coram nobis, habeas corpus, and the Act is diffi-
cult if not impossible to ascertain, overlap does exist. Despite this,
there is no opinion reporting the dismissal of a post conviction pro-
ceeding on the grounds that the constitutional violation alleged
should have been raised by way of another remedy.
An early prophecy of one commentator that "[t]he only safe
and economical way for Nebraska prisoners to exhaust their state
remedies is to file three proceedings concurrently [post conviction,
habeas corpus, and coram nobis] . . .,"278 just has not come to be.
Except where a motion for a new trial or a direct appeal are cur-
rently pending, the Nebraska courts appear to be ignoring the re-
quirements of section 29-3003.
While several criticisms and recommendations for change
could be made regarding the statutory requirements that when un-
fulfiled serve as the basis for summary denial of motions to va-
cate,2 79 the courts cannot be censured for ferreting out claims
defective for that reason and disposing of them without conducting
an evidentiary hearing. Certainly there is no fault in following a
practice of at the earliest point possible disposing of claims that
ultimately must fail because of noncompliance with a statutory
prerequisite for relief. If anything, criticism should be made of the
courts' failure to more closely adhere to the commands of section
29-3003.
V. DISPOSITION ON THE BASIS OF AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
A. Requirement of An Evidentiary Hearing
Unless the files and records of the case affirmatively establish
277. Although several early cases held that the constitutionality of a statute could
not be raised in a habeas proceeding, e.g., In re Caldwell, 82 Neb. 544,118 N.W.
133 (1908); Ex parte Fisher, 6 Neb. 309 (1877); these decisions have not been
followed by later opinions, State ex rel. Brito v. Warrick, 176 Neb. 211, 125
N.W.2d 545 (1964); Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67,71 N.W.2d 716 (1955); In re Roz-
gall, 147 Neb. 260, 23 N.W.2d 85 (1946). The constitutionality of a statute may
also be raised in a post conviction proceeding. State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523,
215 N.W.2d 859 (1974); State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 201 N.W.2d 241 (1972);
State v. Alvarez, 185 Neb. 557, 177 N.W.2d 591 (1970), modified, 408 U.S. 937
(1972); State v. Losieau, 184 Neb. 178, 166 N.W.2d 406 (1969); State v. Kauff-
man, 183 Neb. 817, 164 N.W.2d 469 (1969).
278. Lake, supra note 53, at 770 nA9.
279. For a discussion of the need for a unitary post conviction remedy, see STAND-
APns, supra note 5, at § 2.1 and Commentary.
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that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the Post Conviction Act
directs the sentencing court to cause notice of the motion to vacate
-to be served on the county attorney, grant a prompt evidentiary
hearing, determine the issues, and make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law.2 0 But to arrive at the point of an evidentiary hear-
280. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975). See State v. Russ, 193 Neb. 308, 310,
266 N.W.2d 775, 777 (1975); State v. Reichel, 187 Neb. 464, 466, 191 N.W.2d 826,
827 (1971); State v. Virgilito, 187 Neb. 328, 330, 190 N.W.2d 781, 783 (1971); State
v. Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 284, 142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966). See also State v.
Svoboda, 199 Neb. 452, 455, 259 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1977); State v. Ford, 198 Neb.
376, 378, 252 N.W.2d 643, 644-45 (1977).
The procedures for carrying out the functions of giving notice, conducting
an evidentiary hearing and making findings of fact and law have been left to
the trial courts to develop along the lines of local practice. A number of trial
courts upon receiving a motion to vacate, issue an order directed to the
county attorney to show cause why the motion should not be granted, e.g.,
State v. Reichel, 184 Neb. 194, 195, 165 N.W.2d 743,744 (1969), or an evidentiary
hearing held, e.g., State v. Pilgrim, 184 Neb. 457, 458, 168 N.W.2d 368,369 (1969);
State v. Erving, 180 Neb. 680, 681, 144 N.W.2d 424,426 (1966). A response to the
order to show cause is then filed, e.g., State v. Reichel, 184 Neb. at 195, 165
N.W.2d at 744, or a hearing is held on the order and a determination made as
to the necessity of an evidentiary hearing, e.g., State v. Pilgrim, 184 Neb. at
458, 168 N.W.2d at 369; State v. Losieau, 180 Neb. 671, 674-75, 144 N.W.2d 406, 409
(1966). In some courts the county attorney will file a response to the motion
to vacate without receiving any order from the court, see, e.g., Transcript,
State v. Jonsson, 192 Neb. 730, 224 N.W.2d 181 (1974), while it appears other
courts rule on the necessity for an evidentiary hearing without any response
from the county attorney, e.g., State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 256, 231 N.W.2d
345, 348 (1975). What is common to all courts is some procedure for ruling on
the prima facie validity of a prisoner's claim prior to the granting of an evi-
dentiary hearing.
The proceedings are governed, to the extent applicable, by the Code of
Civil Procedure, NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 25 (Reissue 1975). The applicability of
the Code is controlled by section 25-2225, which provides that where a civil
action, legal or equitable, is created by statute, and the mode of proceeding
prescribed, the proceedings shall be conducted in conformity with the Code
so far as may be consistent with the statute and as shall be practicable. See
Chilen v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 135 Neb. 619, 627-28, 283 N.W. 366, 370
(1939). While arguably a post conviction proceeding is neither an action at
law nor a suit in equity, this does not detract from the application of section
25-2225. Swan v. Bowker, 135 Neb. 405, 409-12,281 N.W. 891, 893-95 (1938). Fur-
ther, although neither the Post Conviction Act nor any case interpreting the
Act has explicitly stated that the Code governs, several post conviction cases
strongly intimate that it does. State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 257, 231 N.W.2d
345, 349 (1975) (court cited NEB. Rv. STAT. § 25-101 in relation to coram nobis
and post conviction proceedings); State v. Williams, 188 Neb. 802, 803, 199
N.W.2d 611, 612 (1972) (appeal from denial of post conviction relief in munici-
pal court shall be the same as the appeal of any other civil action); State v.
Erving, 180 Neb. 680, 685, 144 N.W.2d 424, 428 (1966) ('The pleading of conclu-
sions is no more acceptable in a post-conviction proceeding than in any other
civil proceeding."). A number of cases also report the use of procedural de-
vices in the trial court which would be consistent only with the applicability
of the Code of Civil Procedure. E.g., State v. O'Kelly, 181 Neb. 618, 620, 150
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ing, a petitioner first must have overcome or avoided all of the
different bases discussed above that the court is permitted to use
summarily to deny relief. This is a difficult task in view of the nu-
merous motions denied without benefit of a hearing.28 '
Up to now, the focus of discussion has been on identifying the
circumstances in which a petitioner under the Act can be summa-
rily denied relief. The correlative issue to be discussed is under
what circumstances an evidentiary hearing will be granted.28 2
N.W.2d 117, 119 (1967) (discovery); State v. Williams, 189 Neb. 127, 128, 201
N.W.2d 241, 242 (1972) (amendment); State v. Oziah, 186 Neb. 541, 542, 184
N.W.2d 725, 726 (1971) (amendment). Cf. Documentary Supplement, State
Post Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 147, 206 (1970) ("There is presently no machinery for perfecting
amended petitions for post-conviction review [under the Nebraska Act].").
No specific time period has been used to define the requirement of a
prompt hearing under the Act, but
delay in a state court in and of itself does not present sufficient
grounds to merit federal intervention. Only when evidence is pro-
duced that shows the state delay is a result of discrimination,
amounting to a denial of process, should federal intervention proceed
to a hearing on the merits.
Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835, 838 n.4 (8th Cir. 1967).
The evidentiary hearing is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings,
State v. O'Kelly, 181 Neb. 618, 150 N.W.2d 117 (1967), and at the conclusion of
the hearing the court is directed to make findings of fact and law. The making
of findings is important in light of the requirement of Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 314 (1963), that an evidentiary hearing be granted a state habeas
petitioner when the district court cannot determine whether the state court
made its determination of the prisoner's claim on the merits or on a procedu-
ral ground. See Breitenstein, Remarks on Recent Post Conviction Decisions,
33 F.R.D. 363, 434 (1963); Note, 4 Comparative Analysis of the Ohio Post Con-
viction Determination of Constitutional Rights Act, 17 WEST. RES. L. REV.
1367, 1381 (1966).
281. See §§ H, II & IV of text (numerous examples of motions to vacate that were
denied without an evidentiary hearing).
282. In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1968), the Supreme Court set down
the circumstances under which a federal court must grant an evidentiary
hearing on a constitutional claim raised in a section 2255 proceeding. With
one exception, they are the same as those that were established in Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), for granting hearings to state habeas petitioners,
394 U.S. at 227. See note 138 supra. The exception is the third circumstance
of Townsend, the adequacy of the fact-finding procedure, which the Court
held did not apply in a section 2255 proceeding because "federal fact-finding
procedures are by hypothesis adequate to assure the integrity of the underly-
ing constitutional rights." 394 U.S. at 227.
A different catalog of circumstances under which a section 2255 hearing
must be granted is given in Kapatos v. United States, 432 F.2d 110, 113 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1970); Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822,
831 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Wright, J., dissenting); and Ormento v. United States, 328
F. Supp. 246, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1971):
An evidentiary hearing is required as to constitutional claims (1)
where a federal trial or appellate court said nothing in the earlier
proceedings because the issue was not raised, (2) where it was un-
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There are two factors universal to every situation in which an evi-
dentiary hearing is ordered: (1) the motion to vacate must raise an
issue of fact material to the determination of the prisoner's consti-
tutional claim, and (2) the factual issue raised cannot be resolved
to the satisfaction of the trial court by reference to the motion and
the files and records of the case.283 These two factors serve as but
the starting point for several variations that provide a basis for fur-
ther analysis.
The usual circumstance in which resort to an evidentiary hear-
ing must be had occurs when the claimed constitutional error was
not previously raised in the original criminal proceeding.284 Exam-
ples of such errors are claims of an involuntary guilty plea where
the plea taking was not in conformance with the necessary re-
quirements;285 a coerced confession;286 an unintelligent waiver of
the right to counsel;287 and ineffective assistance of counsel where
the acts contended to be ineffective occurred off the record.288 If
clear whether the court's "say" was on the merits, (3) where new law
has been made or facts uncovered relating to the constitutional claim
since the trial and appeal, and (4) where the trial or appellate court
bases its rulings on findings of fact made after a hearing that was not
full and fair.
283. See State v. Blunt, 182 Neb. 477,479, 155 N.W.2d 443,444 (1968); State v. Erving,
180 Neb. 680, 685, 144 N.W.2d 424, 428 (1966).
284. A claim not previously raised falls within the fifth circumstance of Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), and the first circumstance of Kapatos v!
United States, 432 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1970), for which an evidentiary hear-
ing is required in a section 2255 proceeding. See note 282 supra.
285. State v. Curnyn, 202 Neb. 135, 274 N.W.2d 157 (1979); State v. Svoboda, 199
Neb. 452, 259 N.W.2d 609 (1977); State v. Ford, 198 Neb. 376, 252 N.W.2d 643
(1977); State v. Elliott, 192 Neb. 217,219 N.W.2d 775 (1974). For a discussion of
the necessary requirements for the taking of a guilty plea, see note 109 supra.
Examples of an evidentiary hearing being held regarding a claim of an invol-
untary guilty plea are found in note 136 supra.
286. State v. Fugate, 180 Neb. 701, 144 N.W.2d 412 (1966). An evidentiary hearing
regarding a coerced confession was held in State v. DeBerry, 191 Neb. 445, 215
N.W.2d 73 (1974); State v. Bundy, 184 Neb. 406, 167 N.W.2d 770 (1969); State v.
Howard, 182 Neb. 411, 155 N.W.2d 339 (1967); State v. Fugate, 182 Neb. 325, 154
N.W.2d 514 (1967); and State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707, 144 N.W.2d 525 (1966).
287. State v. Reichel, 187 Neb. 464, 191 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
288. State v. Blunt, 182 Neb. 477, 155 N.W.2d 443 (1968). Examples of an eviden-
tiary hearing held to investigate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
are numerous although it is not always possible to tell from the opinions
whether the complained of acts were reflected in the record: State v. Hoppes,
202 Neb. 383, - N.W.2d - (1979). State v. Partridge, 201 Neb. 799, 272 N.W.2d
366 (1978); State v. Fowler, 201 Neb. 647, 271 N.W.2d 341 (1978); State v. Mor-
row, 197 Neb. 627, 250 N.W.2d 247 (1977); State v. Halsey, 195 Neb. 432, 238
N.W.2d 249 (1976); State v. Robinson, 194 Neb. 111, 230 N.W.2d 222 (1975); State
v. Cortez, 191 Neb. 800, 218 N.W.2d 217 (1974); State v. DeBerry, 191 Neb. 445,
215 N.W.2d 73 (1974); State v. Krider, 191 Neb. 285, 214 N.W.2d 611 (1974); State
v. Henry, 191 Neb. 27, 213 N.W.2d 733 (1973); State v. Hall, 188 Neb. 130, 195
N.W.2d 201 (1972); State v. Hatten, 187 Neb. 237, 188 N.W.2d 846 (1971); State v.
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the necessary facts underlying the claim are not reflected in the
files and records, they must be developed through an evidentiary
hearing.289
Only once has the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that an evi-
dentiary hearing is required in circumstances other than when the
claim was not raised in the original proceeding.290 However, sev-
eral cases suggest the possibility that, if presented with the proper
factual situation, the court would order a hearing for claims previ-
ously raised when they are supported by newly discovered evi-
dence, when there has been a change in the applicable
constitutional standard, and when the claims were previously not
decided on the merits. That a hearing would be granted on allega-
tions of newly discovered evidence has been suggested only by im-
plication,291 even though this is a well established basis for a
hearing under section 2255.292 Whether the Nebraska courts will
adopt the section 2255 standard that there must be a substantial,
nonfrivolous allegation of evidence which could not have reason-
ably been presented in the original proceeding and which is rele-
vant to a constitutional claim remains to be seen.293
Anderson, 186 Neb. 769, 186 N.W.2d 479 (1971); State v. Phillips, 186 Neb. 547,
184 N.W.2d 639 (1971); State v. Oziah, 186 Neb. 541, 184 N.W.2d 725 (1971); State
v. Norgard, 186 Neb. 535, 184 N.W.2d 632 (1971); State v. Moss, 185 Neb. 536, 177
N.W.2d 284 (1970); State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 157 N.W.2d 165, supp. op.,
183 Neb. 242, 159 N.W.2d 320 (1968); State v. Jackson, 182 Neb. 472, 155 N.W.2d
361 (1968); State v. Putnam, 182 Neb. 185, 153 N.W.2d 436 (1967); State v. Deck-
er, 181 Neb. 859, 152 N.W.2d 5 (1967); State v. Konvalin, 181 Neb. 554, 149
N.W.2d 755, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 872 (1967).
289. There are numerous other issues not raised in the original proceeding on
which evidentiary hearings have been held, but the examples given ade-
quately illustrate the point. See Fairchild, Post Conviction Rights and Reme-
dies in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 52, 61.
290. State v. Svoboda, 199 Neb. 452,259 N.W.2d 609 (1977). See text accompanying
note 198 supra.
291. See note 212 & accompanying text supra.
292. Newly discovered evidence is the fourth circumstance of Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), and the third circumstance of Kapatos v. United
States, 432 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1970). See note 282 supra.
293. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963). The similar Nebraska standard for
granting a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, NEB. REv.
STAT. § 29-2101 (Reissue 1975), is that the evidence must be competent, credi-
ble, materially affect the defendant's substantial rights and with reasonable
diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial. State v. At-
kinson, 191 Neb. 9,213 N.W.2d 351 (1973); Duffey v. State, 124 Neb. 23,245 N.W.
1 (1932).
At least one court has held that where the petitioner has already had a full
evidentiary hearing on the same claim, greater specificity in the allegations is
required before another hearing will be granted on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence. This is to avoid relitigation of issues on the basis of proof
already deemed insufficient. Dalli v. United States, 491 F.2d 758, 761 (2d Cir.
1974).
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Similarly, the cases indicate the need for an evidentiary hearing
when there has been a retroactive change in the applicable consti-
tutional standard.2- A change in the constitutional standard alone
does not necessarily require a hearing if the claim was decided in a
prior proceeding under the old standard and all of the necessary
facts are undisputed and contained in the record.295 But where the
claim was raised and the evidence disputed, reconstruction of the
facts will not be possible and an evidentiary hearing will have to be
held before the new constitutional standard can be applied.296
Where a constitutional claim was raised in the original criminal
proceeding on disputed evidence, but the trial court's decision was
not on the merits or on appeal the decision in the supreme court
was not on the merits, an evidentiary hearing will be necessary
when the same claim is raised in a post conviction proceeding.297
As previously discussed, if the claim was raised in a prior post con-
viction proceeding, it will not be considered in a subsequent pro-
ceeding, even if the prior decision was not on the merits.298
A wider range of circumstances necessitates an evidentiary
294. See note 211 & accompanying text supra. New law impliedly falls within the
first circumstance of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), and is the
third circumstance of Kapatos v. United States, 432 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
1970). See note 282 supra.
A circumstance similar to a retroactive change in the applicable constitu-
tional standard and one apparently unique to Nebraska occurs when the
claim is being considered for a second time, but in the prior proceeding the
adjudication was on nonconstitutional grounds. See note 210 & accompanying
text supra. Although none of the cases in which this situation arose resulted
in an evidentiary hearing, any previous findings of fact might well have been
influenced by the nonconstitutional standard unless the prior evidence was
undisputed.
295. The need for the facts to be undisputed is suggested by State v. Flye, 201 Neb.
115, 118-19, 266 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1978), and State v. Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 284,
142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966):
Where no controverted material issues of fact are presented, the facts
as shoun by the record are undisputed, the taking of oral testimony
on the motion could not add to or detract from the information shown
by the court's files and records, and the court is satisfied that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, no hearing is required under the pro-
visions of the Post Conviction Act.
(Emphasis added.)
296. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314-15 (1963). Findings of fact made in the
prior proceeding will not avoid the necessity for a new trial if the fact finder
has been guided by an erroneous standard of law, since "findings of fact may
often be ... influenced by what the finder is looking for." Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 547 (1961). See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 315 n.10.
297. State v. Svoboda, 199 Neb. 452, 259 N.W.2d 609 (1977). A decision not on the
merits falls within the first circumstance of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
313 (1963), and the second circumstance of Kapatos v. United States, 432 F.2d
110, 113 (2d Cir. 1970). See note 282 supra.
298. See notes 185-86 & accompanying text supra.
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hearing in federal habeas proceedings than is currently recog-
nized by the Nebraska courts as requiring a hearing under the Post
Conviction Act.299 The Nebraska courts have not chosen to deny a
hearing in situations that would require a hearing under federal
habeas, but simply have not yet been confronted with the neces-
sary factual setting requiring a decision. That the state courts will
follow the lead of the federal courts by granting a hearing when-
ever a federal district court would do so is suggested by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's statement in State v. Leadinghorse3o that
"[a]n evidentiary hearing is not always necessary in order to dis-
miss a post conviction motion, however, such a hearing is usually
advisable to avoid protracted litigation." 301
B. Burden and Standard of Proof
The burden of proof in a post conviction proceeding rests on the
petitioner 3 2 while the standard of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence,303 the usual standard in civil actions.304 The same bur-
299. The Nebraska courts have not yet found the necessity for an evidentiary
hearing when (1) in a prior proceeding the factual determination regarding
the petitioner's constitutional claim is not fairly supported by the record as a
whole; (2) the fact finding procedure employed in the prior proceeding was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing on the petitioner's constitutional
claim; (3) for any reason it appears that the judge in a prior proceeding did
not afford the petitioner a full and fair fact hearing on his constitutional
claim; and (4) there was an application of an incorrect constitutional stan-
dard to the petitioner's claim in a prior hearing. These are the second, third,
sixth and first circumstances listed in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313
(1963), as necessitating a hearing.
300. 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 573 (1974).
301. Id. at 486, 222 N.W.2d at 575.
302. State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 475, 259 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1977); State v. Halsey,
195 Neb. 432, 433, 238 N.W.2d 249, 250 (1976); State v. McClelland, 194 Neb. 535,
537,233 N.W.2d 786, 787 (1975); State v. Robinson, 194 Neb. 111, 112, 230 N.W.2d
222, 223 (1975); State v. Howell, 188 Neb. 687, 689, 199 N.W.2d 21, 23 (1972);
State v. Fusby, 188 Neb. 139, 142, 195 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1972); State v. Rhodes,
187 Neb. 332, 334, 190 N.W.2d 623, 624 (1971); State v. Hatten, 187 Neb. 237,243,
188 N.W.2d 846, 850-51 (1971); State v. Myles, 187 Neb. 105, 108, 187 N.W.2d 584,
586 (1971); State v. Huffman, 186 Neb. 809,814,186 N.W.2d 715, 718 (1971); State
v. Rapp, 186 Neb. 785, 786, 186 N.W.2d 482,483 (1971); State v. Phillips, 186 Neb.
547, 553, 184 N.W.2d 639, 643 (1971); State v. Moss, 185 Neb. 536, 538, 177 N.W.2d
284, 286 (1970); Harris v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 483, 484, 176 N.W.2d 733, 734 (1970);
State v. Coffen, 184 Neb. 254, 258, 166 N.W.2d 593, 595 (1969), State v. Riley, 183
Neb. 616, 617, 163 N.W.2d 104, 105 (1968); State v. Reizenstein, 183 Neb. 376,377,
160 N.W.2d 208, 209 (1968); State v. Raue, 182 Neb. 735, 736, 157 N.W.2d 380, 381
(1968); State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. 701, 711, 157 N.W.2d 165, 167 (1968) (Carter,
J., dissenting); State v. Williams, 182 Neb. 444, 445, 155 N.W.2d 377, 378 (1967);
State v. Sagaser, 181 Neb. 329, 333, 148 N.W.2d 206, 208 (1967). See State v.
Orosco, 199 Neb. 532, 542, 260 N.W.2d 303, 309 (1977).
303. State v. Halsey, 195 Neb. 432,433-34, 238 N.W.2d 249, 250 (1976); State v. Deck-
er, 181 Neb. 859, 860-61, 152 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1967).
304. Keiserman v. Lydon, 153 Neb. 279, 285, 44 N.W.2d 513, 517 (1950).
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den and standard of proof apply in federal habeas corpus and sec-
tion 2255 proceedings,3 05 but with certain claims the burden of
persuasion shifts to the government to rebut the petitioner's claim
or to show the existence of an affirmative "defense" once the peti-
tioner has established a prima facie claim for relief.3 06
In a Nebraska post conviction proceeding the burden of proof
apparently never shifts, but always remains with the prisoner.307
The effect of Nebraska not shifting the burden to the state in a situ-
ation in which it would have shifted in a federal habeas proceeding
is to render the state fact-finding procedure inadequate for pur-
poses of determining the necessity of an evidentiary hearing in
any subsequent federal habeas proceeding.308 The result is to shift
from the Nebraska courts to the federal courts the responsibility
for determining the relevant facts when considering the applica-
tion of federal constitutional standards.
C. Presence of Prisoner
The Post Conviction Act specifically provides that "[a] court
may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
305. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938); Fugate v. Gaffney, 453 F.2d 362,
364-65 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972); Coon v. United States,
441 F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 860 (1971); Skinner v. United
States, 326 F.2d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1964). See State v. Orosco, 199 Neb. 532, 542,
260 N.W.2d 303, 309 (1977).
306. An example of a shifting burden of proof occurs when the record is silent as
to whether counsel was furnished to an accused at a critical stage. If the ac-
cused introduces evidence tending to show that he was not represented, the
burden then shifts to the state to prove by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence that the accused was represented. Losieau v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 795, 803
(8th Cir. 1969). Other examples of when the state assumes the burden of
proof are where the issue is the voluntariness of a confession, Reizenstein v.
Sigler, 428 F.2d 702, 707 (8th Cir. 1970); the giving of consent to a search and
seizure, Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1964); an absence of
prejudice, when there has been a belated appointment of counsel, United
States ex rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186, 1188-90 (3d Cir. 1969); and
that a guilty plea was in fact voluntarily and understandingly entered when
the defendant pleaded guilty in federal court between July 1, 1966, and April
2, 1969, and the record does not demonstrate literal compliance with FED. R.
Cam. P. 11, Hall v. United States, 489 F.2d 427,430 (5th Cir. 1974). See, Devel-
opments, supra note 5, at 1140-41.
307. Reizenstein v. Sigler, 428 F.2d 702, 707 (8th Cir. 1970). But see State v. Reichel,
187 Neb. 464, 191 N.W.2d 826 (1971) (suggestion that state may bear the bur-
den of proof when claim is made of an unintelligent waiver of counsel and
files and records do not show otherwise); State v. Brown, 185 Neb. 389, 176
N.W.2d 16 (1970) (state has burden of proof to show harmless error once a
constitutional violation has been established).
308. Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293, 316 (1963).
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production of the prisoner, whether or not a hearing is held."309
While on its face the language of the statute seemingly permits the
sentencing court to dispense with the presence of the prisoner
under all circumstances, the argument can be made that the pres-
ence of a prisoner at an evidentiary hearing concerning his claim is
necessary for him to be able to offer testimony as to events in
which he participated,3 10 to confront witnesses against him,3 1 1 and
to assist and prompt his counsel3 12 or, if unrepresented, to ex-
amine and cross-examine witnesses. 3 13 Of these reasons, only the
first, the offering of testimony, has been adopted as a basis for cut-
ting back the Act's grant of discretion:
This [the language of the statute] does not mean that a defendant may be
prevented from testifying in support of a claim under circumstances
where his testimony would be material. However, the mere filing of a mo-
tion under the Post Conviction Act, alleging a denial or infringement of
constitutional rights, does not automatically entitle a prisoner to a trip to
the sentencing court, even where an evidentiary hearing is required. The
Act itself points up the fact that there are occasions when allegations of
fact outside the record can be fully investigated and developed without
requiring the personal presence of the prisoner.3 14
309. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975).
310. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1963); Ladner v. United States,
358 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1958); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952);
Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 996 (3d Cir. 1972). The argument has
been made that a prisoner has a due process right to be present when he has
personal knowledge of material issues of fact, see Note, supra note 10, at 817-
18, even though a habeas petitioner has no due process right to present oral
argument on appeal. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 286 (1948). Nor is there a
due process right to an evidentiary hearing itself in a state post conviction
proceeding. Weiland v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 1284,1288 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 847 (1977). But cf. Garton v. Swenson, 266 F. Supp. 726,727 (W.D. Mo.
1967) (constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing on federal claims alleged
in a state post conviction proceeding).
311. See Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804, 807-08 (D. Mass. 1958), affd per
curiam, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958). The sixth
amendment right of confrontation does not apply to collateral proceedings.
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,222 (1952); Douglas v. Maxwell, 357 F.2d
320, 321 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (1966); United States ex rel. Mar-
shall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1964).
312. See Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 995 (4th Cir.) (Winter, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1972); Raines v. United
States, 423 F.2d 526,534 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff; J., dissenting in part); Green
v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D. Mass.), affdper curiam, 256 F.2d 483
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958); STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 74.
313. Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D. Mass), afid per cmiam, 256
F.2d 483 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).
314. State v. Woods, 180 Neb. 282, 285, 142 N.W.2d 339, 341 (1966). The quoted lan-
guage from Woods is substantially similar to language found in Machibroda
v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1962). The federal courts have inter-
preted section 2255 regarding the presence of the prisoner to the same effect
as the Nebraska court has interpreted the Post Conviction Act.
Although a prisoner has a right to be present at an evidentiary hearing
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The Post Conviction Act also provides that "[t] estimony of the
prisoner or other witnesses may be offered by deposition." 315
While no Nebraska opinion has of yet interpreted this provision,
the practice under section 2255 and federal habeas corpus has been
to permit the presentation of testimony by means of depositions,
interrogatories, and affidavits where the parties have had the right
to propound written interrogatories to the affiant or to fie answer-
ing affidavits.3 16
The problem inherent in the use of depositions is their unsuita-
bility for resolving questions of credibility. Direct observation by
the judge of the witnesses' testimonial demeanor would seem es-
sential to a correct resolution of such a dispute and it might well be
argued that the language quoted above in regard to the necessity
for the presence of the prisoner at an evidentiary hearing is broad
enough to preclude the use of depositions when the issue is one of
credibility.317 Where depositions are used for proof of uncontro-
only when he can testify to material facts, he will at the same time be able to
assist his counsel in cross-examination. Where the prisoner would not have a
right to be present, it is very likely that he also would have no knowledge to
offer in assistance of cross-examination.
315. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1975). Id. §§ 25-1233 to -1234 suggest that
the only time the production of the prisoner would be permitted is when the
sentencing court is located in the county of incarceration. Otherwise, the use
of a deposition would be necessary for the presentation of his testimony. The
relationship between these sections and the Post Conviction Act has never
been considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
316. Authorization for the use of depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits in sec-
tion 2255 proceedings has been found in the statement in Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962), that "[T]he statute itself recognizes
that there are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully
investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner." Wal-
ters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 992-93 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973);
Kent v. United States, 423 F.2d 1050, 1051 (5th Cir. 1970). However, the proce-
dure had been recognized prior to Machibroda. Kimbrough v. United States,
226 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1955). But see Phillips v. United States, 533 F.2d 369,
371 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1977). The use of depositions
and affidavits in habeas proceedings is specifically authorized by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2246 (1976). If affidavits are used, the other party must have been given the
right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants or to file answering
affidavits. See Clark v. Lockhart, 512 F.2d 235, 237-38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 872 (1975); Anderson v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 84, 94 (6th Cir. 1966). Al-
though not authorized by section 2246, the use of interrogatories in habeas
proceedings has been noted. McGarrah v. Dutton, 381 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1967).
317. See Phillips v. United States, 533 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1976) ("Normally,
when a case turns on an issue of credibility, the trier of fact should have the
benefit of oral testimony."); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 994-95 (4th Cir.),
(Winter, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129
(1972) ("Where the single issue was the credibility of Wren and Mr. Kirkman,
Wren should have been seen and observed by the district judge so that he
would be able to resolve this issue with the help of his own observation of
Wren's testimonial demeanor.").
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verted facts, they are an efficient method of avoiding the inconve-
nience of requiring the presence of far distant witnesses or the
expense and security problems of transporting the prisoner to the
sentencing court.
Even where the use of depositions would be appropriate, fair-
ness would seem to require that the prisoner, if unrepresented by
counsel, be permitted to attend and cross-examine.3 18 Further,
where the deposition concerns matters of which the prisoner has
personal knowledge, his presence would be desirable in order for
him to assist his counsel in the conduct of cross-examination. 319
D. Right to Counsel
The district court is empowered to appoint up to two attorneys
to represent a prisoner in all proceedings under the Post Convic-
tion Act.3 20 The appointment of counsel is discretionary with the
court,32 ' but where the prisoner has presented a justiciable issue
of law or fact, an indigent prisoner is entitled to the assistance of
counsel.322 On the other hand, where the motion and the files and
The importance of the trial judge having observed the demeanor of the
witnesses has been recognized in Nebraska in the context of the weight to be
given to the trial court's findings in an appeal de novo on the record in an
equity action. Modern Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Journey West Camp-
ground, Inc., 193 Neb. 781, 784-85, 229 N.W.2d 192, 194 (1975); Seybold v. Sey-
bold, 191 Neb. 480, 482, 216 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1974).
318. Phillips v. Smith, 300 F. Supp. 130, 133-34 (S.D. Ga. 1969). Cf. Campbell v.
Minnesota, 487 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1973) (use of affidavits in state hearing with-
out opportunity for cross-examination of affiants renders hearing less than
full and fair); Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1959) (hear-
ing without presence of prisoner with knowledge of facts so he can cross-
examine witness is an abuse of discretion); Miller v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 385,
386-87 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (failure to allow prisoner to cross-examine deposition
witness renders state hearing less than full and fair). It is unlikely that a
Nebraska petitioner would ever be unrepresented in a situation in which a
deposition would be required. See § V-D of text infra.
319. Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 995 (4th Cir.) (Winter, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1972).
320. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3004 (Reissue 1975). A petitioner moving in the county
or municipal court to vacate a misdemeanor sentence must apply to the dis-
trict court for appointment of counseL Although the problem should rarely
arise because of the few misdemeanants who apply for relief under the Act,
the bifurcating of the proceedings between two separate courts will tend to
result in unnecessary confusion that could be avoided by placing the power
to appoint counsel in the court being moved for relief.
321. State v. Nicholson, 183 Neb. 834, 837, 164 N.W.2d 652, 655, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
879 (1969).
322. State v. Pilgrim, 184 Neb. 457, 460, 168 N.W.2d 368, 370 (1969). But of. State v.
Craig, 181 Neb. 8, 10,146 N.W.2d 744,746 (1966) (when appeal presents a single
narrow and uncomplicated question of law, no abuse of discretion to refuse to
appoint appellate counsel when counsel had been appointed to represent
prisoner in the trial court). The seemingly contradictory holding in Craig
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records show the prisoner is entitled to no relief, a failure to ap-
point counsel is not an abuse of discretion.323 Appointment of
counsel on appeal is similarly discretionary with the district
court 24 and where there are no valid grounds for the appeal325 or,
at most, a single narrow and uncomplicated question of law, 326
there is no abuse of discretion in refusing to appoint appellate
counsel.
Appointment of counsel for indigent petitioners is desirable for
several reasons.327 As has been previously discussed, the assist-
ance of counsel is more likely to guarantee that claims are alleged
can be rationalized with Pilgrim on the basis that the issues would have al-
ready been developed in the trial court where the defendant had the benefit
of counsel and the supreme court would merely be reviewing those issues.
See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
323. State v. Birdwell, 188 Neb. 116, 117, 195 N.W.2d 502, 503 (1972); State v. Nichol-
son, 183 Neb. 834, 837, 164 N.W.2d 652, 655, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
324. Harris v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 483, 484, 176 N.W.2d 733, 734 (1970); State v. Jackson,
182 Neb. 472, 477, 155 N.W.2d 361, 364 (1968); State v. Williams, 182 Neb. 444,
446, 155 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1967); State v. Hizel, 181 Neb. 680, 684, 150 N.W.2d 217,
219, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 868 (1967); State v. Burnside, 181 Neb. 20, 22, 146
N.W.2d 754, 755, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 936 (1966).
325. State v. Taylor, 193 Neb. 388, 389-90, 227 N.W.2d 26,27 (1975); State v. Gero, 186
Neb. 379, 380, 183 N.W.2d 274, 275 (1971); State v. Jackson, 182 Neb. 472, 477, 155
N.W.2d 361, 364 (1968); State v. Williams, 182 Neb. 444, 446, 155 N.W.2d 377, 378
(1967); State v. Hizel, 181 Neb. 680, 684, 150 N.W.2d 217, 219, cert. denied, 389
U.S. 868 (1967); State v. Burnside, 181 Neb. 20, 22, 146 N.W.2d 754, 755, cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 936 (1966).
326. State v. Craig, 181 Neb. 8, 10, 146 N.W.2d 744, 746 (1966). See note 322 supra.
327. See generally Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2254, Adv.
Comm. Note to R. 8 (West 1977); STANDARDS, supra note 5, at § 4.4 and Com-
mentary Developments, supra note 5, at 1197-1202.
While there is no sixth amendment right to counsel in a collateral pro-
ceeding, see note 311 supra, several courts have recognized a limited due
process right to counsel in federal habeas corpus and section 2255 proceed-
ings when the prisoner shows a particularized need, such as mental incompe-
tence, or the matter is of such a difficult nature that the prisoner is unable to
adequately present his case to the court. Vandenades v. United States, 523
F.2d 1220, 1226 (5th Cir. 1975); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th
Cir. 1962). See generally Miller, The Right to Counsel in Collateral Proceed-
ings--Habeas Corpus, 15 How. L.J. 200 (1969); Note, Discretionary Appoint-
ment of Counsel at Post-Conviction Proceedings: An Unconstitutional Barrier
to Effective Post-Conviction Relief, 8 GEO. L. REV. 434 (1974); Note, Criminal
Procedure-Post Conviction Right to Counsel, 77 W. VA. L REV. 571, 589-93
(1975); Developments, supra note 5, at 1202-05. A number of other federal
courts have found an abuse of discretion in a failure to appoint counsel in
circumstances similar to those in which a due process right to counsel has
been held to exist. Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1970); Fleming
v. United States, 367 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1966). With the adoption of the
rules governing section 2254 cases and section 2255 proceedings, the appoint-
ment of counsel is mandatory when an evidentiary hearing is required and
permissible at any stage of the proceeding whenever the interests of justice
so requires. Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254, R. 8(c)
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in conformity with the fact pleading standard applicable to post
conviction proceedings 328 as well as that a prisoner's motion to va-
cate will contain all of his potentially viable claims. 329 This, in
turn, will relieve the courts of the responsibility in cases with de-
fective motions of reviewing the files and records for the existence
of inadequately or unpleaded constitutional claims.330 Besides
these obvious benefits, counsel is able to investigate the facts un-
derlying a claim, thus resulting in the drafting of pleadings better
suited to assist the court in its task of reviewing the motion and
fies and records of the case;33 1 the pleadings themselves are likely
to be clearer and shorter than those drafted by a pro se prisoner;332
and, it is hoped, frivolous claims will be culled by the attorney
(West 1977); Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C.A foll.
§ 2255, R. 8(c) (West Supp. 1978).
Although some state courts have found a constitutional requirement of
counsel in certain circumstances under their own post conviction remedy,
e.g., People v. Shipman, 397 P.2d 993, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965), the federal courts
have not yet imposed this requirement upon the states, Abraham v. Wain-
wright, 407 F.2d 826, 827-28 (5th Cir. 1969); Noble v. Sigler, 244 F. Supp. 445, 449
(D. Neb. 1964), affid, 351 F.2d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 853
(1966), nor have the state courts of Nebraska recognized this right, State v.
Burnside, 181 Neb. 20, 22, 146 N.W.2d 754, 755, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 936 (1966).
It should be noted, however, that the constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to provide "prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law," Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), and that this requirement exists despite any
provisions for appointing counsel for prisoners in state post conviction pro-
ceedings whose claims survive initial review by the courts. Id. at 828 n.17.
See generally Potuto, The Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds Have
Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207 (1977-1978).
Despite the absence of any constitutional requirement for the appoint-
ment of counsel in state post conviction proceedings, powerful pressures to
do so exist through the requirement of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963),
that an evidentiary hearing be provided a federal habeas petitioner when the
state courts have failed to afford him a full and fair fact hearing. Id. at 313.
See note 138 supra. One of the factors that almost all of the courts look to in
determining whether there was a full and fair hearing at the state level is
whether the prisoner had the assistance of counsel in that hearing. Lane v.
Henderson, 480 F.2d 544, 545 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948,
951 (8th Cir. 1970). Although Nebraska requires the appointment of counsel
for indigent prisoners whenever a justiciable issue of law or fact is presented
which would cover any situation in which an evidentiary hearing would be
required, those states not having a similar requirement run the risk of invol-
untarily delegating their fact finding function to the federal courts.
328. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
329. See text accompanying note 39 supra. But see STANDnADs, supra note 5, at 66
("[I]t is wasteful to appoint counsel to determine solely if the applicant has
some grounds for relief not stated in his original application.").
330. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
331. See STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 66; Developments, supra note 5, at 1198-99.
332. See, Developments, supra note 5.
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rather than by the courts. 333 Perhaps most importantly, the skilled
assistance of counsel will be helpful in overcoming the apparently
inimical attitudes of the courts to claims for post conviction re-
lief.334
Unfortunately, the appointment of counsel is only required
once a prisoner has successfully passed the pleading stage by
presenting a justiciable issue of law or fact. Prior to that stage,
when a prisoner is most in need of counsel in order to be able to
present such a claim, the sentencing court is permitted to dismiss
a defectively pleaded claim without providing counsel.
33 5
A justiciable issue having been pleaded, the appointment of
counsel for an indigent petitioner becomes mandatory. After the
pleading stage of the proceedings, the assistance of an attorney is
important for identifying issues, 336 briefing and arguing the law,
gathering evidence, interviewing witnesses, 33 7 utilizing discov-
ery,3 38 participating in pretrial conferences3 3 9 and conducting the
333. Id. at 1199.
334. The heuristic conclusion that the Nebraska courts are hostile to post convic-
tion claims admittedly finds little express support in the case law, but is
mainly based on an overall impression derived from the tone and tenor of the
numerous opinions arising under the Post Conviction Act. See, e.g., State v.
Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966). The compelling need for
counsel in such a situation is suggested by Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-
69 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelli-
gent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other-
wise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it
of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
335. See Lake, supra note 53, at 769-70.
336. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254, Adv. Comm. Note to
R. 8 (West 1977).
337. See, Developments, supra note 5, at 1198.
338. Id. at 1199; Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254, Adv. Comm.
Note to R. 8 (West 1977).
339. See, Developments, supra note 5, at 1199; Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28
U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254, Adv. Comm. Note to R. 8 (West 1977).
Pretrial conferences in Nebraska are authorized by NEB. Sup. CT. R. V,
Pre-Trial Procedure: Formulating Issues. For a discussion of the utility of
pretrial conferences in a post conviction context, see Carter, Pre-Trial Sug-
gestions for Section 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 391 (1963).
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evidentiary hearing.3 ° However, an indigent prisoner will never
reach this stage unless he has first successfully completed the diffi-
cult task of having pleaded a justiciable claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
The prior sections consist of a catalog of the actions the trial
courts may take in response to the filing of a motion to vacate
under the Nebraska Post Conviction Act. Throughout, suggestions
have been made for improvements in the administration of the
Act. This has been done with the objective in mind of better adapt-
ing the present procedure to the standard of providing a post con-
viction procedure that allows for the presentation and
consideration of all meritorious constitutional claims a prisoner
may have, but which at the same time will result in the swift and
expeditious denial of frivolous or meritless claims.M1 The changes
suggested may be summarized into two major recommendations:
1. Counsel should be appointed for all indigent post conviction
petitioners. This is the most efficacious step that can be
taken to insure that all meritorious claims are presented to
and considered by the courts.
2. The standards applied by the Nebraska courts in consider-
ing claims for post conviction relief should conform to those
applied by the federal courts to habeas corpus proceedings.
Uniformity in the standards applied will preserve the role of
the Nebraska courts as the initial enforcer of federal consti-
tutional standards as well as avoid the ill will that would be
generated by the federal courts' assumption of this role.
These two reforms, although not encompassing several of the sug-
gestions for change that have been made in the preceding pages,
will result in a post conviction procedure that is, in fact, "fair to the
person in custody and to the State of Nebraska." -2
340. See, Developments, supra note 5, at 1198.
341. See § H1 of text supra.
342. Judiciary Comm. Statemen supra note 2.
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